

UNITED



NATIONS

**REPORT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION ON KOREA
Volume II — Annexes**

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OFFICIAL RECORDS : FOURTH SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 9 (A/936/Add. 1)

LAKE SUCCESS

New York

1949

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NOTE

All United Nations documents are designated by symbols, i.e., capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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August 1949

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Annex I

TEXTS OF MAIN DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE COMMISSION'S EFFORTS IN LENDING ITS GOOD OFFICES TO BRING ABOUT UNIFICATION AND IN SEEKING TO REMOVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BARRIERS

A. Final report of Sub-Committee I and selected appendices (A/AC.26/37)

1. MAIN BODY OF THE REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I

Organization

1. Sub-Committee I was established by a resolution¹ of the Commission at its 5th meeting on 9 February.

The Sub-Committee originally consisted of the representatives of Australia, India and Syria. The Syrian representative departed from Seoul on 26 March. The representative of El Salvador was appointed to the Sub-Committee on 5 April. At its 2nd meeting the representative of India was elected Chairman of the Sub-Committee.

Terms of reference

2. At its 5th meeting, the Commission laid down the following terms of reference for Sub-Committee I:

(i) To utilize every available medium such as the Press, radio, public meetings and personal contact in order to impress upon the people throughout Korea the Commission's earnest desire to extend its good offices to remove existing barriers in Korea with a view to promoting unification;

(ii) To study the nature and extent of existing economic, social and other barriers in Korea; obtain full information from official as well as from unofficial sources concerning efforts to remove such barriers; and recommend methods for further improvement;

(iii) To explore means for promoting social and cultural relations among the people throughout Korea;

And, as a means of discharging the tasks enumerated in paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii),

(iv) To make immediate contact with North Korea with a view to arranging visits there for the Commission, its subsidiary bodies or individual members.

Meetings and visits

3. The Committee held 36 meetings, comprising 14 hearings and 22 regular meetings. It exchanged views with the President of the Republic of Korea and members of his Cabinet on 11 February 1949.²

The Committee visited the following points near the 38th parallel to study prevailing conditions along the parallel:

Kaesong and Paekchon on 19 February 1949; Iang Nam Ni, north of Tongdich, On-ni, on 25 May 1949; Chunchon on 15 June 1949; Ongjin on 26/27 June 1949.

A visit was made to the headquarters of the Korean Army and to a military hospital in Seoul on 23 June 1949, where captured prisoners and wounded soldiers were questioned regarding their political views, military training, etc.

The Committee inspected industrial establishments in and around Seoul between 5 and 8 May, to study the economic situation created by the division of the country at the 38th parallel.

Implementation of terms of reference

4. In its endeavour to promote the unification of Korea, the Committee undertook the following tasks:

(a) Attempted to contact North Korea with a view to arranging a visit of the Commission, subsidiary bodies, or individual members thereof through the following means:

A cable was sent to Lake Success requesting the good offices of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for establishing contact with the north (appendix (a) (i)). Subsequently, a letter was dispatched to Kim Il Sung via Hong Kong (appendix (a) (ii)). On 29 June 1949, Mr. Singh (India), as Chairman of Sub-Committee I, made a broadcast to the north explaining the objectives of the Commission and stressing its desire for contact.

(b) Gathered information and opinions from representative Koreans on the existing political, economic and social problems resulting particularly from the division of Korea.

(c) Solicited suggestions regarding possible means of eliminating existing barriers in Korea and effecting the unification of the country.

Suggestions and opinions gathered

5. To ascertain views regarding the problem of unification, the Committee interviewed a number of Koreans, officials³ as well as non-officials, and also talked with United States representatives in Seoul.

The Committee also took note of the deliberations of the National Assembly and studied local Press reports.

On completing its formal hearings on 3 June 1949, the Committee issued a Press statement⁴ inviting the general public to submit views regarding unification.

Policies of the Commission and the Government

6. Contact with North Korea; hearings before the Committee:

The Committee called upon the President of the Republic and his Cabinet on 20 February 1949 to find out what the Government expected of the Commission, and was informed that it

¹ A/AC.26/1.

² A/AC.26/SC.1/1.

³ The word "officials" in the present report refers to members of the Cabinet.

⁴ A/AC.26/30.

should seek contact with the north only through USSR channels.

Subsequently the Government expressed the view that the names of all persons to appear before the Commission should first be cleared by the Government. The Committee recommended to the Commission the rejection of both these propositions, and the Commission agreed.

Removal of barriers

7. The Committee visited a number of industrial establishments in South Korea.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Commission, on 28 May 1949, that legal trade between North and South Korea was officially banned as from 1 April 1949, but that mail was regularly exchanged between the two zones.⁵ The Committee learned, however, that some trade was being transacted between north and south via the port of Hong Kong. This method naturally resulted in excessively high costs to the consumer.

The Committee obtained impressive evidence of the economic inter-dependence of North and South Korea, and discovered that many firms operating in the south were suffering acutely from the lack of basic materials formerly obtained from the north. At present, supplies obtained from the Economic Co-operation Administration tend to alleviate this situation to a certain extent.

Situation on the 38th parallel

8. The Committee visited the principle points on the southern side of the 38th parallel,⁶ where fighting between the north and south had been reported. These points included Kaesong, Paekchon, Iang Nam Ni, Choon Chun and Ongjin.

Tension was evident at all these places, and on 15 June, during the visit to Choon Chun, the party that included two members of the Committee and two members of the Secretariat, accompanied by Korean military and police officials, was fired upon from the north and had to take cover. The Committee saw damage to a greater or lesser extent at all the points which it visited. At Paekchong it saw a police station which had been burnt down, at Iang Nam Ni it saw a police post which had been destroyed by mortar fire and in the distance nine burnt houses in a village. North of Chunchon it saw a village which had been completely evacuated.

On 26 June, the Committee went to Ongjin, near the western extremity of the parallel, reported to have been, for the previous two weeks, the scene of severe fighting. A visit was made to a nearby village, where more than half the dwellings had been burned to the ground. A number of people were said to have been kidnapped from that village, by raiders from the north.

Later, the Committee witnessed artillery fire by the opposing armies fighting on Gahchi Hill.

A military hospital was inspected, and two young soldiers who had surrendered from the north were interviewed.

Information gathered from a few North Korean soldiers at Ongjin indicated that they were generally ignorant about the situation in both North and South Korea. According to them, the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Commission were "tools of American imperialism". They had also been told by their officers that their brethren in South Korea were yearning for the northern army to come down and liberate them from that yoke.

Summary of views expressed before the Committee

9. The United States of America and the USSR are primarily responsible for the division of the country, and should therefore be called upon to lend their good offices for the unification.

Officials in South Korea have advocated the holding of general elections in North Korea under United Nations supervision to elect one hundred representatives from North Korea to join the present National Assembly in Seoul.

A number of people recommended a conference between representatives of north and south. Some advocated a conference on an official level between the regimes of north and south, while others suggested a conference of non-officials, representatives of various political parties in both zones, in which officials might participate but only as observers. Such a conference might seek to arrive at basic agreements on unification, and might recommend a general election throughout Korea on the expiration of the term of office of the present National Assembly (May 1950). It was also proposed that a conference of political leaders in the south should be held in order to strengthen the basic political structure of the Government of the Republic, prior to convening a north-south conference.

With regard to economic intercourse between the north and the south the Government expressed the view that economic channels between the two zones had been exploited by the north for subversive political purposes. The Government of the Republic had therefore officially banned any economic intercourse between north and south. This view, however, was not shared by non-officials, who felt the desirability and indeed the urgent necessity, of the resumption of trade between the two zones.

The United Nations should take control of all the police and armed forces now in the service of North and South Korean authorities until a unified security force is set up by a central national government.⁷

A Korean advisory group might be established to assist the Commission in the solution of Korea's problems.

Findings

10. The difficulty in establishing direct contact with North Korea constituted a major obstacle for the Committee in its attempt to implement its terms of reference. In view of the existing tension at the 38th parallel, and the persistently hostile attitude of North Korea towards the Commission as reflected in the Pyongyang broadcasts,⁸

⁵ A/AC.26/SC.1/23.

⁶ For reports on these trips see A/AC.26/37, appendix V.

⁷ A/AC.26/SC.2/5, annex 2.

⁸ For a specimen Pyongyang broadcast regarding the Commission, see A/AC.26/37, annex VI, appendix I.

the Committee discounted the possibility of direct physical penetration into the northern zone without prior clearance from the authorities.

On the basis of its formal hearings and general observations, the Committee has made the following findings:

(1) "There is an overwhelming desire for unification among Koreans.

(2) "The division of the nation has generated a feeling of political frustration, bitterness and restlessness. Despite isolated and indirect references to the possibility of unification by the use of force, the desire for unification by peaceful means remains preponderant. Many Koreans in the south look to the United Nations Commission for the solution of their problems. Tension however has been exacerbated by the violence of propaganda.

(3) "Despite the failure of the north-south conference of April 1948, the idea of a renewed attempt in this direction still persists and remains the subject of strong disagreement between the Government on the one hand and some members of the National Assembly and other political leaders on the other hand.

(4) "The division of Korea has resulted in adverse economic consequences for the south, where the Committee observed the economic conditions. The existing ban on normal trade between the two zones is a serious impediment in the way of the unification of the country.

(5) "The divergence of views between the Government and leaders outside it on the problem of unification has caused a deterioration of mutual confidence between them which may prejudice the prospects of unification. This increase in political tension is evidenced by the recent arrest of eleven members of the National Assembly and the assassination of Mr. Kim Koo—a leading political figure and eminent patriot—on 26 June 1949. Improvement in the political atmosphere would enhance the possibilities of unification.

(6) "The political relationship between the United States and the USSR has a direct and vital bearing upon the fundamental problems of Korea."

Recommendations

11. The Commission should:

(1) "Authorize the Committee to continue exploring all possible means of effecting unification;

(2) "Report to the General Assembly its view that an important means of contributing to the prospect of unification would be the achievement of a broader basis of popular support for the Government of the Republic;

(3) "Make known its willingness and readiness to assist in any discussions between representatives of the north and the south to consider plans and possibilities for the unification of Korea;

(4) "Offer its assistance for the purpose of a resumption of legitimate trade between north and south on a trial basis;

(5) "Recommend the cessation of all propaganda—emanating from within or outside of Korea—designed to inflame ill-feeling between

the two zones of Korea, as being highly detrimental to the prospects of unification;

(6) "Bring to the attention of the Governments of the United States and the USSR, through the General Assembly, their original responsibility for the present division of Korea and urgently exhort them continually to use their good offices in furthering the unification of Korea on the basis of independence and the principles approved by the United Nations."

2. APPENDICES

(a) CONTACT WITH NORTH KOREA

(i) *Telegram to the Secretary-General for transmittal to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

(The text appears in chapter II, paragraph 20, of the report of the Commission: A/936, vol. I.)

(ii) *Letter to General Kim Il Sung*

(The text appears in chapter II, paragraph 22, of the report of the Commission: A/936, vol. I.)

(b) SURVEY OF INFORMATION AND OPINIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF UNIFICATION

1. On 2 March 1949, the Commission adopted the report of the Sub-Committee.

Paragraph 1 of this report⁹ authorizes the Committee "to gather information from and obtain the opinions of personalities on problems arising out of the division of Korea and on possible methods for removing existing economic, social and other barriers, with a view to promoting unification".

Paragraph 2 listed the names of the first group of persons to be interviewed at Committee hearings and paragraph 3 set forth the following general questions to be asked at the hearings:

(i) What are your views concerning the problem of unification?

(ii) What steps, if any, have been taken to promote unification since the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea, and what steps should be taken in this direction?

(iii) To what extent is it possible to remove economic, social and other barriers in Korea?

2. From 3 March to 2 June 1949, the Committee interviewed the following officials and non-officials:

Lee Bum Suk, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense,

Kim Yak Soo, Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly,

Pak Kun Oong, Former member of the Interim Legislative Assembly,

Yim Louise, Minister of Commerce and Industry,

A. C. Bunce, Chief of the Korean Mission, US Economic Co-operation Administration,

Lee Eung Jun, Major-General, Chief of Staff, Korean Army,

Kim To Yeun, Minister of Finance,

⁹ A/AC.26/7.

Kimm Kiusic, Chairman, National Independence Federation,

Kim Pyung Hoi, Member of the National Assembly,

Sul Eui Sik, Publisher of the *Sai Han Minbo*,

Kim Pyung Yon,¹⁰ Governor of the Pyongan Namdo Province (North Korea),

Kim Koo, Chairman, Korean Independence Party,

Kwon Yun Ho, Protestant leader,

Lee Chung Chun, General, Member of the National Assembly.

At hearings of Sub-Committee II members of Sub-Committee I consulted the following persons regarding their views on the problem of unification:

Sin Ik Hi, Chairman of the National Assembly,

Paik L. G., President, Chosen Christian College,

Yun Chi Yung, Former Minister of the Interior,

Bishop Ro, Vicar Apostolic of Seoul,

Kim Bup Rin, President of Dong Kook University,

Cho So Ang, Chairman of the Socialist Party,

Limb B. C., Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Kim Hyo Suk, Minister of the Interior.

3. On 11 February 1949, the Committee exchanged views with President Syngman Rhee and his Cabinet.¹¹

4. For background material the Committee used the National Assembly debates and pertinent articles in the local Press.

5. Since the Committee has not been able to visit North Korea, its activities have been necessarily confined to the south; and even in the south it was able to interview only a small number of people representing mainly the intelligentsia. However, the Committee has regularly examined the intercepts of radio broadcasts from Pyongyang (North Korea), which definitely reveal a non-co-operative and hostile attitude toward the Commission.

Views concerning the problem of unification

(a) Korean officials, Executive Branch

1. The USSR was primarily responsible for the establishment of the 38th parallel, and in sponsoring a puppet regime in violation of the General Assembly's resolutions of 14 November 1947 and 12 December 1948, it jeopardized all chances for the unification of Korea.

2. The real source of authority in the north was exercised by the USSR and not by the Korean regime. Therefore, any attempt to unify Korea by peaceful means must be made by negotiating with the Soviet Union and not with the regime in the north.¹²

3. However, the United States was partly responsible for the unfortunate situation in Korea

¹⁰ Appointed by the Government of the Republic of Korea.

¹¹ A/AC.26/SC.1/1.

¹² A/AC.26/SC.1/1, A/AC.26/23.

at the present time because it had failed in the past to check communist infiltration and had even encouraged compromises with the communists.¹³

All previous attempts for unification made by the United States had ended in failure.¹⁴ The Government of the Republic refused to negotiate with the northern regime as it considered it illegal.

4. The Korean Government sought unification by peaceful means. Since, however, it was faced with a menace of communism from the north, it might have to meet force with force; and for defensive purposes it needed an adequate supply of weapons.¹⁵

5. The Korean Government favored the retention of American armed forces in Korea until its own security forces were adequate to resist aggression from the north.¹⁶

(b) Members of the National Assembly

1. Two members of the National Assembly maintained that the presence of foreign troops in Korea retarded unification, and subsequently this view was also supported by 63 members of the National Assembly in a petition addressed to the Commission on 18 March 1949.¹⁷

Mr. Kim Yak Soo believed that the 38th parallel constituted a demarcation line in the rival struggles of the United States and the USSR. Both he and General Lee Chung Chun held the view that an understanding between the United States and the USSR was an indispensable prerequisite in attempting to solve the problems of Korea. Meanwhile, Koreans themselves should exert their own efforts toward unification.¹⁸

2. Mr. Kim Pyung Hoi believed in unification without the participation of foreign Powers although their co-operation with the United Nations in achieving unification was desirable. He advocated the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.¹⁹

(c) Non-official persons

1. The majority of persons consulted expressed the view that the problem of unification stemmed from the differences which existed between the United States and the USSR and that unification depended largely upon an understanding between these nations.

2. The Powers that originally created the division of Korea must assume moral responsibility for the removal of the barriers. They had further accentuated the differences by instituting their two respective economic, political and military systems.

3. Mr. Kimm Kiusic held the view that the existence of an illegal *de facto* regime in the north with which neither the United Nations nor the Government of the Republic was prepared to negotiate formally further added to the difficul-

¹³ A/AC.26/SR.13, page 3; Press release 2A, 7 May 1949, Office of Public Information, Seoul; A/AC.26/23.

¹⁴ A/AC.26/23.

¹⁵ Statement of President Rhee, Press release 2A, 7 May 1949, Office of Public Information, Seoul.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ A/AC.26/NC.2.

¹⁸ A/AC.26/SC.1/8 and A/AC.26/SC.1/26.

¹⁹ A/AC.26/SC.1/18.

ties.²⁰ He advocated a conference between non-official leaders of north and south, under the supervision of the Commission, in which officials from both sides could participate as mere observers. He did not appear too sanguine about the prospect of such a conference but thought the attempt well worthwhile.

4. Mr. Kim Koo and Mr. Kwon Yun Ho shared in substance Mr. Kimm Kiusic's views and added that the assistance of the Commission would be necessary to ensure the security of such a conference.

5. General Lee Chung Chun did not advocate a north-south conference. He looked to the Commission for a solution to the problem of unification.

Steps taken by the Government to promote unification

(a) Korean officials, Executive Branch

1. The Government has kept 100 seats vacant in the National Assembly to be filled by representatives from the north. It has appointed governors for the five provinces in the north.²¹ These officials however had not been able to assume their posts in North Korea.

2. Until December 1948, the Government sought to engage in direct legal barter trade with the north. The North Korean authorities had confiscated a ship (Yang Do Whan) which had proceeded to the north under a barter trade agreement. The north exploited commercial channels for subversive propaganda. Trade between the south and the north was officially banned by the Korean Government and it did not intend to lift its ban.^{22 23}

3. The Government had appealed to Koreans in the north for their support for unification.²⁴

4. Colonel B. C. Limb, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the removal of the 38th parallel as a barrier was possible only through the co-operation of north and south. Since such co-operation was impossible in view of the non-co-operative attitude of the north, unification must precede co-operation between the two zones.²⁵

5. Mr. Lee Bum Suk, Prime Minister, stated that the Government did not wish to have any dealings with the communists since in the first place, no compromise with communism was possible. Furthermore, it would be detrimental to the growth of democracy in the south. The Government preferred to contact the people in the north rather than their leaders.²⁶

(b) Members of the National Assembly

1. Mr. Kim Pyung Hoi maintained that the Government had done nothing to promote Korean unification. On the contrary the Government had retarded unification by concluding an economic

compact with the United States and by requesting the retention of American troops in Korea.²⁷

(c) Non-official persons

1. In the opinion of the majority of non-officials no significant steps had been taken by the Government to promote unification. Mr. Pak Kum Oong felt that since the establishment of the Republic of Korea and of a regime in the north, differences had become intensified. He attributed these differences largely to personal rivalries and to a desire for political power among the leaders.²⁸

2. Mr. Sul Eui Sik also thought that the Government had made no real efforts to attain unification. The Government had constantly pursued an ultra-pro-American policy, and it was not disposed to deal with the Soviet Union or the North Korean regime which it persistently ignored.²⁹

3. Mr. Kimm Kiusic stated, that as a step toward unification, the three major political parties³⁰ had recently merged, and efforts were being made to bring other parties into this group. In his view it was of primary importance to consolidate the "non-left" political parties *vis-à-vis* the left.³¹

Proposed plans for unification

(a) Korean officials, Executive Branch

1. On 3 March 1949, Colonel B. C. Limb, Minister of Foreign Affairs,³² suggested that the Commission should take the following steps:

(i) Persuade the Soviet Union to dissolve the North Korean "puppet" government, as well as all political parties and social organizations thereof, release political prisoners held in the north and guarantee safe conduct across the parallel, thus enabling the Korean Government to conduct general elections in North Korea under the supervision of the United Nations Commission.

(ii) Supervise the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Soviet Army, the Chinese Communist Army, guerrilla troops and other similar military units or groups from North Korea.

(iii) Lend its good offices for the immediate dissolution of the "People's Army" and security forces of the north.

2. The Government also stated that any international agreement or treaties concluded by the north and any subsequent administrative policies adopted without the approval of the Korean Government should be declared null and void.

All assets removed from Korea by the Soviet Army should be returned or reimbursement made therefor.

3. In general, the Government was opposed to any proposal for unification except its own. It even indicated its disapproval of the plans made by some of the members of the National Assembly.

²⁰ A/AC.26/SC.1/17.

²¹ A/AC.26/SC.1/16, page 4.

²² A/AC.26/SC.1/1, page 4; A/AC.26/SC.1/10; A/AC.26/W.6.

²³ There is a weekly exchange of mail across the 38th parallel (A/AC.26/SC.2/12, page 12).

²⁴ A/AC.26/SC.2/12, page 12.

²⁵ A/AC.26/SC.2/12, page 13.

²⁶ A/AC.26/SC.1/6.

²⁷ A/AC.26/SC.1/18.

²⁸ A/AC.26/SC.1/9.

²⁹ A/AC.26/SC.1/20.

³⁰ The National Independence Federation, the Korean Independence Party had recently merged to form the "society for the acceleration of unified independence," A/AC.26/SC.1/17, page 6.

³¹ A/AC.26/SC.1/17, page 6.

³² A/AC.26/9.

The Government has indicated its disapproval of certain proposals recommended by certain members of the National Assembly and other political leaders.

4. President Rhee was opposed to any attempts by the Commission to make direct contact with the authorities in the north since in his view it would imply recognition of the regime. Instead the Commission should request the USSR for facilities to visit the north. The Commission should verify the alleged withdrawal of the USSR troops and subsequently demand the dissolution of the northern regime on grounds of its illegality.³³

5. Mr. Lee Bum Sak, the Prime Minister, advocated strengthening the military forces of the Republic for parity with the north.³⁴ This view, however, was not shared by other officials, who felt that the south was in a position to defend itself against any possible attack from the north.

All officials, however, favoured the retention of United States troops in South Korea, until its security forces were strengthened and adequate.

6. The Government was specially opposed to the following proposals made to the Commission:

(a) Conference of leaders of the north and south

The Government felt that no useful purpose would be served even if a conference could be convened. In the light of past experience such a conference would not only fail to achieve constructive results but would actually strengthen the Communists and weaken democratic government in Korea.³⁵

(b) Withdrawal of United States troops

Dr. Chough Pyong Ok of the Korean Government Liaison Committee expressed dissatisfaction with a recent proposal made by a group of National Assembly representatives demanding the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops,³⁶ on the grounds that their action was calculated to cause unrest in the south.³⁷

"On 7 February 1949, President Rhee appeared before the National Assembly, and again expressed his strong disapproval of the proposed resolution demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops. In the course of his speech, he said: 'if you (the National Assembly) insist on adhering to the so-called simultaneous and immediate withdrawal of foreign troops it will surely result in nothing but destruction.' He added that if United States troops left Korea, the way would be paved for the penetration of Soviet troops into the south."³⁸

(b) Members of the National Assembly

1. According to Mr. Shin Ik Hi, Chairman of the National Assembly, the overwhelming ma-

jority of the Assembly representatives believed that the only means of unification was to fill the vacant seats in the National Assembly for representatives of the north.³⁹

2. Mr. Kim Pyung Hoi suggested that the Commission should prepare a plan to make Korea the "Switzerland of Asia," and submit this plan to the United States and to the USSR. Troop withdrawal, however, was a primary prerequisite to such a plan.

The Commission might also request the United States and the USSR to sponsor a north-south conference, or alternatively the United Nations Commission might convene a conference of representatives of the Republic of Korea and the North Korean People's Government.

3. If it proved impossible to negotiate with the north, then the people of South Korea should prepare the political basis for unification. Steps should be taken for protection of human rights and partisan favouritism should be abolished. Improved conditions in the south would attract the people of the north. Korea could not be unified without negotiations with the "communists" of North Korea.⁴⁰

(c) Non-official persons

1. Mr. Kimm Kiusic advocated a conference between north and south and suggested the establishment of a small advisory or consultative group to assist the Commission in its work.⁴¹

2. Mr. Sul Eui Sik recommended that the Korean Government and the northern regime should appoint an election committee to be composed of representatives including non-officials of both zones. This committee would organize a nation-wide election to establish a national government.

Failing this he favoured the conference plan, as well as the proposal to establish an advisory group⁴² or consultative group proposed by Mr. Kimm Kiusic.

3. Mr. Cho So Ang suggested that the Commission should request the United States and the USSR to arrange a north-south conference. Both he and Mr. Sul believed that a prerequisite to unification was an understanding between the United States and the USSR in respect to the Korean problem.⁴³

4. Mr. Pak Kun Oong favored a plan for unification giving due consideration to the legal aspect of the Korean problem and safeguarding the prestige of the leaders of the south and north as well as of the United States and USSR Governments.⁴⁴

5. Mr. Kim Koo supported the idea of a north-south conference. He also made the following alternative proposals:

The Commission should:

(i) Supervise elections in the north to fill the 100 seats set aside by the National Assembly;

³³ A/AC.26/SC.1/1.

³⁴ A/AC.26/SC.1/6.

³⁵ A/AC.26/SC.1/1, A/AC.26/SC.1/16, page 5, A/AC.26/23.

³⁶ Resolution introduced at the 22nd session of the National Assembly, 4 February 1949. In this connexion also see A/AC.26/NC.2, petition to the Commission from sixty-two National Assembly members concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

³⁷ A/AC.26/W.6.

³⁸ Report of the 24th session, National Assembly, 7 February 1949.

³⁹ A/AC.26/SC.2/2, page 6.

⁴⁰ A/AC.26/SC.1/18.

⁴¹ A/AC.26/SC.1/17.

⁴² A/AC.26/SC.1/20.

⁴³ A/AC.26/SC.2/11.

⁴⁴ A/AC.26/SC.1/9.

(ii) Or supervise elections in the whole country without disturbing the Government of the Republic;

(iii) Or revert to the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 November 1947 and hold general elections in the whole country.

However, he believed that a preliminary north-south conference should precede any general elections.

Removal of economic, social, and other barriers

In the present circumstances, the Government disfavoured and prohibited economic intercourse between the north and the south.

(a) Members of the National Assembly

1. Mr. Kim Yak Soo stated that illegal commerce between the south and the north was carried on via Hong Kong and he advocated legalization and extension of trade between the two zones. In his judgment cultural intercourse was more difficult because of its political implications.⁴⁵

(c) Non-official persons

1. The general view was that while the removal of economic, social and other barriers would constitute a major step toward unification, the present political situation almost precluded any possibility of the elimination of such barriers in the foreseeable future.

2. Dr. A. C. Bunce, Chief of the United States Economic Co-operation Administration in Korea, pointed out that previous attempts to promote economic intercourse with the north had failed, and he saw no likelihood of an improvement in the present situation.⁴⁶

3. Mr. Kimm Kiusic foresaw no possibility of economic, social or cultural intercourse without the removal of the barrier of the 38th parallel.⁴⁷

4. Mr. Cho So Ang suggested that barriers could be removed by legalizing trade and encouraging contacts between families split between the south and the north.⁴⁸

5. Mr. Kim Koo did not know why the Government had prohibited trade between the two zones. He thought that north-south trade should be encouraged rather than halted.

6. Mr. Kwon Yun Ho had little hope of improving cultural and economic relations between the two zones.

A summary of this survey is contained in document A/AC.26/SC.1/28.

B. Excerpts from the hearing of Mr. Arthur C. Bunce, Chief of the Korean Mission, United States Economic Co-operation Administration, and report on important economic developments submitted by him (A/AC.26/SC.1/13)

1. EXCERPTS FROM THE HEARING OF MR. ARTHUR C. BUNCE

The CHAIRMAN introduced Dr. A. C. Bunce, Chief of the Korean Mission of the United States

Economic Co-operation Administration, who was accompanied by Mr. R. A. Kinney, his Special Assistant.

In connexion with section 3 (2) of his report (see appendix), Dr. Bunce pointed out that the cost of cereal imports into South Korea had declined from \$50 million in the fiscal year 1947 to \$40 million in the fiscal year 1948, and to \$15 million in the fiscal year 1949. It was hoped that next year South Korea would be on an export basis in rice.

The CHAIRMAN asked for Dr. Bunce's opinion on whether the standard of living might be higher in North Korea than in South Korea, since most of the basic industries were located in the north.

Dr. BUNCE replied that it was difficult to answer yes or no. Unless food was being exported, the amount *per capita* should be higher in the north. That area also possessed most of the electric power, coal, iron and steel and fertilizer industries. But South Korea had more consumers' goods, such as textiles, rubber shoes, light bulbs and small machine tools.

The CHAIRMAN wondered whether the main cause for refugees coming to the south was a political one.

Dr. BUNCE said he had met a large number of refugees, of whom he had known many previously during his stay of six years in North Korea. The refugees could be divided into several categories. First, there were those who felt politically oppressed, including ministers and other Christians who believed they were losing religious freedom, and a large group who were antagonistic to Russian occupation and were unwilling to cooperate with the USSR Command.

A second group consisted of middle-class merchants who had found themselves unable to make a living because of trade restrictions, and who came south because of pressure of economic circumstances.

A third group was composed of farmers dissatisfied with land reforms in the north.

Dr. Bunce explained that, prior to the end of the war, farm tenancy was much more extensive in South Korea than in North Korea, where it probably did not exceed 50 per cent. All land in the north, including that formerly farmed by tenants and that operated by the owners, had reverted to the Central Committee of the so-called government, to be re-distributed to farmers. The tenants had not been charged for the land but had found that taxes, which were supposed to be 23 to 27 per cent of output, actually ranged from 33 to 50 per cent of production. The tax rates were based on a year of good crops rather than on actual current production. Despite widespread floods in 1946, which destroyed a portion of the crops, taxes in that year were assessed on the basis of the previous year's crops. Consequently many farmers, including farmers who had formerly owned their farms, had become destitute through the winter. Having been landowners before, they felt a certain antagonism toward the new regime and many had come to South Korea.

The CHAIRMAN inquired whether Dr. Bunce considered that the USSR economic administration in North Korea had been designed to benefit the zone itself or the USSR.

⁴⁵ A/AC.26/SC.1/8, page 3.

⁴⁶ A/AC.26/SC.1/13.

⁴⁷ A/AC.26/SC.1/17, page 11.

⁴⁸ A/AC.26/SC.2/11, page 3.

Dr. BUNCE said the Russians during their occupation had brought some good technicians into North Korea, to help re-establish and develop the industries of that area. Mr. Pauley, United States representative who had investigated removals of plants and equipment from North Korea, had found that in general the reports of such removals were exaggerated. Machine tools and some power equipment had been removed, but there had been nothing like the stripping of industrial machinery which had occurred in Manchuria.

There had been reports from North Korea that the People's Republic had founded USSR-Korean joint stock companies and the Russians and Koreans were operating them as joint enterprises on a fifty-fifty ownership basis.

The CHAIRMAN asked how soon South Korea would be able to maintain its present economic level without United States aid, as long as the country remained divided.

Dr. BUNCE replied that if South Korea were deprived of American aid in the next fiscal year, it would suffer an extreme set-back in production and living standards within a year, and food riots would probably result. Without imported fertilizer, South Korea could not possibly grow enough cereals to meet its food needs.

The CHAIRMAN asked how long the United States proposed to continue its assistance to Korea.

Dr. BUNCE replied that the ECA plans were based on a long-range programme, but that commitments could not be made for more than a year at a time because they were dependent upon Congressional appropriations. Objective estimates indicated that if the rehabilitation programme could be carried on for an additional three years, South Korea could not only maintain but improve its standard of living within five years, though its foreign exchange balance might continue to show an annual shortage of 30 to 40 million dollars. For the thirty-five years prior to Japan's surrender in 1945, Korea had usually imported more than it exported, and the Japanese had made up the balance of payments by taking over ownership of an even larger portion of Korea's basic resources.

If Korea were united, imports and exports could be balanced at a figure of about \$80 million each year, and Korea would not have to go into debt or be economically dependent upon any other country.

The CHAIRMAN asked what were the prospects of commercial intercourse between North and South Korea as long as the country remained divided.

Dr. BUNCE said such exchange was very difficult. In its one attempt to promote such trade, the Military Government had deposited money in an escrow account in Japan and had released goods to a private trader. This trader had obtained a ship and taken the goods north to Hungnam. There the goods had been taken off and the ship loaded with fertilizer, but before the ship left port, the crew was seized and jailed and the ship itself confiscated. Ten of the crew had made their way to South Korea within three or four weeks, and others later.

Since the ship had been confiscated two days after the recognition of the Republic of Korea by

the United Nations General Assembly, it might have been done in retaliation, but this was not certain.

The CHAIRMAN asked if Dr. Bunce felt that the present Government in South Korea was carrying out economic reforms energetically enough to satisfy the people.

Dr. BUNCE said he had been frankly amazed at the tremendous progress made since the Government came to power. When he had left Korea last year for a short period, he had not believed that it was possible to attain such increases in production of coal and electric power. Since his return the attitude displayed by the Korean people in attempting to solve their problems had increased his confidence.

The CHAIRMAN inquired what per cent of the Korean budget was spent on military and police forces.

Dr. BUNCE referred to the proposed budget for the fiscal year 1949-50, which had just been released. Out of a total budget of over 196 thousand million *won*, the Ministry of National Defence was to be allotted some 12 thousand million *won* (for ordinary expenses, plus 1,666,533,800 *won* for extraordinary expenses), and the Ministry of Home Affairs, which included the police department, was to receive some 5 thousand million *won* for ordinary expenses, plus 10,026,004,588 *won* for extraordinary expenses.

In reply to another question by the Chairman, he said that the largest single item in the budget was an appropriation of over 23 billion *won* for transportation. This included the cost of building a new spur railroad to increase production and distribution of coal.

Dr. LIU (China) asked what were the causes of the poor rice collections in the current year, which were reported to be only 50 per cent of the amount to be collected.

Dr. BUNCE said that the Military Government had carried on a series of unpopular but successful compulsory collection programmes.

The Korean Government, on the other hand, had adopted a programme of voluntary grain contributions, on the ground that a democracy should not force people to sell their produce. No quotas were allocated, and farmers were told that they might sell all they could above their own needs. The Government had appealed for contributions, but these had been low on account of its failure to establish quotas. The Prime Minister had commented on the results by saying to the Americans: "You taught us too much democracy".

The CHAIRMAN asked whether the poor rice and grain collections were responsible for the impending stoppage of rations in cities like Seoul.

Dr. BUNCE replied that they were directly responsible.

The CHAIRMAN asked if serious consequences might be expected.

Dr. BUNCE said this would depend on whether rice had been smuggled out or was still on hand. Indications were that prices might not rise too much unless profiteers got hold of the rice and held it off the market; if that were allowed to

happen the price would rise and they would reap billions in profits. The Government had promised to take strong action against grain speculators. On the other hand, if the rice were held by a large number of small dealers, prices would be kept within bounds and people would not suffer too much.

The CHAIRMAN inquired as to the extent of tenancy and the average size of farm holdings.

Mr. KINNEY said that tenant farmers constituted only about 40 per cent of the farm population of South Korea at present. The average holding per farm household was one *chungbo*, or about two and a half acres, per farm.

Dr. BUNCE observed that accurate figures on farm tenancy were hard to obtain, but those available indicated that tenancy had been reduced from 73 per cent of the cultivated area in 1945 to between 40 and 45 per cent at present.

The CHAIRMAN asked if it were being progressively reduced.

Mr. KINNEY replied that at present most large landlords were anxious to sell because of the imminence of enactment of a land reform programme, whereas tenants wished to wait until such a programme was in force. The National Assembly at present had under consideration a measure whereby the cost of land purchased by farmers would be approximately the value of three annual crops; but there was strong sentiment in the Assembly to aid the farmers by reducing this price. It was expected that the bill would be passed in the current month, and undoubtedly its terms would be generally favourable to farm tenants.

The CHAIRMAN inquired as to the extent of foreign capital investments in Korea.

Dr. BUNCE replied that there were practically none at present, except for a few oil storage and other facilities. The Chinese had the largest remaining holdings. There had been some capital investment by British and Americans, but the Japanese had liquidated practically all foreign holdings but their own. There was no ownership by foreign capital of any of the country's basic resources in South Korea.

The Military Government had found that 80 per cent of the total industrial corporate wealth of the country was in Japanese hands. It had declared that this wealth must be held in trust for the Korean people, and had prohibited sale of large industrial properties to private investors, even to Koreans.

The Korean Government itself would have to decide whether to socialize or to sell such large industries.

The CHAIRMAN asked what was the financial status of the Korean Government, and whether it had a large public debt.

Dr. BUNCE replied that its financial status was very sound. It had no public debt, but only an internal debt to itself. Inflation was much abated. He believed that after a year and a half of constructive effort, production might be stabilized, the national economy balanced, and a permanent foreign exchange rate established.

The Japanese had increased the circulation of currency to a tremendous degree (from 4 to 8 thousand million *won* in one month following surrender in August-September 1945). Terrified lest law enforcement break down and the Koreans attack them, many Japanese employers had paid their workers a year's salary as insurance for their own safety, and this practice might have been a significant factor in preventing widespread attacks upon the Japanese immediately following Japan's surrender.

The whole system of taxation and law enforcement had been dominated by the Japanese, and had broken down when they were ordered to leave Korea. Industries almost without exception had come to a complete standstill, all mills had closed, and the workers were celebrating their liberation. There were no tax collection agencies, and the only way to finance the administration was to increase the circulation of currency. The Korean Government's Bank of Chosun currency issue was almost 39 thousand million *won* at present.

The United States authorities had settled with the Korean Government in US dollars for occupation costs of the United States Army in *won*. \$25 million had been turned over to the Korean Government and at present it had a reserve of 28 million US dollars, while it had no foreign debts payable in "hard currencies".

The Government now had the problem of balancing its budget so as to stop the increase in the circulation of currency. As the programme of ECA imports was accomplished, and the imported commodities sold by the Korean Government, the Korean Government was to set up a counterpart fund from the *won* proceeds of the sale of ECA goods. This counterpart fund could not be used without the authority of the ECA. To the extent that it would collect from the Korean people for these imported supplies, the Korean Government could bring in a tremendous quantity of *won*. Collections for imported goods had been poor in the past but they were expected to improve.

The CHAIRMAN wondered if anything had been done to integrate the economy of Korea with that of Japan.

Dr. BUNCE cited the recent trade agreement with the occupation authorities in Japan. In the past, 80 to 90 per cent of all Korean exports had gone to Japan, but now Japan imported little from Korea, largely because it was trying to build up its own foreign exchange. It was hoped that in the future many of the goods which Korea needed could be obtained from Japan. If ECA dollars went to Japan for machinery, Korea would get more for its money, and Japan would be helped toward recovery; there would be mutual advantages.

The CHAIRMAN asked if the Korean Government had assumed any financial responsibility in connexion with activities of the American Mission in Korea.

Dr. BUNCE said the ECA had worked in close co-operation with the Korean Government, which had drafted its rehabilitation programme with the aid of American consultants. The new Government had established an Office of Planning which had considered the preliminary ECA budget, and

at least thirty Korean officials had consulted ECA officials in revising it. The programme of aid was essentially a joint Korean-American project.

The CHAIRMAN said he understood that the Government was anxious to buy more military equipment, especially from the United States. Did this seem warranted in view of Korea's economic situation?

Dr. BUNCE said this was a difficult problem. Without security in South Korea the programme of economic aid could not possibly succeed. At the same time excessive military expenditures would defeat the objectives of the economic aid programme. It must be recognized that certain essential military needs must be met, but also that military expenditures would do nothing to rebuild industry and increase production. The two needs must be considered together.

In reply to a question by Mr. MAGAÑA (El Salvador), Dr. BUNCE said the Korean Government was empowered to open trade with any country; it already had considerable trade with Japan, the Netherlands East Indies, Hong Kong, the United States, China and the Philippines, and the objective was to expand its total volume of trade. The policy of ECA was to purchase goods from any country which offered the lowest price.

The CHAIRMAN asked if Dr. Bunce would suggest any steps the Commission might take to break down economic barriers between North and South Korea.

Dr. BUNCE said he had prepared his detailed report in order to give the Commission the background of the repeated unsuccessful attempts made by United States authorities to lessen economic barriers. Whether the Commission might succeed would depend on the extent to which the People's Committee in Pyongyang, representing the people of North Korea, would feel free to work with the Commission toward attainment of a truly independent Korea.

The PRINCIPAL SECRETARY had four questions. First, how had the enormous number of northern 'refugees been absorbed into the economy of South Korea?

Dr. BUNCE said their absorption had created a serious problem. The original tendency for most of them to settle in Seoul had brought a sharp population increase and an acute housing shortage in the past few years. To offset this trend, a policy had been developed of lodging them temporarily in camps, where they were vaccinated and inoculated, then moving them to rural areas where they had relatives.

A consistent attempt had been made to distribute refugees throughout rural areas and small towns, but in spite of it the population of Seoul had increased tremendously.

The PRINCIPAL SECRETARY'S second question was whether there had been any invisible import of capital from North Korea, China or Manchuria.

Dr. BUNCE said most of the refugees had brought practically nothing with them except a few personal belongings. Refugees from Japan had been limited as to amount of baggage. The result had been an influx of population but not of capital.

The PRINCIPAL SECRETARY wondered what hope there was of establishing fertilizer production in the south.

Dr. BUNCE said it was hoped this would be possible after a more thorough survey of the extent of local coal deposits. If sufficient coal were available, thermal electric power plants could be developed to provide power for fertilizer manufacture, though it was not likely that this could be done in the next fiscal year. If the aid programme continued, there was hope of financing the erection of factories for fertilizer production.

The PRINCIPAL SECRETARY wondered whether the exchange rate of 450 *won* to one dollar had been established in order to facilitate imports.

Dr. BUNCE said the rate had been something of a compromise. The original rate of 15 to \$US1 for occupation forces had later been raised to 50 to \$US1, then to 450. The United States authorities would have liked to raise it still more, but in view of prices and wages prevailing at the time, they had been unwilling to establish a rate which might have appeared to enable Americans to exploit Korean labour through their *won* purchases. Recent calculations showed that the present price of Korean rice on the open market approximated the world price and indicated that in this regard at least the dollar-*won* rate was not too inequitable.

2. REPORT PRESENTED BY MR. ARTHUR C. BUNCE

April 4, 1949

(1) *History of United States economic negotiations with the USSR in Korea*

(a) *Introduction*

It was never the intention of the Government of the United States that the dividing line between the Soviet and American occupation zones along the 38th parallel north latitude should become a barrier severing the normal economic relationships between the two halves of the economically inter-related Korean peninsula. During the early days of the occupation of Korea, the American Command initiated negotiations with the Soviet Command to try to obtain Soviet co-operation in unifying the economy of Korea. Rebuffed in these attempts in Korea, (and at least in one instance told by the Soviet Commander that even the matter of securing chlorine to meet an emergency in water purification would have to be discussed at a higher level), the Commanding General of the United States forces in Korea recommended that this problem be handled at a higher level.

(b) *The Joint Conference*

In December, 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics met at Moscow and agreed, with China's adherence, to set up a US-USSR Joint Commission which would assist in creation of a Korean Provisional Government. Paragraph 4 of the Moscow Agreement provided for the convening of a US-USSR conference "for the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent co-ordination in administrative-

economic matters" between the respective Commands in Korea. In this Joint Conference, held in Seoul from 16 January to 5 February 1946, the United States representatives attempted to reach an agreement to remove the 38th parallel as a barrier and to provide for the consideration of Korea as an economic and administrative whole. The Soviet Command, however, viewed the problem as one of exchange and co-ordination between the two adjoining zones of military responsibility. They insisted that administrative-economic integration of the two zones must await formation of the provisional government provided for in the Moscow Agreement. As a result, the American Command was unable to reach an agreement providing for economic unification. The Joint Conference did provide the basis for several agreements, including the allocation of broadcast bands for radio stations in North and South Korea, provisions for periodic and restricted exchange of mail between the two zones, and continuation of the flow of electricity across the 38th parallel into South Korea during 1946.

(c) *The Joint Commission, 1946*

The US-USSR Joint Commission met in Seoul from 20 March to 6 May 1946. During these sessions of the Commission the American delegation made repeated efforts to reach an agreement with the Soviets regarding economic and administrative unification of the two occupation zones prior to the formation of the Korean Provisional Government. The Americans several times attempted to place on the Commission's agenda a series of proposals to effect economic co-ordination between the zones concurrently with the negotiations regarding establishment of the Korean Provisional Government. The Soviet delegation rejected these proposals, contending that no such discussions could take place before the Koreans had actually taken over operation of the Government and could participate in such planning from the beginning. As a result of this Soviet attitude, the economic sub-committee of the Joint Commission, headed by Dr. A. C. Bunce of the American delegation and Chancellor Balasnov of the USSR, was unable to proceed with any pre-planning or with discussion of any economic topics other than the wording of the questionnaires regarding the economic platform of a future Korean Government. During a subsequent deadlock in the Joint Commission over freedom of expression, the American delegation again sought to discuss (under paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision) integration of the country's economy and administration. The Soviet delegation refused also to consider these questions, and the Commission adjourned *sine die* on 6 May 1946.

(d) *Subsequent developments. The Joint Commission, 1947*

Between the time the Joint Commission adjourned on 6 May 1946 and reconvened on 21 May 1947, the American Command made several attempts to negotiate an over-all economic agreement with the Soviet Command. Thus, on 2 July 1946, the American Commander proposed that a conference between economic specialists of the two Commands be held in Seoul. Such a conference, to be convened in accordance with one of the decisions reached by the Joint Conference in February 1946, would, in the words of the US

Commanding General, "confine itself to economic matters which are of importance to our immediate situation". The proposals for such a conference were repeated by the American Commander on 26 July and 31 August 1946, without avail. During the second meeting of the Joint Commission, the efforts of the American delegation to implement its objective of political and economic unification of Korea were blocked for essentially the same reason as in 1946—failure to agree upon what Koreans were to be consulted in the formation of a Korean Provisional Government, and Soviet unwillingness to discuss measures for economic unification of Korea before political unification was achieved. During the entire period from the end of the war until the present, there has been limited barter trade between North and South Korea, with officials in both zones attempting to supervise such trade. Several American attempts to arrange for large scale purchase of fertilizer from North Korea, with payment either in US dollars or goods, proved fruitless.

(e) *Electric power problems*

The Korean power system, developed by the Japanese, constituted a well-integrated unit based almost entirely upon the dependable water supply of North Korea, with a few standby thermal plants for use mainly in case of an emergency. Well over 90 per cent of Korea's hydro-electric power capacity is located north of the 38th parallel, and prior to and during the war had become the source of almost all of South Korea's power. After the Japanese surrender of 15 August 1945, electric power continued to flow south across the 38th parallel, although at a rate substantially below that of the pre-Japanese surrender period.

The problem of electric power was discussed at the Joint Conference in January-February 1946. The initial American position was that the hydro-electric power generated in Korea should be made available to the Korean people as a whole, that each zone should bear the costs of generation and transmission in proportion to the amount of power consumed, and that stocks and production of maintenance materials should be divided in proportion to needs. A "Joint Control Plan" was submitted by the American Command to the Soviets on 22 January 1946. This plan envisaged the formation of a special joint Soviet-American commission controlling "by use of technical observers" the entire Korean electric power system, which was to be operated by Korean technicians from the five electric power companies functioning in Korea at the time of the Japanese surrender.

However, the Soviets insisted that there were two separate power systems, one in each zone, and that relations between the two systems should be conducted as if they were entirely independent of each other. The Soviets agreed to supply the minimum amounts of power requested by the Americans for the period through December 1946. Payment was to be in electrical equipment, food-stuffs, and other specified materials. The Soviets at first insisted that two-thirds of all power deliveries to South Korea be paid for in rice, which the Americans declared was not possible at that time, in view of the growing food shortage in South Korea.

The question of method and amount of payment for the electric power furnished South

Korea was a continuing source of misunderstanding from January 1946 until the power from North Korea was finally cut off on 14 May 1948. The payments from South Korea were rendered more difficult by the Soviet insistence upon receiving largely goods and equipment in short supply and difficult to obtain. However, the United States Congress appropriated \$5 million for the use of South Korean authorities to help them in purchasing goods to pay the Soviets. All indications are that the cutoff of power from North Korea, four days after the successful South Korea elections of 10 May 1948, was motivated mainly by political considerations. On 14 May 1948, at the time of the power cutoff, over \$2 million worth of critical materials, purchased according to Soviet specifications, were in Seoul awaiting pick-up by Soviet representatives, and sufficient quantities of the materials requested by the Soviets in payment for past delivery of power were *en route* to Korea to enable South Korea to pay its power bill to North Korea in full.

(2) *Economic effects of the division of Korea*

The peninsula of Korea is an economically interrelated unit, and the rigid division of the country at the 38th parallel has disrupted the normal functioning of the Korean economy.

Before the Japanese surrender, approximately 64 per cent of the population of Korea lived south of the 38th parallel, and 36 per cent north of this parallel. In the post-war period, over two million Koreans who had been living in Japan, China (especially Manchuria), and other parts of the Far East repatriated to South Korea. In addition, at least two million Koreans living in the Soviet occupation zone fled south across the 38th parallel into the American occupation zone. The result of this influx, coupled with the continuation of the traditional high rate of natural increase, was to increase the population of South Korea from 1945 to the present by over 25 per cent, or from slightly over 16 million in 1945 to over 20.5 million. Since the outflow of population from the Soviet occupation zone in the post-war period is estimated to have approximately equalled the combined total of inflow of population plus natural increase, the population of North Korea has remained relatively stationary during the past four years and totals slightly over 9 million. As a result, the traditional balance of population of Korea has been upset, and at present about 70 per cent of the total population of Korea lives south of the 38th parallel, and only about 30 per cent in North Korea.

This marked concentration of the population in South Korea is especially significant in relation to the production of foodstuffs in the two zones of Korea. In the period 1940 to 1944, when 64 percent of the population lived in South Korea, slightly less than 64 per cent of the country's food, measured in calories, was produced in South Korea. Although South Korea produced more rice *per capita* than did North Korea, the north grew more millet, corn, and other cereals *per capita*, with the result that, prior to the end of the war, the *per capita* food production was almost equal in the two areas. At present, however, North Korea has exclusive access to almost all of Korea's large commercial fertilizer facilities, with the result that the task of trying to

maintain or to increase the level of agricultural production has been relatively easier in the north than in South Korea. It is estimated that South Korea, with 70 per cent of the population at present, still produces about 64 per cent of the total foodstuffs, and conversely that North Korea, with 30 per cent of the population, produces 36 per cent of the total foodstuffs.

Undoubtedly the most serious economic unbalance stemming from the division of Korea is the resulting acute shortage of electric power and fuels in South Korea. Over 90 per cent of Korea's ample electric power production facilities, including almost all of Korea's dependable, year-around hydro plants, are located in North Korea. Therefore, while South Korea has been acutely short of electric power, North Korea has electric power substantially in excess of its requirements and, according to some reports, is sending North Korea power not only into Manchuria, but also into the Maritime Provinces of the USSR.

During the years prior to Japanese surrender, over 75 per cent of Korea's coal was produced in North Korea, where almost all of Korea's best deposits of coal are located. In addition, North Korean forests were the source of over two-thirds of Korea's lumber and fuel wood. The accumulated effect of the acute shortage of electric power, coal, and fuel wood in South Korea as a result of the division of Korea, has resulted in severe over-cutting of South Korea's forest resources.

The major portion of Korea's heavy industries and mines is located in North Korea. Over 95 per cent of Korea's iron ore production facilities, and over 90 per cent of Korea's iron and steel production facilities, are located north of the 38th parallel. Korea has one of Asia's largest and most efficient concentrations of chemical industries located in the Hungnam-Hamhung area in North Korea. Korea's only petroleum processing plant is a major installation, designed to serve the needs of all Korea, located at Wonsan in North Korea. Seven of the eight major cement plants in Korea are located in North Korea. South Korea has the bulk of Korea's textile, food processing, and light chemicals plants, but many of these plants were built to process raw materials from North Korea.

The economic results of the post-war division of this economically interrelated peninsula have been serious, and would have been disastrous for South Korea and its people if the United States had not provided substantial economic assistance. The United States Government has supplied South Korea with over \$350 million worth of foodstuffs, fertilizer, raw materials for industry, electrical supplies, transportation and communications equipment, medical supplies, automotive equipment, etc, since the end of the war.

The American Government, working through the Economic Co-operation Administration and in close co-operation with the Government of the Republic of Korea, has developed a broad long-range programme for the economic rehabilitation of South Korea, beginning 1 January 1949, subject, of course, to Congressional appropriations on an annual basis. The basic emphasis of this programme is on expansion of production of coal, electric power, cereals, marine products and ex-

portable minerals. The objective of the programme is to get South Korea on as sound and stable an economic footing as possible, as rapidly as possible. Although the goal of the programme is a united Korea, independent both politically and economically, it is recognized that the development of an economically self-sustaining Korea presents tremendous difficulties as long as Korea remains divided along the 38th parallel. As far as possible, the developments in South Korea are designed to supplement the needs of a united Korean nation.

3. Major developments in South Korea during the period of Military Government

(a) Agriculture

Agriculture is the backbone of the Korean economy and over two-thirds of the population of Korea, both north and south of the 38th parallel, are engaged in agricultural pursuits. Therefore, during the period of United States Military Government control of South Korea from September 1945 to August 1948, primary emphasis was placed upon trying to help solve the most pressing problems of agriculture. These problems include expansion of agricultural production, elevation of the status of the farm population, and providing an adequate supply of foodstuffs for all Koreans, both producers and non-self-suppliers.

(i) Agricultural production

Planted acreage and agricultural production declined during the years 1940 to 1946, largely as a result of a reduction in the amount of commercial fertilizer applied to Korea's depleted soils. Since almost all land suitable for cultivation in South Korea is already being tilled and any extension of cultivated area can only be accomplished gradually, future increases in agricultural production must come more as a result of expanded double cropping and greater yield per acre, than from an extension of arable acreage. The key to increased yields from Korea's depleted soils is the increased application of farm-produced and commercial fertilizers. Yields of rice and other cereals in Japan (which traditionally has utilized almost twice as much commercial fertilizer per planted acre as Korea) generally average about 50 per cent above Korean yields. In early 1947, the United States Military Government in Korea developed a five-year plan to increase applications of commercial fertilizer in South Korea to the highest levels in Korean history. Since almost all Korea's chemical fertilizer plants are situated north of the 38th parallel, the post-war division of Korea has severed South Korea from its normal source of supply, and has rendered it almost entirely dependent upon fertilizer imports. The American Government purchased and brought into South Korea over 150,000 metric tons of commercial fertilizer in the period 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947, and stepped imports up to 400,000 metric tons for the period 1 July 1947 to 30 June 1948. Present indications are that imports for the period 1 July 1948 to 30 June 1949 will exceed 600,000 metric tons. That this programme, plus other factors favourable to agriculture, has greatly improved agricultural production is shown by the following table:

TREND OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN SOUTH KOREA
(1935-1939 annual average imports index 100)

	Planted average	Production
1940-1944	97	94
1945	86	74
1946	79	71
1947	84	80
1948	97	103
1949 (goal)	101	108

(ii) Food collection and distribution

The compulsory grain collection and rationing programme conducted by the Japanese from 1938 to 1945 broke down at the end of the war, and a free market in rice and other cereals was authorized in October 1945. However, lowered agricultural production coupled with the influx of over three million Koreans into South Korea from Japan, Manchuria, and the Soviet occupation zone of North Korea, resulted in a growing shortage of foodstuffs during the first half of 1946.

In order to assure adequate stocks of food to meet the minimum needs of the population, the Military Government re-established controls over food, and instituted plans for compulsory collection of cereals from the farmers, beginning in the summer of 1946. During the period from July 1946 until August 1948, the Military Government conducted five grain collection programmes which succeeded in collecting from the farmers the bulk of the cereals produced which were surplus to their needs. These collected grains, in turn, were rationed to the non-self-suppliers in the cities and towns at fixed low prices. The result of these successful grain collection programmes, plus the American financed imports of cereals to make up for deficits (180,848 metric tons were imported in 1946, 448,962 metric tons in 1947, and slightly over 250,000 in 1948) was the relatively equitable distribution of available foodstuffs in Korea, with the result that the food situation was stabilized. Reflecting this relative stability of the food situation, the open market price of rice increased only about 50 per cent (from 10,000 *won* to 15,000 *won* per *suk*) from September 1946 to the present time.

(iii) The farmers and their land

The lot of the generally capable Korean farmers deteriorated during the period of Japanese rule, as the sharp increase in farm tenancy evidences. Farm tenancy in South Korea increased from 40 per cent of the cultivated area in 1910 to about 73 per cent in 1945. During the period of Military Government rule, however, the following developments greatly improved the position and general well-being of the farm population:

(1) Military Government Ordinance No. 9, of 5 October 1945, provided that farm rentals must not exceed one-third of production, whereas previously the tenant farmers paid an average of 60 per cent of their production as rent, in addition to high taxes and water fees.

(2) The Military Government sale to tenant farmers of formerly Japanese-owned farmland, which comprised 15.3 per cent of the total farm acreage in South Korea, enabled over 500,000 tenant farmers to become the owners of all or part of the land they tilled. Payments were set

at the relatively low figure of 20 per cent of production for fifteen years. The post-war inflation had the effect of sharply reducing the farmers' burden of accumulated debts, and this factor, coupled with the sharp increase in the income of tenant farmers as a result of reduction of farm rentals, afforded many farmers the opportunity to buy the farms they tilled. Such purchases were facilitated by the general eagerness of absentee landholders to sell their farmland because the reduction in farm rentals made farmland a much less profitable investment than formerly. In addition, the apparent inevitability of an over-all land reform program which will redistribute the lands of absentee landlords, rendered these holdings less secure. As a result of all these factors, the per cent of farm tenancy dropped from 73 to 40 per cent of the total cultivated farmland between the end of the war and August 1948. At present the National Assembly is considering a land reform law providing for the purchase and distribution of the holdings of Korean absentee landlords to tenant farmers.

(b) *Industry and mining*

The adverse effects of Korea's division into two military occupation zones is nowhere more marked than in the industry of South Korea. The basic military directives to the American occupation forces called for the re-activation of industry and the stimulation of production, but the division of Korea made this most difficult. Other adverse factors include the economic dislocation resulting from the disintegration of the Japanese Empire economy (of which Korea was an integral part) and the shortage of technicians following the repatriation of the Japanese (who had monopolized control and direction of Korean industry prior to Japan's surrender).

Reflecting the gradual expansion of industrial output in South Korea, total coal production in South Korea was increased from approximately 270,000 metric tons in 1946, to 450,000 metric tons in 1947, and 760,000 metric tons in 1948. The cotton textile industry has been rehabilitated and expanded, and there are over 275,000 spindles now operable. Shortage of electric power has been the main factor limiting production in the textile, as well as most other, industries.

(c) *Education and technological training*

During the period of the Japanese rule of Korea, Korean educational facilities underwent some expansion, but they were far short of actual needs. Also, Japanese students were usually given preferential status in educational institutions in Korea, and as a result a substantial part of the total school enrolment, especially in high schools and colleges, was Japanese. In 1945 the Military Government launched a major expansion of educational activities with the following results:

(1) An expansion of Korean primary school enrolment from approximately 1,500,000 in 1945 to 2,500,000 in 1948; an expansion in the number of Korean primary school teachers from 13,782 in 1945 to 34,757 in 1948; and in number of primary schools from 2,694 in 1945 to 3,442 in 1948;

(2) An increase in the number of middle schools from 252 in 1945 to 423 in 1948, with

Korean enrolment increasing from 62,136 in 1945 to 226,960 in 1948;

(3) Expansion of institutions of higher learning from 19 in number in 1945 to 29 in 1948, with student enrolment increasing from 3,039 Koreans in 1945 to 21,250 students in 1948;

(4) Adult education programmes with primary emphasis on development of a literate population. The very substantial results of these programmes are reflected in the rapid increase in the per cent of the population able to read the Korean script, Hangeul, from less than one-third of the population in 1945 to an estimated 83 per cent of the population in 1948.

(5) Under the Japanese rule positions of engineering and technical leadership in Korean industry, mining, transportation and communications were largely monopolized by the Japanese, with the result that the Korean population was seriously deficient in the technical skills necessary to operate the Korean economy. In order to help increase the skill of the Korean population, a broad programme of vocational and technical training was undertaken and a separate Technological Training Board was established to supervise this activity. This programme for the expansion of technological training has hardly more than started but it is planned that it will be pushed vigorously under the industrial rehabilitation programme being developed by the Korean Government, in co-operation with the Economic Co-operation Administration.

C. Agreement on Aid concluded between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (signed at Seoul on 10 December 1948) (A/AC.26/W.3)

Preamble

The Government of the Republic of Korea having requested the Government of the United States of America for financial, material and technical assistance to avert economic crisis, promote national recovery, and insure domestic tranquillity in the Republic of Korea, and

The Congress of the United States of America, in the Act approved June 28, 1948 (Public Law 793, 80th Congress), having authorized the President of the United States of America to furnish assistance to the people of the Republic of Korea and:

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea, believing that the furnishing of such assistance, on terms consonant with the independence and security of the Government of the Republic of Korea, will help to achieve the basic objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and the United Nations General Assembly resolution of November 14, 1947, and will further strengthen the ties of friendship between the American and Korean peoples:

The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Government of the United States of America will furnish the Government of the

Republic of Korea such assistance as the President of the United States of America may authorize to be provided in accordance with the Act of Congress approved June 28, 1948, (Public Law 793, 80th Congress), and any Acts amendatory or supplementary thereto.

Article II

The Government of the Republic of Korea in addition to making the most advantageous use of all available Korean resources, will make similarly effective use of the aid furnished to the Government of the Republic of Korea by the Government of the United States of America. In order further to strengthen and stabilize the economy of Korea as soon as possible, the Government of the Republic of Korea hereby undertakes to effectuate, among others, the following measures:

(a) The balancing of the budget through the exercise of economy in governmental expenditures and the increase of governmental revenues by all practicable means;

(b) The maintenance of such controls over the issuance of currency and the use of private and governmental credit as are essential to the attainment of economic stability;

(c) The regulation of all foreign exchange transactions and the establishment of foreign trade controls, including an export and import licensing system, in order to insure that all foreign exchange resources make a maximum contribution to the welfare of the Korean people and recovery of the Korean economy;

(d) The establishment of a rate of exchange for the Korean currency as soon as economic conditions in Korea warrant such action;

(e) The exertion of all possible efforts to attain maximum production, collection and equitable distribution of locally-produced supplies, including the continuance of a program of collection and distribution of indigenously-produced cereal grains designed to,

(1) Assure a minimum adequate staple ration at controlled prices for all non-self-suppliers, and where necessary to distribute to indigent and needy persons their fair share of available food supplies; and,

(2) Obtain foreign exchange;

(f) The facilitation of private foreign investment in Korea together with the admittance of private foreign traders to transact business in Korea subject to such restrictions as are prescribed in the Constitution and the Laws of the Government of the Republic of Korea;

(g) The development of Korean export industries as rapidly as practicable;

(h) The management or disposition of government-owned productive facilities and properties in such a manner as will insure, in the general welfare, the furtherance of maximum production.

Article III

1. The Government of the United States of America will appoint an official (hereinafter referred to as the United States Aid Representative)

to discharge the responsibilities in Korea of the Government of the United States of America under the terms of this Agreement. Within the terms of this Agreement, the United States Aid Representative and his staff will assist the Government of the Republic of Korea to make the most effective use of Korea's own resources and of aid furnished to the Government of the Republic of Korea by the Government of the United States of America, thereby to advance reconstruction and promote economic recovery in Korea as soon as possible.

2. The Government of the Republic of Korea agrees to extend diplomatic privileges and immunities to the United States Aid Representative and members of his mission.

3. The Government of the Republic of Korea will furnish all practicable assistance to the United States Aid Representative in order to enable him to discharge his responsibilities. The Government of the Republic of Korea will permit the free movement of employees of the Government of the United States of America engaged in carrying out the provisions of this Agreement to, in or from Korea; facilitate the employment of Korean nationals and residents; authorize the acquisition of facilities and services at reasonable prices; and in other ways assist the United States Aid Representative, in the performance of his necessary duties. The Government of the Republic of Korea, in consultation with the United States Aid Representative, will effectuate such mutually acceptable arrangements as are necessary for the utilization of the petroleum storage and distribution facilities, and other facilities which are required to carry out the objectives of this Agreement.

4. The Government of the Republic of Korea will permit the United States Aid Representative and his staff to travel and to observe freely the utilization of assistance furnished to Korea by the Government of the United States of America, and will recognize his right to make such recommendations in respect thereto as he deems necessary for the effective discharge of his responsibilities under this Agreement. The Government of the Republic of Korea will maintain such accounts and records pertaining to the Aid Program, and will furnish the United States Aid Representative such reports and information as he may request.

5. In the event the United States Aid Representative ascertains the existence of abuses or violations of this Agreement, he will so inform the Government of the Republic of Korea. The Government of the Republic of Korea will promptly take such action as is necessary to correct such abuses or violations as are found to exist and inform the United States Aid Representative of action taken. If, in the opinion of the United States Aid Representative, appropriate corrective action is not taken by the Government of the Republic of Korea, he may take such steps as may be appropriate and proper and may recommend to the Government of the United States of America the termination of further assistance.

6. The Government of the Republic of Korea will establish an operating agency to develop and administer a program relating to requirements, procurement, allocation, distribution, pricing, and accounting for supplies obtained under this agreement. In the development and execution of such

a program the operating agency will consult with the United States Aid Representative.

Article IV

1. The Government of the Republic of Korea will develop an over-all economic recovery plan designed to stabilize the Korean economy. An integral part of this economic recovery plan will be an import-export program to be agreed upon by the United States Aid Representative and the Government of the Republic of Korea. In consonance with this agreement upon the import-export program, the Government of the Republic of Korea will transmit to the United States Aid Representative fully justified import requirements, together with estimates of export availabilities, this information to be transmitted at such times and in such form as may be desired by the United States Aid Representative.

2. The Government of the Republic of Korea will insure that the periodic allocation of foreign exchange by categories of use will be made in consultation with and with the concurrence of the United States Aid Representative, and that expenditures of foreign exchange will be made in accordance with such allocations.

3. Where it is deemed necessary, the Government of the Republic of Korea will employ foreign consultants and technicians to assure the effective utilization of domestic resources and of equipment and materials brought into Korea under the import-export program. The Government of the Republic of Korea will in each case inform the United States Aid Representative of its intention to employ such individuals.

Article V

1. The Government of the Republic of Korea will take all appropriate steps regarding the distribution within Korea of goods provided by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement, and of similar goods imported through the use of other funds or produced locally, to insure a fair and equitable distribution of these supplies at reasonable prices consistent with local economic conditions within the Republic of Korea, and to insure that all such goods are used for the purpose envisaged by this Agreement.

2. The Government of the United States of America shall from time to time notify the Government of the Republic of Korea of the indicated dollar cost of commodities, services, and technical information (including any cost of processing, storing, transporting, repairing or other services incident thereto) made available to Korea on a grant basis pursuant to this Agreement. The Government of the Republic of Korea, upon notification of such indicated dollar costs, shall thereupon deposit in a special account in its name at the Bank of Chosen a commensurate amount in *won*, computed at a *won*-dollar ratio which shall be agreed to at such time between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the United States Aid Representative. The Government of the Republic of Korea will use any balance in the special account to pay the United States Aid Representative such funds as he may require from time to time to meet the *won* expenses incurred in the discharge of his responsibilities within Korea

under this Agreement. The remaining sums in the special account may be used only for such other purposes as may be agreed upon from time to time between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the United States Aid Representative.

3. The Government of the Republic of Korea will not permit the re-export of goods provided by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement or the export or re-export of commodities of the same character produced locally or otherwise procured, without the concurrence of the United States Aid Representative.

4. The Government of the Republic of Korea will insure that all commodities made available under this Agreement or the containers of such commodities shall, to the extent practicable, be marked, stamped, branded, or labeled in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the nature of such commodities or containers will permit, in such a manner as to indicate to the people of Korea that such commodities have been furnished or made available by the United States of America.

Article VI

1. The Government of the Republic of Korea will undertake to use its best endeavor to cooperate with other countries in facilitating and stimulating and increasing interchange of goods and services with other countries and in reducing public and private barriers to trade with other countries.

2. Pending the entry into force of a Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Government of the United States of America shall accord, immediately and unconditionally, to the merchandise trade of the Republic of Korea treatment no less favorable than that accorded to the merchandise trade of any third country. Similarly, treatment no less favorable than that accorded to the merchandise trade of any third country shall be accorded, immediately and unconditionally, within the Republic of Korea, to the merchandise trade of the United States of America.

3. Departures from the application of the most-favored-nation treatment provided for in paragraph 2 of this article shall be permitted to the extent that they are in accord with the exceptions recognized under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated October 30, 1947 concluded at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as now or hereafter amended. The provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to require compliance with the procedures specified in the General Agreement with regard to the application of such exceptions.

4. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall apply, with respect to the United States of America, to all territory under its sovereignty or authority.

5. The Government of the Republic of Korea shall accord most-favored-nation treatment to the merchandise trade of any area in the free territory of Trieste, Japan or Western Germany in the occupation or control of which the Government of the United States participates, for such time and to such extent as such area accords most-favored-

nation treatment to the merchandise trade of the Republic of Korea.

6. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall not derogate from such other obligations concerning the matters contained in this Agreement as may at any time be in effect between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea.

7. The Government of the Republic of Korea will take the measures which it deems appropriate to prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enterprises, business practices or business arrangements affecting international trade which have the effect of interfering with the purposes and policies of this Agreement.

8. The provisions of this article and of article VII shall apply during such period as the Government of the United States of America extends aid to the Government of the Republic of Korea under the terms of this Agreement, unless superseded by a Treaty of Amity and Commerce.

Article VII

The Government of the Republic of Korea shall, with respect to commercial, industrial, shipping and other business activities, accord to the nationals of the United States of America treatment no less favorable than that now or hereafter accorded by the Republic of Korea to nationals of any third country. As used in this paragraph, the word "nationals" shall be understood to include natural and juridical persons.

Article VIII

The Government of the Republic of Korea will facilitate the transfer to the United States of America, for stock-piling or other purposes, of materials originating in the Republic of Korea which are required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, upon such reasonable terms of sale, exchange, barter or otherwise, and in such quantities, and for such period of time, as may be agreed to between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea after due regard for the reasonable requirements of the Republic of Korea for domestic use and commercial export of such materials. The Government of the Republic of Korea will take such specific measures within the intent of this Agreement as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph, including the promotion of the increased production of such materials within the Republic of Korea, and the removal of any hindrances to the transfer of such materials to the United States of America. The Government of the Republic of Korea will, when so requested by the Government of the United States of America, enter into negotiations for detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

Article IX

1. The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America will co-operate in assuring the peoples of the United States of America and of Korea full information concerning the goods and technical assistance furnished to the Government of the Republic of Korea by the Government of the United States of America.

2. The Government of the Republic of Korea will permit representatives of the Press and radio of the United States of America to travel and to observe freely and to report fully regarding the receipt and utilization of American aid.

3. The Government of the Republic of Korea will permit representatives of the Government of the United States of America, including such committees of the Congress as may be authorized by their respective houses to observe, advise, and report on the distribution among the people of commodities made available under this Agreement.

4. The Government of the Republic of Korea will co-operate with the United States Aid Representative in providing full and continuous publicity in Korea on the purpose, source, character, scope, amounts and progress of the economic and technical aid provided to the Government of the Republic of Korea by the Government of the United States of America under the provisions of this Aid Agreement.

Article X

1. Any or all assistance authorized to be provided pursuant to this Agreement will be terminated:

(a) If requested by the Government of the Republic of Korea;

(b) If the United Nations finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of assistance by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement unnecessary or undesirable.

(c) If the President of the United States of America determines that the Government of the Republic of Korea is not adhering to the terms of this Agreement; or whenever he finds, by reason of changed conditions, that aid provided under this Agreement is no longer necessary or desirable; or whenever he finds that, because of changed conditions, aid under this Agreement is no longer consistent with the national interests of the United States of America.

Article XI

This Agreement shall become effective with the formal notification to the Government of the United States of America that the Korean National Assembly has consented to this Agreement. It shall remain in force until three (3) months after the day on which either Government shall have given to the other notice of intention to terminate.

This Agreement may be amended at any time by agreement between the two Governments.

Article XII

This Agreement shall be registered with the United Nations.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Korean languages at Seoul, Korea, this 10th day of December 1948. The English and Korean texts shall have equal force, but in the case of divergence the English text shall prevail.

*For the Government of the
United States of America*

John J. MUCCIO

For the Government of the Republic of Korea

LEE Bum Suk

KIM Do Yun

**TEXTS OF MAIN DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT**

**A. Final report of Sub-Committee II and
appendices (A/AC.26/34)**

1. MAIN BODY OF THE REPORT OF
SUB-COMMITTEE II

1. To implement the resolution of the General Assembly of 12 December 1948, the Commission, at its 2nd and 3rd meetings, discussed the question of setting up subsidiary bodies. It was agreed that the representatives of China, France and Syria should form a working group to draw up the terms of reference of Sub-Committee II to carry out paragraph 4 (c) of resolution 195 (III) of the General Assembly.⁴⁹ At its 5th meeting on 9 February 1949, the Commission adopted the draft resolution of the working group and established Sub-Committee II, consisting of the representatives of China, France and the Philippines.⁵⁰ At the first meeting of the Sub-Committee, Mr. Henri Costilhes, representative of France, was elected Chairman. Mr. Rufino Luna, representative of the Philippines, agreed to preside over all the hearings of the Sub-Committee.

2. The terms of reference of the Sub-Committee were defined by the Commission at its 5th meeting as follows:

(a) To study the development of representative government in Korea;

(b) To be ready for consultation with governmental authorities and to provide such information and advice as may be requested;

(c) To gather from experts and organizations opinions and views which have a bearing on the further development of representative government in Korea.

3. From 11 February to 24 June 1949, the Sub-Committee held twenty-five meetings altogether, including ten meetings devoted to hearings. Summary records of all these hearings were distributed to members of the Commission. The major decisions and activities of the Sub-Committee are recorded in documents A/AC.26/5, A/AC.26/11, A/AC.26/SC.2/14 and A/AC.26/SC.2/15.

Chronology of important developments in Korea

4. At the initial meetings of the Commission, a desire was expressed to have a survey made of political events in Korea, and it was felt that members of the Chinese and French delegations to the Temporary Commission, who had constituted the Main Committee left in Seoul, might be best qualified to prepare a resume on important political developments from August 1948 to January 1949. At its first meeting, the Sub-Committee decided to request the representatives of China and France, together with the Secretary of the Sub-Committee, to prepare such a resume. The working group recommended that, instead of a

report, a chronology of important events with commentaries should be prepared. The Sub-Committee, at its 2nd meeting, adopted the recommendation of its working group. This decision was incorporated in the Sub-Committee's first report and recommendations, adopted by the Commission at its 14th meeting. At its 7th meeting, the Sub-Committee approved the *Chronology of important developments in Korea from 15 August 1948 to 31 January 1949* (A/AC.26/SC.2/5). It was circulated for the information and reference of the members of the Commission.

Hearings of Korean officials and personalities

5. The desire that the Sub-Committee should soon proceed with hearings was expressed by the Chairman of the Commission at its 11th meeting. The Sub-Committee, at its 3rd meeting, decided on the first list of persons to be heard. The Sub-Committee gave careful consideration to the selection of officials and experts, since views had been expressed by some officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea that paragraph 4 (c) of the resolution of the General Assembly of 12 December 1948 applied to North Korea only and that it would be unnecessary for the Commission to consult non-official Koreans, especially those who are regarded as undesirable elements. In preparing its first report on the persons to be heard and the topics to be discussed at the hearings, one consideration by which the Sub-Committee was guided was that, while it upheld the Commission's right to hear or consult any Koreans, it would try to avoid any unnecessary misunderstanding and controversy with the Korean Government.

6. Following the submission of the Sub-Committee's report and recommendations, the Commission discussed the question of consulting Korean personalities together with that of the attitude of the Government in this matter. In adopting the report of the Sub-Committee at its 14th meeting, the Commission established certain principles and procedure concerning the hearing of Korean personalities:

(a) The Sub-Committee had the right to select any Koreans for hearings and the view expressed by Korean authorities should not alter the independent position of the Commission in this regard;

(b) In order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and controversy with the Korean Government, and to test its reaction, the Sub-Committee should proceed gradually, but not too slowly, with its interviews;

(c) The Sub-Committees should submit the list of persons to be heard to the Commission for review.

This procedure was followed by both Sub-Committees in their hearings. Sub-Committee II's second list of persons to be heard was adopted at the 22nd meeting of the Commission.

7. The eleven persons consulted by Sub-Committee II were carefully selected. They repre-

⁴⁹ Paragraph 4(c) states: "Be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people".

⁵⁰ A/AC.26/SR.5.

sented the Government, political parties and educational, social and religious organizations. Their views on the development of representative government reflected sufficiently the attitude of the Government and the main trends of public opinion on this question. A summary and analysis together with a conclusion of the hearings is appended to this report as appendix (a).

Trips to the provinces affected by recent disturbances

8. The work of the Sub-Committee in gathering views and opinions concerning the further development of representative government in Korea was not limited to its hearings. The Sub-Committee was of the opinion that conditions in local areas, particularly in those provinces affected by recent disturbances, had a bearing on the question. To observe general conditions in those areas and to gather views and opinions on the spot, the Sub-Committee organized trips to Cholla Namdo (25-28 April) and Cheju Do (8-14 May). The trip to Cheju Do was planned with a view to observing the elections of 10 May at the same time. A detailed report of these trips is contained in appendix (b).

9. Before going on to the general conclusions, it should be pointed out that in relation to its second term of reference, namely, "be ready for consultation with governmental authorities and provide such information and advice as may be requested", the Sub-Committee has not received any requests of that nature.

General conclusions

10. On the basis of the views expressed by Korean officials and personalities, the observation trips undertaken by the Sub-Committee, and its deliberations, the Sub-Committee is of the opinion that, since the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea, many concrete steps have been taken and progress has been made in the development of representative government, particularly in view of the short period of time which has elapsed and the tremendous problems confronting the young Republic. However, the growth of representative government has been frequently hampered by disturbances in several areas, notably in Cholla Namdo and Cheju Do. Although sporadic guerrilla activities continue in some mountain areas, the Government, which was faced with the necessity of declaring martial law in some areas for a short time and curfew hours in almost all cities, towns and villages, seems to have succeeded in crushing the main rebellion and restoring peace and order. The divergences of view continue between the Executive and the National Assembly regarding the implementation of the Constitution and the enactment of such important bills as the Anti-Traitors Law, Land Reform Bill and Local Administration Bill. This is, however, a wholesome sign for the growth of democracy in Korea.

11. It is believed that once the security of the Republic is completely assured and law and order established throughout the country, greater strides can be made toward the further development of representative government.

2. APPENDICES

(a) SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF HEARINGS REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Recommendations of the Sub-Committee and decisions of the Commission

1. In accordance with the terms of reference of Sub-Committee II laid down by the first resolution of the Commission establishing the Sub-Committee, which directed it to "3. Gather from experts and organizations opinions and views which have a bearing on the further development of representative government in Korea . . ." ⁵¹ Sub-Committee II, at its 2nd meeting, decided to conduct hearings with officials and experts on the question of the development of representative government. For this purpose a questionnaire dealing with the problem of representative government and its related subjects was prepared.

2. At its 4th meeting, the Sub-Committee agreed that the first group of people to be heard should consist of not more than six persons. It approved the main topics for discussion at the hearings. The names of those to be heard and the topics for the hearings were incorporated into the Sub-Committee's first report and recommendations to the Commission. ⁵² The Commission, at its 4th meeting, adopted the Sub-Committee's report. The first group of hearings, when five persons were heard, took place between 28 February and 15 March 1949 inclusive.

3. Having completed the hearings of the first group of persons, Sub-Committee II, at its 10th meeting, decided to hear six more people. The report of the Sub-Committee on further persons to be heard is contained in document A/AC.26/SC.2/7, which was adopted by the Commission at its 22nd meeting. These hearings were held between 30 March and 14 April 1949 inclusive.

4. Since the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948 called upon "all Koreans to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfilment of its responsibilities", the Sub-Committee did not overlook the importance of hearing the views of Koreans from the north. Under the present circumstances, however, it was not possible to hear the views of northern Koreans directly. The Pyongyang radio intercepts remain the only channel of news from the north. Secondly, no attempt was made to invite members of the South Korea Labour Party (communist party) for hearings, since they have been driven underground and are regarded by the Korean authorities as subversive elements. With regard to the position of the Korean Government on the question of the access of Koreans to the Commission, the Sub-Committee maintained that, while the Commission still upholds the principle underlying the resolution of the Commission adopted at its 10th meeting, the Sub-Committee, in making up the list for the hearings, should give due consideration to the wishes of the Korean Government concerning certain persons who might be regarded as undesirable elements.

5. In order to attain a balanced representation of views held by high officials and of the main

⁵¹ A/AC.26/1.

⁵² A/AC.26/SC.2/1 and A/AC.26/SC.2/1/Rev.1.

trends of opinion held by private citizens concerning the problem, the following individuals were invited for hearings. On the basis of their professions and positions, they can be classified as follows:

(a) Three high officials with ministerial rank: Kim Hyo Suk, Minister of Internal Affairs; Limb, B. C., Minister of Foreign Affairs; Yoo Chin O, Director of the Office of Legislation;

(b) Members of the National Assembly and political leaders:

(i) Members of the National Assembly: Shin Ik Hi, Chairman of the National Assembly and member of the Supreme Council of the Democratic Nationalist Party; Yun Chi Yung, Member of the National Assembly and former Minister of Internal Affairs;

(ii) Leaders of political parties: Cho So Ang, leader of the Socialist Party; Kim Soong Soo, leader of the former Hankook Democratic Party and member of the Supreme Council of the Democratic Nationalist Party;

(c) Experts, social and religious leaders: An Chai Hong, civil administrator of the defunct Interim Government and leader of the New Life Association; Kim Bup Rin, Buddhist scholar and member of the Inspection Committee; Park, L. G., President of Chosen Christian College; Rao, Paul M., Vicar Apostolic.

6. Topics for discussion at the hearings were given in advance to the persons invited. In addition to extemporaneous questions and answers at the hearings, the people heard all followed the outline given below in presenting their views:

(a) The development of representative government in Korea:

(1) Steps taken in the development of representative government from the establishment of the Republic of Korea to the present,

(2) Problems confronting the Government and the people in their efforts for the development of representative government,

(3) Specific views and proposals on the further development of representative government;

(b) The development of representative government in relation to the problem of unification:

(1) Political basis for unification,

(2) Comments on the structure of government and conditions in North Korea,

(3) Possibilities of extending representative government within North Korea,

(4) Representation and participation of all Koreans in a unified Korea.

Views of officials

7. The views of the three Ministers (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Internal Affairs and Director of the Office of Legislation), with reference to the question of the development of representative government in Korea, reflected the attitude of the Government.

Both Minister Kim and Minister Limb emphasized the suppression of all communist activities, whether inspired in the north or in the south, and

measures for an increase in production and for bringing about land reform as concrete steps taken in the development of representative government since the establishment of the Republic of Korea.

The Foreign Minister seemed to regard recognition of the Government of the Republic of Korea by friendly Powers as an indication in itself of the representative character of the Government.

The Director of the Office of Legislation, who had an important part in the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic, pointed out that the Government did not actually begin to function until three months after its establishment. He listed the following as concrete steps taken toward the development of representative government: (a) preservation of peace and order; (b) reorganization of administrative machinery of the Government in order to reduce costs of administration and number of government employees; (c) absorption of the Police Department by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in order to put it under the control of a civilian; (d) placement of the national defence force under the Ministry of Defence, a post held by a civilian as provided in the Constitution; (e) establishment of the Inspection Committee and of the Board of Audit to investigate any misbehaviour of officials; (f) establishment of the Office of Planning in order to organize economic recovery; (g) establishment of the Office of Legislation and of the Law Drafting Committee in order to complete the work of drafting civil and criminal laws; (h) implementation of the constitutional provision regarding the arrest of civilians without a warrant.

8. With regard to the problems confronting the Government, the three Ministers unanimously stressed the division of Korea by the 38th parallel, terrorism by the communists and economic difficulties as the greatest obstacles to the development of representative government.

Minister Limb stated that "in the light of the present situation one cannot expect representative government to develop smoothly and without reverses".⁵³ He added further "when economic reconstruction is accomplished and law and order again prevail, South Korea will experience a marked development toward democracy and representative government".⁵⁴

9. As for specific views and proposals on the further development of representative government, Minister Kim maintained that removal of the 38th parallel through the agreement of the Powers concerned should be a prerequisite, and the Director of the Office of Legislation believed that an increase in production by carrying out the five-year plan and the establishment of a strong military force were the most urgent measures to be put into effect.

10. All these officials believed that the strongest foundation existing for unification was the racial, cultural and linguistic homogeneity of Korea. They felt that the 100 seats in the National Assembly reserved for North Korea constituted a political basis for unification. They all claimed that the Government of the Republic of Korea was the only Government which had jurisdiction

⁵³ A/AC.26/SC.2/12, page 5.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, page 6.

over the zone north of the 38th parallel and the moral force to govern a united Korea.

Admitting the responsibility of Koreans in a divided Korea, Mr. Yoo stated that the division had not been effected by the Koreans, and that the responsibility for the resulting situation had been transferred to the United Nations. He could not see any possibility of unification through consultation with the north until the communist party changed its policy. The appointment of the five exiled leaders from the north as governors of the northern provinces had had a profound psychological effect on North Korea in favour of unification. However, under the circumstances, a strong force in South Korea was necessary for a peaceful solution of the problem of Korean unification and independence.

11. All the ministers condemned the northern regime as a one party dictatorship modelled on the Soviet pattern which, they said, disrespects and disregards fundamental human rights and freedoms. In their view, there was no possibility of extending representative government within North Korea until Korea was united under the leadership of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

Views of the members of the National Assembly and political leaders

(i) *Members of the National Assembly*

12. Mr. Shin, who was once a prominent member of both the Korean Independence Party and the National Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence, and the leader of the short-lived Nationalist Party, was elected Chairman of the National Assembly, succeeding Dr. Rhee when the latter was elected President of the Republic of Korea. Following the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Hankook Democratic Party and the Nationalist Party were amalgamated to form the Democratic Nationalist Party. Mr. Shin became one of the five members of its Supreme Council. As Chairman of the National Assembly, Mr. Shin tries to play the role of a moderator. On the whole he supports the Government.

Mr. Yun, once a member of the former Hankook Democratic Party and former Minister of Internal Affairs, is considered an outstanding supporter of the Government's policy.

While Mr. Shin was evasive in his statements and replies to questions, Mr. Yun was emphatic on the legal status of the Government of the Republic of Korea and its sovereign right in recovering the territory north of the 38th parallel. Neither of these gentlemen elaborated on the steps which had been taken in the development of representative government. However, Mr. Yun asserted, on the one hand, that the Koreans were capable of managing their own affairs and, on the other hand, stated that Korea could not afford to do without American occupation forces.

13. Mr. Shin, speaking in general and vague terms, mentioned external pressure and internal division as major problems confronting the Government of the Republic of Korea and spoke of the need of bringing the Government and all the people into a union as a concrete suggestion for the further development of representative government.

Taking into consideration the economic distress of the people, Mr. Yun believed that the Government of the Republic of Korea, with the assistance of the United States and the United Nations Commission, could overcome all the obstacles with which it was faced.

In reply to a question, Mr. Shin thought certain constitutional amendments regarding the power of the President and the creation of an upper house might be necessary measures for the further development of representative government.

14. Cultural homogeneity, the existence of the Government based on its present Constitution, and filling the vacancies of the 100 seats in the National Assembly for the northern representatives, were regarded by Messrs. Shin and Yun as important bases for unification. They referred to the northern regime as a class dictatorship under the control of the USSR. Mr. Yun, especially, saw no solution in a compromise between the right and the left and was convinced that any coalition would always lead to communist domination and thus to the self-destruction of Korea. Emphasizing the sovereignty of the Korean Government, he protested against the idea of having a conference between the north and south. He further curtly remarked that Korea was not a laboratory for such experiments.

15. Mr. Shin thought extension of representative government into North Korea was possible since the people in the north desired to come under the jurisdiction of the Government in the south. Mr. Yun believed that the only way of extending representative government to the north was for the Commission to conduct and supervise a general election there in order to select the 100 representatives for the vacant seats in the National Assembly. Furthermore, he urged the Commission to give full support to the Government of the Republic of Korea and observe its legal status. He believed that the Commission should "arouse world opinion to condemn the country which is violating international laws and treaties by continuing its illegal occupation of Korean territory".⁵⁵

(ii) *Leaders of political parties*

16. Messrs. Kim Soong Soo and Cho So An, two outstanding political leaders, have followers in the National Assembly. Mr. Kim was a leader of the former Hankook Democratic Party (extreme right) which played a prominent role during the elections of 10 May 1948 and in the election of Dr. Rhee as President, and which after the establishment of the Government became a component part of the Democratic Nationalist Party, the dominant political party in the National Assembly. Although he has held no government office, Mr. Kim, though not a member of the National Assembly, is regarded as a party whip of the Democratic Nationalist Party. Mr. Cho, formerly a close associate of Mr. Kim Koo and leading member of the Korean Independence Party, broke away from this group after the establishment of the Government and subsequently organized the Socialist Party (moderate), which claims to have a number of members in the National Assembly. Mr. Cho holds no office in the Government and regarded the enactment of land reform and local self-government bills and

⁵⁵ A/AC.26/SC.2/4, page 6.

the National Traitors' Act as evidences of the development of representative government. He believed that the full implementation of those laws would greatly improve the situation in South Korea. Mr. Kim maintained that, while the Chief Executive had failed to follow the usual practice of selecting members of the party which had won a majority in forming the Cabinet, the Government of the Republic of Korea was a representative one. It was weakened by the inclusion of certain minority and left-wing leaders in the Cabinet. He considered this type of idealism a major problem standing in the way of the development of representative government. For the further development of representative government, he urged that a parliamentary form of government be completed and perfected.

Mr. Cho offered three suggestions for the further development of representative government: (a) politically, the Government should appoint the most competent men to hold office. Many laws and regulations inherited from the Japanese regime must be eliminated and the fundamental rights and freedoms must be respected; (b) economically, he suggested a planned economy to solve the economic problem confronting Korea and to serve as a basis for representative government; (c) culturally, he emphasized the need for free primary education and exchange of ideas.

17. Referring to political bases for unification, Mr. Kim felt that Koreans were a united people and that unification would automatically be achieved by getting rid of a handful of communist leaders. Mr. Cho maintained that Koreans desired neither class dictatorship nor a monopoly of political power, but instead wished to have a democratic or socialist regime which would guarantee equal rights and opportunity for all.

While Mr. Kim condemned the régime in the north as an illegal government, Mr. Cho pointed out that there was no freedom of elections in North Korea. He believed that a strong and democratic government in South Korea would help bring about unification. Mr. Kim felt that "the only way to extend representative government within North Korea would be for the Commission to supervise and observe an election there."⁵⁶ Unless the Commission saw some way to gain access to the north and carry out a general election there, there would be no hope of peaceful unification. "The only effective method of uniting Korea is to bring strong pressure upon Russia through world public opinion."⁵⁷ Furthermore, he believed that there were democratic elements in the north which would play a prominent role in the movement to unify the country.

Views of experts and representatives of religious and social organizations

18. The four personalities who appeared before the Sub-Committee, also represented four religious or social organizations: the Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist religions and a New Life Association. With the exception of Mr. Kim Bup Rin, the Buddhist professor who is concurrently a member of the Inspection Committee, the experts held no official positions in the Government. The four of them supported the

Government but with varying degrees of criticism and apology.

19. Bishop Ro and Mr. Kim believed that the Government had been doing its utmost to improve its internal organization and the public welfare, and that accomplishments in this direction indicated definite progress in the development of representative government.

In listing some of the steps taken in the development of representative government, Dr. Paik, President of Chosen Christian College, was somewhat apologetic in saying that "of course, there is room for improvement, for no government is perfect; everything depends upon how the man in authority exercises his powers",⁵⁸ and Mr. An, who was the highest civil administrator during the Military Government and who is regarded as a "middle-of-the-roader", was positive in stating that the Government had not fully implemented its pledge to democratize the police force and to guarantee civil rights. However, he regarded the friction between the executive and the legislative bodies as a healthy sign in the development of representative government, since it meant that the chief executive could not do things as he pleased when the National Assembly tried to overrule him. Furthermore, he gave credit to the Government for maintaining law and order, although disturbances continued.

20. With regard to the problems confronting the Government, all of the experts emphasized the economic difficulties resulting from the division of the country, differences in ideologies and the menace of communism. This situation, intensified by the inability of the Government to improve Korean economy in order to meet the primary needs of the people, had created confusion and unrest which in turn caused the people to be easily persuaded to listen to irresponsible and communist propaganda and the promises of demagogues.

While Dr. Paik considered an uneducated and uninformed electorate an important major problem confronting the Government in its efforts for the development of representative government, Mr. An mentioned the gulf existing between the Government and the people as a major obstacle to this development. He believed that the Chief Executive would have to be responsible for such a situation.

21. These four experts were all specific in offering suggestions toward the further development of representative government.

Bishop Ro emphasized the importance of moral and spiritual education and the appointment of persons of integrity and ability to government posts as specific measures for the further development of representative government, while Dr. Paik stressed the necessity of raising the intellectual and cultural level of the people. Mr. Kim made the following specific proposals: (a) the Government must win the people to a high patriotism; (b) an upper house as a means to facilitate the expression of the popular will and a supreme advisory council to the president to give advice on policy, should be created; (c) a purge of corrupt officials should be thoroughly carried out. Mr. An believed that the development of representative government in Korea could only be

⁵⁶ A/AC.26/SC.2/10, page 6.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, page 7.

⁵⁸ A/AC.26/SC.2/3, page 7.

achieved through the free expression of the will of the people and that at present "free expression of the will of the people is practically impossible because of the nervousness and the sensitiveness of the Government".⁵⁹ It was also his opinion that fear of communism had driven the Government to resort to persecution and to arrest as communists those who happened to disagree with it. Mr. An expressed the fear that "if the next election has to be held before the unification of the country, the Government will intervene in it to a marked extent".⁶⁰

22. Bishop Ro, Dr. Paik and Mr. An all shared the view that the Government of the Republic of Korea, with the full support of the people, should be the rallying point for all Koreans and a potent force for unification. To do so, this Government should not only become more tolerant and inclusive, but also should be strengthened. This is what Dr. Paik called the policy of attraction backed by a big stick. They all regarded the northern regime as controlled by a few men dictated to from Moscow, and one which allowed no freedom. They saw no prospect of compromise and agreement with the north and no immediate hope for extending representative government there. Bishop Ro urged that the Government with the full support of the United Nations should extend its jurisdiction to the north. They all felt that the solution of the Korean problem required definite agreement between the two great Powers. When the unification could be achieved, the question of representation would be easily solved. Emphasizing that unification must precede the participation of all Koreans in a unified Korea, Mr. An warned that "this is perhaps the last chance to solve the Korean problem through an international organization. If it fails, there is no telling what might happen . . ."⁶¹

Conclusions

23. From the views expressed by the eleven persons who appeared before the Sub-Committee, the following general conclusions are drawn on each of the topics in the questionnaire:

(a) Officials and private individuals alike raised no question regarding the representative character of the structure of the Government set up in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, adopted on 12 July 1948, and promulgated on 19 July 1948 by the National Assembly.

They all agreed that the Government of the Republic of Korea should be the rallying point for solving the problem of Korean independence and unification, and that it should be strengthened.

Some believed the Government should be strengthened by the creation of a strong military force. Others felt it could be strengthened by winning greater confidence and support from the people and by appointing men of integrity and ability to important government posts.

(b) All except one, who regretted that the Government had not fully implemented its pledges

to democratize its policy and to guarantee civil rights,⁶² seemed to agree that the Government has been trying its best to further the development of representative government by completing the government structure, enacting new laws and increasing production. In view of the short period of time which has elapsed and the difficult problems confronting the Government, it has made noticeable progress in the growth of representative government. Without exception, all gave full credit to the Government for maintaining peace and order, which is essential to the growth of any democracy.

(c) It was the consensus of opinion of all the persons heard by the Sub-Committee that the geographic and ideological division of Korea and the resulting economic conditions and unrest were the main obstacles to the development of representative government. In this connexion, it should be pointed out that Mr. An stressed the gulf between the Government and the people as a major obstacle, while Mr. Kim Soong Soo felt that the development of representative government had been hampered by the failure to adopt a cabinet system of government.

(d) Numerous and concrete proposals made by these persons regarding the further development of representative government indicated their concern with this problem. Their views are naturally varying because of the difference in their positions and points of view.

(e) They agreed unanimously that racial, cultural and linguistic homogeneity and geographic and economic unity are the strongest bases for unification. However, they differed in political approach to the problem of unification. While the majority believed that political bases for unification had been firmly established in the structure of the Government and in the provision for reserving 100 seats in the Assembly for the representatives from the north, a minority felt that the Government must reform itself by being more tolerant and inclusive in order to be the rallying point for unification. Thus they all agreed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a starting point for bringing about unification.

(f) Regarding the structure of government and conditions in North Korea, the consensus of opinion was that the regime in North Korea is a dictatorship under the control of one party—the North Korea Labour Party (former communist party). According to the religious leaders who appeared before the Sub-Committee, there had been religious persecution in North Korea, and there is still little freedom of worship.

(g) The overwhelming majority were not optimistic regarding the extension of representative government within North Korea. However, two persons believed that the desire of the northern people to live under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea and the existence of hidden democratic elements in North Korea are important factors in the further development of representative government.

(h) The majority were very vague in expressing their views on the question of representation and participation of all Koreans in a united Korea. The more definite view was that a general

⁵⁹ A/AC.26/SC.2/6, page 6.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, page 19.

⁶¹ A/AC.26/SC.2/6, page 13.

⁶² A/AC.26/SC.2/6, page 2.

election in North Korea under the observation of the United Nations Commission on Korea should be the natural solution to this problem. Two of the eleven persons emphasized the point that unification should precede participation of all Koreans in a unified government, and that with unification the problem of representation would be automatically solved.

(b) REPORT ON TRIPS TO THE PROVINCES AFFECTED BY RECENT DISTURBANCES

Recommendation of the Sub-Committee and decisions of the Commission

1. The provisions of paragraph 4 of the resolution of the General Assembly of 12 December 1948 required the Commission among other things to be available for consultation and observation in regard to the further development of representative government based on the freely expressed will of the people. The Commission, at its 5th meeting, established, therefore, two sub-committees and entrusted Sub-Committee II with the task of studying the development of representative government in Korea and gathering from experts and organizations opinions and views which have a bearing on the matter.⁶³

2. After having heard a number of officials, experts and representatives of organizations at the hearings, the Sub-Committee, at its 10th meeting, discussed the question of observation trips in the provinces in order to gather views and observe conditions at first hand. It was felt that the study of the development of representative government should be supplemented by making observation trips to such places as Yosu, Soon Chun and Cheju Island, where revolts and disturbances had recently taken place.

3. At its 11th meeting, the Sub-Committee agreed on a report and recommendations concerning the trips to Cholla Namdo and Cheju Do. The report was adopted by the Commission at its 22nd meeting. The Commission authorized the Sub-Committee to organize these trips for the purposes of observing general conditions and it was understood that the other members of the Commission would be invited to participate.⁶⁴

4. The Sub-Committee discussed the detailed preparations for these trips at its 14th and 18th meetings, and fixed a date for the trip to Cheju Do, from 18 to 21 April, and for the trip to Cholla Namdo from 25 to 28 April. It requested the Secretariat to make the necessary arrangements.

5. On 18 April, the representatives of China, France and India and six members of the secretariat flew to Cheju Island, in accordance with the original schedule, but because of bad weather, the party was unable to land. The trip to that area was therefore postponed. However, the trip to Cholla Namdo was made according to the original schedule.

6. Before the Sub-Committee set another date for the trip to Cheju Do, it was informed that the Government of the Republic of Korea might invite the Commission to observe the elections in North Cheju on 10 May 1949. At its 20th meet-

ing, the Sub-Committee decided that, if a written invitation from the Government were extended to the Commission to observe the said elections, the visiting group should leave Seoul on 8 May 1949.

7. The question of observing the election on Cheju Island was brought to the attention of the Commission which, at its 24th meeting, reviewed the history of the elections on Cheju Do in 1948. It was agreed to observe the elections if a written invitation were extended to the Commission from the Government of the Republic of Korea.

8. In a letter dated 22 April, Colonel Limb, Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed the desire of the Government for the Commission to observe "the by-elections" on Cheju Do. At its 27th meeting, the Commission reaffirmed its decision with the understanding that the Commission would merely be present during the elections without assuming any responsibility for the results of such elections.

Trip to Cholla Namdo

9. The Sub-Committee, having completed a series of hearings, embarked on the second phase of its programme by organizing observation trips to areas affected by recent disturbances, in order to study present conditions in those areas and the problems confronting the Government.

Cholla Namdo, one of the richest and largest provinces of Korea, is located on the tip of the peninsula. The southern part of Cholla Namdo became the centre of an uprising on the mainland on 19-20 October 1948, when some of the officers of the 14th Regiment of the Korean Constabulary, together with some of the two thousand soldiers scheduled for duty on the Island of Cheju, and an equal number of civilians under the influence of the communists, revolted against the Government and took control of Yosu on 19 October and of Soon Chun on the following day. Riots spread to other counties—Kurye, Posong, Kwangyang, Hadong and Koksong. The Government mobilized land and sea forces to subdue the revolt on the peninsula of Yosu and, on 4 November, it announced the complete annihilation of the rebellion. However, a number of rebel bands escaped into the Chiri Mountains, north-east of Soon Chun, and to several small islands off the peninsula, to continue guerrilla activities.

In order to have an over-all picture of the conditions in Cholla Province, the Sub-Committee selected Kurye, Yosu and Soon Chun, three counties seriously affected by the rebellion, Kwangju, the capital city of Cholla Namdo, and Hwasun, an important coal mining centre, as the main places of interest. To get an impression of Cholla Pukto, the party also stopped at its capital, Chonju, for a few hours, on its way back to Seoul.

10. The observation group, under the auspices of Sub-Committee II, consisted of Mr. Costilhes, representative of France, Mr. Jamieson, representative of Australia, Mr. Ssutu, alternate representative of China, Mr. Magaña representative of El Salvador, and Mr. Singh, representative of India, together with six members of the secretariat, including two Korean interpreters. Two representatives of the Korean Government, Dr.

⁶³ A/AC.26/1.

⁶⁴ A/AC.26/11; A/AC.26/SR.22, pages 4-5.

Chyung Kyoo Hong, Director of the Office of General Affairs, and Mr. Chang Ku Yung, member of the Liaison Committee, and one American Liaison Officer, Mr. John Gardiner, accompanied the party.

The group left Seoul in a special train early on the morning of 25 April. It visited Kurye, Soon Chun, Yosu, Kwangju, Hwasun and Chonju in accordance with its original schedule. It spent two nights on the train and one night in Kwangju, and returned to Seoul late on the evening of the 28 of April.

11. The first area to be inspected was Kurye in Cholla Namdo. It is about eight hours by train from Seoul and located at the foot of the Chiri Mountains, where the guerrillas took refuge.

Following a short reception, the party drove through the town and neighbouring villages to the base of the Chiri Mountains.

The population of the county of Kurye was estimated at over 60,000, and that of the town itself at about 14,000. The first major raid by the rebels on Kurye took place on 26 October 1948 and the second was made by over 300 rebels on 19 November. The group was told that there had been a great deal of looting during the raids; some signs of destruction were still visible. The Buddhist Temple which the party visited, built in the fifth century A.D. and located on the hillside, had been raided, and occupied for a short time, twice by guerrillas, once in December 1948, and again in January 1949. The entire population of the village on the hill near the temple fled during the raids and had not returned when the observation party was there.

According to official statistics, 900 inhabitants were either killed or missing and over 3,000 houses were destroyed in the county of Kurye from the time of the uprising to March 1949. In terms of *won*, the destruction amounted to almost 500,000,000. Over 2,000 families were in need of relief.

After the tour of Kurye, the group proceeded to Soon Chun. In order to take every possible measure for the safety of the members of the Commission, the Korean authorities advised that the group should travel only by day in this region. The party, therefore, spent the night on the train in the station at Soon Chun.

12. On the morning of 26 April, the group proceeded to Yosu, a fishing centre, an important port and naval base during Japanese domination, and the spring-board for the October revolt. The county of Yosu has an estimated population of over 160,000, and the inhabitants of the city itself number over 60,000. As in Kurye, thousands of the townspeople lined up on the streets to greet the members of the Commission when they entered. After an official reception and a tour of the city by automobile, the party scattered to see the devastation caused by the rebels at closer range. Yosu was occupied by the rebels for three days before national troops dislodged them. When the defeated rebels fled to the nearby islands, many young people followed them. According to reports obtained on the spot, the missionaries in Yosu succeeded in arranging an amnesty and consequently a large number of these young people returned to the city. The ruins in the city of Yosu were widespread. Entire

blocks had been razed to the ground and hastily constructed tents and shacks were scattered in different sections of the city. It was very apparent that many people were living in dire conditions. According to official statistics, the persons killed or missing in Yosu county from the uprising to March 1949 numbered over 1,000 and nearly 3,000 homes were destroyed. The destruction was estimated to amount to over 6 billion *won*, and the number of families in need of relief was put at over 2,000.

13. Having visited Yosu, the group returned to Soon Chun to observe general conditions there.

When the train had stopped overnight in Soon Chun station, the first night of the trip, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee and three members of the secretariat, including the secretary of Sub-Committee II, walked into town from the station in order to see it and to gather information from the local residents unobtrusively.

The county of Soon Chun has an estimated population of over 170,000 and the town of Soon Chun has nearly 50,000 inhabitants. It was occupied by the rebels at the time of the insurrection for about a week before national troops drove them out on 27 October. The fighting and killing there, during that period, was more severe than at Yosu, but the destruction seemed less visible. As a result of the uprising and subsequent disturbances, nearly 2,500 persons were killed or missing and about an equal number of homes were destroyed according to official statistics. In terms of *won*, the value of the destruction was placed at over 1,700,000. It was estimated that over 4,200 families were in need of relief.

At the official reception given to the group at the Girls' Middle School, speeches of welcome by the mayor and student representatives and speeches by the Chairman of the Commission and the Chairman of the Sub-Committee in response were delivered. Then the students entertained the group with a programme of songs and dances. There was also an exhibit of student art and craft work. All this illustrated the rich culture of Korea and the development of education.

14. After the visit to Soon Chun, the group proceeded to Kwangju, capital of the province of Cholla Namdo, which has a population of 100,000. There the members spent the night at the Korean hotel and in army billets. Early the following morning the party gathered at the provincial government building to meet with leading dignitaries and the Press, before making a tour through the city to see hospitals, schools and factories. The group visited first the medical school—with a student body of about 300—college hospital and medical library, and then a large high school for girls. All school buildings in Kwangju appeared to be well constructed and equipped, and it was apparent that stress was laid upon medical education and physical culture.

The Chonnam Spinning Mills—one of the important vested properties operated now by the Government—which the party visited, manufactures 40,000 roles of cotton sheeting monthly. Most of the machinery is of Japanese origin, installed during their domination. There are over 1,000 looms operated by 3,400 workers. The mill is dependent upon the ECA for raw cotton.

At the conclusion of its visit to the factory, the group proceeded to the auditorium of the

Agricultural Vocational School for an official reception. A colourful programme of songs and formal dances was presented by the students and speeches of welcome and response were delivered.

15. On its way back to Soon Chun, the group stopped over a few hours to inspect the Hwasun coal mine, located about half way between Kwangju and Soon Chun. This coal mine was reorganized in 1934 by the Japanese, who consolidated several pits. When Japan surrendered, the Koreans, in August 1945, organized a self-governing committee to continue the operation of the mine. In 1946 it was put under the control of the Military Government. It was said that in 1946 many clashes occurred among the workers. After the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Hwasun coal mine came under the direct control of the Department of Commerce and Industry. The deposits of this mine are estimated at about 9 million tons and it produces approximately 15,000 tons per month, roughly 20 per cent of the coal needed in South Korea. At present the mine employs about 2,300 men; 20 to 30 per cent of the miners came from the north. Production has been hampered by lack of power and modern equipment. For efficient production, the mine would require electric power of 400 kilowatts. Since the current has been cut off by North Korea, it has to generate its own power but it can only generate about one third of the electricity it requires.

16. The group spent another night on the train in Soon Chun Station. On its way back to Seoul it stopped at Chonju, capital of Cholla Pukto, in order to gather an impression of Cholla Namdo's neighbouring province. An informal reception was given to the party at the provincial government building and the local Press interviewed the delegates. Afterwards the party visited a tobacco factory, which produces cigarettes under the control of the Monopoly Bureau of the Department of Finance. This factory employs 1,000 workers and produces 7 million cigarettes and 6,000 kilogrammes of tobacco daily. A visit to a silk mill, established by the Japanese twenty-seven years ago, was also included in the itinerary.

Chonju appeared to be more prosperous than any other city visited in the Cholla provinces. According to the Vice-Governor, the communists were active in Cholla Pukto after the liberation; however, the situation has now improved greatly and there have been no serious disturbances lately.

17. From this brief visit to the troubled areas, a few conclusions can be drawn. The revolt in Yosu and Soon Chun appears to have been a locally well-planned uprising, judging by its swiftness and the organized way in which control of the cities was taken. The rebels first captured ammunition dumps and then took over police headquarters and administrative and financial services. They organized the People's Committee with the help of local citizens. It was said that they committed all kinds of cruel acts, including plundering, killing and arson. While the uprising was directed by the leaders of the South Korea Labour Party, not all the participants were its members. According to an investigation by eleven religious organizations, conflicts between the national army and the police had some influence on the riots in Cholla Namdo. It should be stated that the causes of the revolt were manifold.

Contrary to certain reports in the metropolitan Press, peace and order in these troubled areas have been restored. However, the task of rehabilitation is tremendous, since it involves over 16,000 families, totalling 87,000 people in all the troubled areas of Cholla Namdo. It was estimated that nearly two thousand million *won* was needed for rehabilitation.

Trip to Cheju Do

18. For the purpose of studying the general conditions, and at the same time being present at the elections in North Cheju Gun on 10 May 1949, the Sub-Committee organized a second major observation trip, to Cheju Island, situated about thirty miles from the tip of the peninsula. This island, over 120 square miles in area, known also as Quelpart, became a part of Korea some 900 years ago. Located south of Korea Strait and half way between South Japan and the northern coast of China, Cheju Island's strategic importance is evident and it was an important Japanese military base during the Second World War. The latest estimate of its population is placed at nearly 300,000, with about 30,000 living in its capital, Cheju City. The principal occupations of the inhabitants of the island are agriculture, fishing and the raising of livestock. The people are noticeably industrious and self-reliant. However, because of its insular position and the consequent lack of cultural exchange with the outside world, the local system of economy and indigenous culture are prominent and strong provincialism is apparent.

19. Following liberation from Japanese domination, Peoples' Committees were set up on Cheju Island, presumably under the influence of the communist leaders. It was said that the belated arrival of United States troops and inefficient administration on the island during the Military Government gave an opportunity to the communists to attempt to dominate the whole territory. Belated strict measures to curb communist activities led to open defiance of the Government authorities on 3 April 1948. Disturbances became more widespread and violent during the registration for the 10 May elections and on Election Day itself. Since less than 50 per cent of the registered voters cast their ballots, the elections in North Cheju Gun were invalidated. Disturbances continued in many areas and the major activities of the rebels were not crushed until April 1949, a few weeks before the Sub-Committee went there.

20. The group, consisting of Mr. Costilhes, representative of France, Mr. Singh, representative of India, and six members of the secretariat, including two Korean interpreters, and accompanied by Chang Kee Yung, a member of the Liaison Committee, left Seoul on a transport plane on the morning of 8 May. The representatives of China and the Philippines had been recalled by their Governments for consultations and were not able to participate. The Chinese alternate representative, who had joined the group in its unsuccessful attempt to land on Cheju in April, could not participate because of his health. Due to bad weather, the party could not return by air on 12 May as scheduled. Instead, it came back by water and rail and reached Seoul on 14 May.

Upon arrival at Cheju Airport, the group was greeted by the Governor, the Army Commander, the Police Chief and other officials and a cheering crowd. The Governor's residence became the living quarters for the group. In the late afternoon a large mass meeting was held in the main square of the city to welcome the members of the Commission, and was followed by a public dinner. The Governor and the representative of the Women's Patriotic Association delivered welcoming addresses and the representatives of both France and India responded.

On the morning of 9 May, the observation group divided into two groups for the purpose of observing the elections and general conditions in various areas.

Group One

21. In order to observe the elections in Cheju City and its neighbouring areas, and to observe conditions around this city, Group One, headed by the representative of India with three members of the secretariat, remained in Cheju City.

On the day preceding the election, Group One visited the island of Chuja, an important fishing centre, with a population of 4,800. The members of the group were told by the mayor and some of the inhabitants, of the people's fervent desire for unification. In this connexion they emphasized the urgent demand for and acute shortage of carbide for night fishing, which is important to the livelihood of the populace. Three hundred drums of carbide a year are needed. The main source of carbide, however, is north of the 38th parallel, and due to the division of Korea, this supply has been severely limited.

22. On Election Day, Group One, accompanied by the Governor and the Chief of Police, made a tour of the polling stations in and around the capital. There were eleven such booths in electoral district A and they were open from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. The populace seemed to be taking the election seriously; 60 per cent of the registered voters had visited the polls by noon. The voting took place in an orderly manner.

23. The following day, Group One visited an internment camp and the Cheju alcohol plant. At the former place, 2,000 prisoners were found to be living in an old warehouse. The women outnumbered the men by roughly three to one and there were many babies in arms and young children. These people had been in hiding in the hills with the rebels. According to the director of the camp, 90 per cent of the prisoners had surrendered and the remainder had been captured by the Korean Army. Questions were addressed to a group of rebels who had been captured just a few days previously. Two persons gave the reasons why they had joined the rebels. A young boy said that he had joined the South Korea Labour Party under duress and without realizing what he was doing. Mr. Lee Doo Won, an outspoken individual over thirty years of age, said that, being dissatisfied with the conditions prevailing after the liberation, he became a member of the South Korea Labour Party in Inchon before he came to Cheju Do and joined the rebels in the mountains in June 1948. He emphatically stated that he was not a communist and that only his party could solve the Korean problem. Criticizing the police and the army, he said that

if those forces had sincerely worked for the welfare of the people and if the Government had genuinely advocated the complete sovereignty of Korea, then there would have been no rebellions against it. In answer to a question by the group, an aged prisoner told how he had found himself in a tragic situation, having to flee to the hills with the rebels after they had attacked his village. This might be the case with many of the other prisoners who had run away and subsequently returned.

The Cheju alcohol plant was constructed by the Japanese shortly before Pearl Harbor and at that time maintained a monthly output of about 1,000 *suk*. After the liberation, and upon the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea, the plant became a vested property and came under the control of the Department of Commerce and Industry. Production had decreased due to the shortage of coal and skilled technicians, and is only about 50 per cent of the pre-war figure at present. The basic raw material used in the making of alcohol is the sweet potato, grown on the island, but the plant has been faced with a shortage of its coal supply, which originally came from North Korea. In addition to the manufacture of alcohol, this plant produced about two-thirds of the electric current consumed in Cheju City. The manager of the plant told the group that if the unification of North and South Korea could be achieved, the plant would be able to secure an adequate supply of high quality coal and could produce more electricity.

In order to gather further information on the operation of the Korean Army in Cheju, Group One visited Colonel Yu's staff headquarters and his operations headquarters in the mountains. Colonel Yu, who had been sent down from Seoul in March 1949 to complete the "mop-up" operation and returned later to Seoul with the members of the Commission, stated that, during the period 25 March to 12 April, the casualties of the rebels were 2,345 and the Army captured 3,600. The total loss of the civilian population during this period was 1,668. Asked whether the basic causes of communism had been eliminated in Cheju Do, Colonel Yu said that he was unable to give a reliable answer. However, he observed that if the insurgents who had now repented and surrendered were left with nothing to do the way might be paved for further trouble. Although he realized the grave financial difficulties facing the infant Republic, Colonel Yu nevertheless emphasized the responsibility of the Government in the work of rehabilitation.

24. Before the group returned to Seoul, the election results in North Cheju Gun were announced. According to these returns, 97 per cent of the registered voters went to the polls in district A, and in district B 99 per cent of the registered voters cast their ballots. There were seven candidates in each district. Mr. Hong Sun Yong, a member of the *Kook Min Wei*,⁶⁵ representative-elect of district A and Mr. Yang Pyung Chik, former member of the Korean Independence Party, representative-elect of district B, ran as independents. Both Messrs. Hong and Yang, who were born in Cheju Do and have lived

⁶⁵ Nationalist Society, affiliated with the National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, headed by President Rhee.

there all their lives, came to visit the members of the Commission on the evening of 12 May. Mr. Hong, a college graduate and the principal of the Girls' School in Cheju City for over ten years, emphasized the major problem of rehabilitation. He pointed out that, due to the riots, the impossibility of farming in many areas, the burning down of a large quantity of barley and the lack of fertilizer, which came mostly from the north, there was a great shortage of food on the island. Unless 60,000 *suk* of rice could be brought to the island to feed the needy, many people would face starvation before the October harvest. Mr. Yang, who has been interested in the youth movement and local affairs, claimed that he belonged to no political party at present. He said the communists had been active before the riots in April. Due to the nervousness of the police, many villages and houses were left unguarded when the raids commenced. The rebels compelled people to follow them to the mountains and, in most cases, the whole family chose to accompany the father, fearing arrest by the police. He thought that although people respected the police, some of them were secretly helping the rebels. He believed that while there was comparative safety on the island, there were still over 500 rebels hiding in the mountains. He emphasized the responsibility of the Government in the reconstruction of Cheju Do and the importance of revising and developing the educational system as a preventive measure against communism.

Group Two

25. In accordance with the decision of the Sub-Committee, its Chairman, secretary and two other members of the secretariat constituting Group Two of the visiting party to Cheju Do, traveled by jeep around the circumference of the island.

In spite of repeated requests to the Minister of Internal Affairs and the local authorities in Cheju for only a minimum of police escort and for dispensing with official receptions, Group Two was heralded by a truckload of police and followed by a jeep carrying the police escort agreed upon. Whenever the group approached a village, it was greeted by seemingly all the inhabitants of that place, lined up along the road, waving flags and cheering. The gates of all the villages were decorated with identical posters of welcome and slogans regarding the unification of Korea. Policemen, alternating with spear-carrying guards, were posted all along the roads. The enthusiasm and hospitality of the Korean officials and the detailed security measures made it difficult for the group to have complete freedom of movement and a flexible itinerary.

At Aewol Li, a small port about thirty miles from Cheju City, the group made its first stop in order to wait for a stalled police jeep. The opportunity was used to visit the harbour and local polling centre. The party was greeted by the Chairman of the Election Committee, and reminiscences about last year's elections as well as information concerning the present elections were exchanged.

In the early afternoon, the group reached Mosul Po, which has a good harbour and a large airdrome built by the Japanese. The Mayor, Chief of Police and other dignitaries entertained the group at a luncheon party. The plight of this

town and the possibility of developing it into a trading centre were the two points stressed by the Korean officials in their conversations with the members of the group.

On its way to Sogwi Po, located roughly in the centre of the south coast of Cheju Island, the group observed an increasing number of partially destroyed villages, some of which were totally burned down and abandoned. All inhabited places are now enclosed by protecting walls made of the loosely piled up volcanic rocks and stones for which Cheju Island is known. The gates are guarded and closed at night. The most striking feature was the village of Kang Jung Ni, in which every house had been burned to the ground and the rebuilding had been undertaken by old and young of both sexes.

The party arrived at Sogwi Po before dusk and, because of the poor accommodations in the hotel and at the insistence of the *gun* chief, the party was quartered in his house for the two nights it was in that area. The first evening, the members attended a dinner and reception at which all the local officials and prominent citizens were present. The *gun* chief delivered a welcoming speech and Mr. Costilhes responded on behalf of the group.

26. The following morning the party devoted most of its time to a trip in the Sogwi Po area. According to the *gun* chief, the city of Sogwi Po suffered its first attack by the rebels in October 1948 and again in November 1948. During the fighting, 190 houses were burned down; the ruins are still to be seen. The casualties among civilians, police and rebels amounted to several hundred. First the group visited an internment camp. Men, women and children, a few hundred of them, were crowded into two separate small houses: in one were those already screened; in the second those still under examination.

The party drove some miles inland to a more mountainous region in order to visit a number of villages. The pattern of the previous day's journey was repeated, the people everywhere were gathered for the usual mass welcome. Hahya Ri, most prosperous village of this area, situated on the dividing line between sea-board and mountains, had remained immune to rebel attacks. The group visited the school, the most prominent structure in the community, as is the case in most of the villages. In greeting the party, the principal of the school took pride in pointing out that not one of his teachers had joined the rebels or become one of their ring-leaders, as had been the case in many other places.

On its way back to Sogwi Po, the group stopped to watch a large number of women divers—about 100 of them—diving for seafood and seaweeds. Both of these are important products in the economy of Cheju Island.

27. On its return trip to Cheju City, on 11 May, the party stopped at Song San Ni, formerly a Japanese naval base. It visited what had been the Japanese ammunition dump along the coast and inspected a canning factory in operation and an iodine plant now shut down due to the shortage of materials and technicians. The chief of the district, in discussing local conditions, presented a gloomy picture of the prevailing scarcity of food there and throughout the whole island. A second stop was made at Tong

Bong Ni, on the northern coast about thirty miles from Cheju City, a town which had been completely destroyed on 5 January. The destruction of villages on the north-eastern and central southern coasts seems to have been greater than in any other part of the island. All the way from Sogwi Po, the party was greeted by cheering crowds whenever it entered or passed through a village. In the afternoon the party reached Cheju City and rejoined Group One.

Causes and effects of the riots on Cheju Do

28. Only a first hand observation of the destruction and ruin conveys an adequate picture of the magnitude of the problem of rehabilitation confronting the Government. The impression of the entire group was deepened by the official figures on the destruction caused by the rebels. There were no statistics on the casualties and property damage from 25 March to 12 May 1949. During this period, the Army intensified its programme of pacification. Up to 25 March, the total civilian casualty list, excluding the rebels, reached over 3,560. Houses, together with their furniture, either completely destroyed or damaged, numbered 33,489. The value of this destruction was placed at over 1,000 million *won*. The loss in livestock due to the uprising was equally great; over some 46,000 head of cattle, horses, hogs and sheep, valued at over 1,000 million *won*. The year of disturbances on Cheju Island reduced the number of its primary schools from ninety-six to fifty-one and the enrolment from 35,701 to 27,205. Two of the eleven middle schools were completely burned down and the enrolment in the middle schools dropped from 3,359 to 3,258. Seventeen teachers joined and led the rioters and over 283 students followed them. It will require more than 55 million *won* to restore the schools to their original condition.

29. The primary causes for the riots and disturbances on Cheju Do are manifold. The following reasons are generally accepted as important:

(a) Because of the strategic, as well as the remote, location of Cheju Island, the South Korea Labour Party chose to concentrate its activities there following liberation;

(b) Poor economic conditions on the island provided a breeding place for the political activities of extremists;

(c) Lack of close contact with the mainland resulted in strong provincialism, which in turn fostered dissension against the Government and caused disorder;

(d) Undiscriminatory measures applied by the authorities to punish the people who fled with the rebels either of their own volition or under compulsion, gave rebel leaders the opportunity to gather larger forces against the Government.

30. The trouble started when the North-west Youth Group made its appearance on Cheju Do and co-operated with the police in searching for communists and communist suspects. In doing so, members of the North-west Youth Group overstepped their authority. It was said that communists and communist suspects had been subjected to severe beatings by them.

Fighting and destruction in the villages followed more or less the same pattern; first it was a struggle between the rebels and the police, and

gradually the Army as well as the population was drawn into it. The people joined the rebels either under duress or in order to escape reprisals and punitive action by the authorities. Destruction was caused and cruelty exhibited by both sides.

31. The trip to Cheju Do provided the members of the Commission with evidence that the villages which had been burned or deserted were in the process of being rebuilt, and that conditions in those places had gradually become normal again. The tremendous problem of rehabilitation had to be seen in order to be realized and appreciated.

Evaluation of the observation trips

32. By visiting the two main areas of recent disturbances, the Commission not only had an opportunity to see at first hand the seriousness of the destruction and the urgency of the problem of rehabilitation and the extent to which the foundation of the Government has been affected by the riots, but also had a good chance to study the degree to which the division of Korea by the 38th parallel has affected the recovery of industries and the livelihood of the people.

33. The presence of the Commission in those areas far from Seoul helped to spread the idea of the United Nations among the common people and to enable them to understand and appreciate the work of the United Nations in general and the task of the Commission in particular.

34. The members of the Commission who participated in the observation trips were impressed by the zeal of the large crowds gathered along roads and streets to greet and cheer them. The Korean authorities did their best in arranging transportation and accommodation for the groups, and the members of the Commission encountered no difficulties in their travels. The pattern of the receptions by local authorities and people indicated plainly the existence of a centralized administration and its relatively efficient operation.

35. The observation group verified that peace and order had been restored in the disturbed areas, and that life in the villages and towns had returned to normal. The small number of rebels still hiding in the mountains constitutes no immediate and serious menace to the security of the two provinces and no challenge to governmental authority.

36. A well planned programme of rehabilitation, to be carried out by an efficient local administration and greater opportunity for the people to take part in the government, should eliminate most of the causes for a repetition of such riots.

37. In all the places visited by the observation groups, the people uniformly expressed their urgent desire for the unification of Korea and their great reliance on the Commission for bringing about that unification.

B. Korean Press Law (A/AC.26/W.14)

Promulgated in 1907

(Korean Régime, Kwang-mu, 11th year)

Revised in 1909

(Korean Régime, Ryung-hui, 2nd year)

Article 1

Any person desiring to publish a newspaper shall first obtain permission for its publication

by presenting an application to the Minister of Home Affairs through the Provincial Governor, in Seoul, through the Director of the Police Bureau.

Article 2

In the said application the following information shall be given :

- (1) Name of paper ;
- (2) Classification of items to be printed ;
- (3) Date of publication ;
- (4) Offices of publication and printing ;
- (5) Names, residence and age of publisher, editor and printer.

Article 3

No one except males above the age of 20, and resident in Korea, shall be eligible as publisher, editor, or printer of such paper.

Article 4

A publisher shall deposit a sum of 300 yen as security at the time of sending in the application to the Bureau of Home Affairs.

Payment of deposit required can be made by a bank certificate of deposit.

Article 5

A newspaper printing items relating to prices of goods and articles on science and art only shall be exempt from security deposit.

Article 6

Permission shall first be obtained in case of making change in items 1, 2 and 5 of article 2. Change in other items shall be reported within a week of being made. In case of the death of a publisher, editor, or printer, or the loss by any one of them of the qualifications described under article 3, application shall be made for permission to appoint a lawful successor within a week following such event, but publication may be continued by appointing a temporary successor pending decision on the application.

Article 7

In case of temporary suspension of publication, report shall be made as to its duration, but such suspension shall not continue for more than one year.

Article 8

Application and reports regarding the two previous articles shall be forwarded as in article 1.

Article 9

In cases of non-publication within two months of the date of permission being granted, the license is thereby cancelled ; so too in the case of non-issue of publication the day after the expiring of the term granted for temporary suspension.

Article 10

Two copies of each issue of a newspaper shall be forwarded prior to circulation to both the Bureau of Home Affairs and the District Office.

Article 11

The publication is prohibited of any article reflecting on the dignity of the Royal Family, contravening the national constitution, or destructive of international friendship.

Article 12

Publication is prohibited of any article regarding confidential proceedings of official meetings and confidential documents, details, or abstracts. This clause also applies to those special matters prohibited publication.

Article 13

Publication is prohibited of those articles favouring an offender or protecting or praising the accused or the prisoner.

Article 14

Publication is prohibited of judicial cases awaiting trial or of those cases debarred a public hearing.

Article 15

It is prohibited to print fictitious articles of a defamatory nature.

Article 16

It is prohibited to pay or to receive compensation for publishing a certain item, or for correcting or withdrawing an item or not.

Article 17

Publication shall bear on every issue the name of the paper, date of issue, publishing office, printing office, and name of publisher, editor and printer.

Article 18

In case of a newspaper undergoing trial on account of any article appearing in it, the sentence pronounced by the Court shall appear in its entirety in the issue of that paper following the day of pronouncement.

Article 19

In case of items reproduced from the *Official Gazette*, should errata have been made in the original and later corrected, the corrections shall appear in the paper reproducing the items in its following issue.

Article 20

In case request is made for correction of any article or for publication of a correction or refutation by any person involved in the matter published, it shall appear in the following issue of the paper concerned.

In case of a letter of correction or refutation exceeding the original article by more than twice its length, matter in excess may be charged for at the same rate as that charged for ordinary advertisements.

Requests framed in language and ideas prohibited by the Press Law and not bearing the name and address of the writer may be refused.

Article 21

The Minister of Home Affairs may prohibit the circulation of a newspaper, confiscate any issue of it, or order temporary or permanent suspension of a paper should he find its contents prejudicial to the peace and order of the country or to the morale of society.

Article 22

The sum deposited as security shall be returned should a paper suspend issue, forfeit its licence, or be prohibited publication.

Article 23

The sum deposited as security shall be used to meet the expenses of the trial or to discharge a fine inflicted remaining unpaid for one week following the day judgment is pronounced; in case the amount deposited is not sufficient to meet such expenses or fine, the balance shall be collected in accordance with the Act for Enforced Payment as in criminal cases.

Article 24

In case of Court expenses or a fine being met by the deposit made the publisher shall supplement the deposit within a week from the day notice has been given, and publication of the paper shall be discontinued until the deficit in deposit has been made good.

Article 25

In case of an offence against article 11, the publisher, editor and printer shall be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years, and the machinery used in committing the offence shall be confiscated.

Article 26

The publisher and editor of a paper committing an offence against the public peace and order or morality shall be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 months, or a fine of 50 to 300 yen.

Article 27

In case of offences against article 12 and article 16, the editor of the paper shall be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 months, or a fine of 50 to 300 yen.

Article 28

In case of an offence against an order given under article 21, the publisher, editor and printer shall be liable to a fine of 50 to 300 yen.

Article 29

In case of an offence against articles 13 and 14, the editor shall be liable to a fine of 20 to 200 yen.

Article 30

In case a newspaper is published without first obtaining permission as required by article 1, or continues publication contrary to article 23, or not having deposited security prints articles other than those specified in article 5, the publisher shall be liable to a fine of 40 to 100 yen.

Article 31

In case of an offence against articles 18, 19 and 20 (1) the editor shall be liable to a fine of 10 to 100 yen.

Article 32

In case of an offence against articles 3, 6, 10 and 17, the publisher shall be liable to a fine of 10 to 50 yen.

Article 33

In case of an offence against article 15, it shall be considered one of fraud and come under the criminal law provided an appeal has been made by the injured party or by a party specially interested in matter.

Article 34

Newspapers published in foreign countries in the Korean language, in Chinese, or in mixed script, coming in to Korea, or published in Korea by foreigners, may be prohibited circulation or confiscated by the Minister of Home Affairs should their contents be deemed prejudicial to public peace and order or to public morality.

Article 35

Any Korean subject offending against article 34 shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 300 yen.

Article 36

Any Korean knowingly circulating or forwarding a paper prohibited distribution under article 34 shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 50 yen.

Article 37

In the case of those articles rendering the editor liable to punishment being signed by another person, he, too, shall be held equally responsible with the editor.

Article 38

This law shall not apply to offenders against it mitigating their acts by self-surrender, or to those punishable on more than two counts, or for bribery.

SUPPLEMENTARY LAW

Article 39

The regulations of this law apply correspondingly to printed matter of every description whatsoever.

Article 40

This law shall be in force from the day of promulgation.

Article 41

Any newspaper published previous to the promulgation of this law shall bring itself into conformity with the regulations of this law within two months following the day of promulgation.

Note: Lee Chul Wun (Dr. Clarence Rhee), the new Director of the Office of Public Information, made the following statement to the Assembly on the occasion of the assumption of his new office, 14 June 1949:

"I want to express my sincere gratitude for the kindness you showed me during my office as Secretary-General (of the National Assembly), and as the new Director of the Office of Public Information I solicit your closest co-operation and intelligent enlightenment.

"Now our Republic faces a most critical moment. I, as Director of the Office of Public Information, will not spare any effort in attempting to solve the problems before me. This can only be done by the unified effort of both officials and citizens. I believe the primary duty of the Director of the Office of Public Information is to convey the will of the Government thoroughly to the people and thus to enable the people to understand and support the Government. This in itself will pave the way to the whole nation to overcome its difficulties.

"Speaking of the freedom of speech, the Office of Public Information is supposed to be concerned with helping the freedom of speech of the people toward a sound and constructive trend. It is not supposed to suppress the freedom of speech. However, there must be a certain limit beyond which no published remark or speech should go. I shall not allow any such vicious, distorted, false or agitative speeches under any circumstances. I will leave the door wide open for constructive criticism.

"I hope you will give me advice any time, and I shall be very grateful for it. Please do not feel that I have left you. I am hoping to make the office a good agent for both the Government and the National Assembly.

"Speaking of the Kwang Moo newspaper law, I will not use this law any more."

C. National Security Law (Law No. 10 of 1 December 1948) (A/AC.26/W.15)

Article I

Those who betray the Constitution by posing as a government, and those who, in collusion with the betrayers, seek to consolidate or group together with the object of disturbing the tranquility of the State, shall be punished in accordance with the following provisions:

1. Leaders and officers of the organizations or groups shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or hard labour for life, or to no less than three years imprisonment or hard labour.

2. Those who played leading roles shall be sentenced to imprisonment or hard labour for from one to ten years.

3. Those who, with knowledge of the hostile nature of any organizations or groups, have joined the same or taken part in their activities shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years.

Article II

Those who group themselves or form an organization with the aim of murder or of incendiary action and destruction of communication or transportation facilities, together with the officers of the said organization, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years, and those affiliated with such organization shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years.

Though the original object of the organization or group is not criminal in intent, if members of such organizations or groups commit murder, arson, or destruction collectively on the instructions, or with the knowledge of the officers of the organization or group, the latter may be dissolved by the President.

Article III

Those persons who deliberately incite or indulge in propaganda to attain the aims of the organizations or groups mentioned in the two previous articles shall be punished with imprisonment or hard labour for not more than ten years.

Article IV

Those who of their own free will and with knowledge of the hostile nature of such organizations and groups deliberately give weapons, money, supplies, promises, and other things for the purpose of inducing anyone to violate this law shall be punished by hard labour for not more than seven years.

Article V

Those who have committed a crime as specified in this law, but have confessed voluntarily shall have their punishment mitigated or shall be entirely exonerated.

Article VI

Those who bear false witness or give false testimony or abuse their official position with intent to distort the facts concerning the crimes enumerated above shall be punished in accordance with the laws governing such offences.

Addendum

This law shall be effective from the date of its promulgation.

Annex III

TEXTS OF MAIN DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN KOREA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KOREAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP

A. Reports of Sub-Committee III

1. FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE III AND APPENDICES (A/AC.26/SC.4/2)

(1) *Observation and verification of the withdrawal from Korea of United States occupation forces*

In accordance with paragraph 2 of the resolution of the Commission of 20 June 1949, Sub-Committee III has engaged in the observation and verification of the withdrawal of United States occupation forces from Korea. It has witnessed the last scheduled embarkations of United States troops at the port of Inchon, 21 June and 29 June. Except for some military personnel still stationed at Kimpo Airport, but soon to be withdrawn, all United States occupation forces appear now to have been withdrawn from Korea. The officers and men comprised in the Korean Military Advisory Group are stated not to fall in the category of occupation forces.

The Sub-Committee is now engaged in verifying the fact of withdrawal of United States occupation forces. In that connexion, it has taken the following steps:

(a) Under date of 23 June 1949, the Sub-Committee addressed to the Ambassador of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea requests for information required to enable it to verify the fact of withdrawal. The requests for information correspond to information requirements set forth in the report of Sub-Committee III of 16 June 1949⁶⁶ approved by the Commission on 20 June 1949. The texts of these requests are annexed (appendices (a) and (b))

(b) The Sub-Committee is presently engaged in visiting the sites of former major military establishments where United States occupation forces had been stationed. It has already visited the Camp Sobingo and Ascom City-Inchon areas. Visits to Pusan and Kwang-ju will conclude this aspect of its work.

(2) *Observation and verification of the withdrawal from Korea of the occupation forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

Sub-Committee III has considered the question of the application of the Commission's resolution of 20 June 1949 to the occupation forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In discussions at the 3rd, 4th and 5th meetings of the Sub-Committee, it was agreed to recommend to the Commission the employment of the following procedure for this purpose: transmission to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, over the signature of the Chairman of the Commission, of a request to convey to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the information contained in the attached *aide-mémoire* (appendix (c)).

⁶⁶ A/AC.26/SC.4/1.

APPENDICES

(a) LETTER TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF SUB-COMMITTEE III

Seoul, 23 June 1949

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a resolution concerning the observation and verification of the withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea, adopted by the Commission at its 35th meeting on 20 June 1949. You will observe from a reading of the second paragraph of the resolution in question that the Commission has charged Sub-Committee III, of which I am Chairman, with the actual task of observation and verification of the withdrawal of occupation forces.

Sub-Committee III has studied and reported to the Commission on the question of the information which will be required in order to permit observation and verification of the withdrawal of the occupation forces of the United States now in progress. That report has been approved by the Commission.

The following is the information which the Sub-Committee seeks to obtain:

A. Matériel

In respect of *matériel*, the task of the Commission will be to ascertain whether military equipment subject to the control of the United States is being retained in Korea. In view of the short interval of time remaining before completion of withdrawal operations of the United States, only verification and not observation of this aspect of the withdrawal will be possible.

It is believed that a verification sufficient to enable the Commission to report, on information and belief, that military *matériel* of the United States occupation forces had been withdrawn from Korea and that, as to the remaining *matériel*, the United States had divested itself of control, can be made on the basis of the following information: a statement, supported by documentary evidence such as inventories, military orders, bills of lading, and evidences of transfer of title from the United States to the Republic of Korea for the period 1 January 1949 to the completion of withdrawal, of stocks on hand, in-shipments, out-shipments, and transfers to the Korean security forces of the numbers and quantities of *matériel* broken down by military and non-military types.

The Sub-Committee, accordingly, requests that the foregoing information be furnished by the Government of the United States. A request for information concerning transfers of United States *matériel* to the Korean security forces is being addressed simultaneously to the Government of the Republic of Korea.

The Sub-Committee is aware that considerations of military security must be taken into account in determining the procedures governing the disclosure, transmission and publication of the required information. For that reason, it is suggested that there be an exchange of views concerning means of making a complete dis-

closure, while meeting the necessary security requirements at the same time.

B. Personnel

The Sub-Committee will observe such outshipments of personnel of United States occupation forces as are still to take place. For purposes of verification, the Sub-Committee desires to have the following information: copies of the orders directing the out-movements of United States military personnel from 1 January 1949 to the completion of the withdrawal, together with the necessary rosters and such other evidence as will show definitive departure from Korea. As a further step toward verification of the withdrawal of military personnel, the Commission desires to visit the sites of the major military establishments where the occupation forces have been stationed after 1 January 1949 in order to determine that no occupation forces still remain there. Your assistance in providing facilities for such visits would be appreciated.

C. Korean Military Advisory Group

The Sub-Committee desires to have a detailed statement concerning the status of the Korean Military Advisory Group and its functions and powers, particularly in respect of any formal rights or *de facto* exercise of control over: (1) the disposition of *matériel* transferred to the Korean security forces; and (2) the activities of those forces themselves. In this connexion, the Sub-Committee would require copies of the agreement or agreements between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Korea affecting the status, functions, and powers of the Korean Military Advisory Group. A similar request for information is being addressed to the Government of the Republic of Korea.

(Signed) A. B. JAMIESON,
Chairman, Sub-Committee III,
United Nations Commission on Korea

(b) LETTER TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF SUB-COMMITTEE III

Seoul, 23 June 1949

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a resolution concerning the observation and verification of the withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea, adopted by the Commission at its 35th meeting on 20 June 1949. You will observe from a reading of the second paragraph of the resolution in question that the Commission has charged Sub-Committee III, of which I am Chairman, with the actual task of observation and verification of the withdrawal of occupation forces.

Sub-Committee III has studied and reported to the Commission on the question of the information which will be required in order to permit observation and verification of the withdrawal of the occupation forces of the United States now in progress. That report has been approved by the Commission.

The following is the information which the Sub-Committee seeks to obtain:

A. Matériel

In respect of *matériel*, the task of the Commission will be to ascertain whether military equipment subject to the control of the United States is being retained in Korea. In view of the short interval of time remaining before completion of the withdrawal operations of the United States only verification and not observation of this aspect of the withdrawal will be possible.

It is believed that a verification sufficient to enable the Commission to report, on information and belief, that military *matériel* of the United States occupation forces had been withdrawn from Korea and that, as to the remaining *matériel*, the United States had divested itself of control, can be made on the basis of the following information: a statement, supported by documentary evidence such as inventories, military orders, bills of lading, and evidences of transfers of title from the United States to the Republic of Korea for the period 1 January 1949 to the completion of withdrawal, of stocks on hand, inshipments, outshipments, and transfers to the Korean security forces of the numbers and quantities of *matériel* broken down by military and non-military types.

The Sub-Committee, accordingly, has addressed a request to the Government of the United States for the foregoing information. As a means of making independent verification of the information to be supplied by the United States concerning transfers of United States *matériel* to the Korean security forces, the Sub-Committee desires to obtain from the Government of the Republic of Korea a documented statement in the same terms as that requested from the Government of the United States concerning transfers of military *matériel* from the United States to the Korean security forces for the period 1 January 1949 to the date of completion of the withdrawal.

The Sub-Committee is aware that considerations of military security must be taken into account in determining the procedures governing the disclosure, transmission and publication of the required information. For that reason, it is suggested that there be an exchange of views concerning means of making a complete disclosure, while meeting the necessary security requirements at the same time.

B. Korean Military Advisory Group

The Sub-Committee desires to have from your Government a detailed statement concerning the status of the Korean Military Advisory Group and its functions and powers, particularly in respect of any formal rights or *de facto* exercise of control over: (1) the disposition of *matériel* transferred to the Korean security forces; and (2) the activities of those forces themselves. In this connexion, the Sub-Committee wishes to obtain from your Government copies of the agreement or agreements between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Korea affecting the status, functions and powers of the Korean Military Advisory Group. A similar request for information is being addressed to the Government of the United States.

(Signed) A. B. JAMIESON,
Chairman, Sub-Committee III,
United Nations Commission on Korea

(c) COMMUNICATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION TOGETHER WITH AN AIDE-MEMOIRE

Seoul, June 1949

On the instructions of the United Nations Commission on Korea, I have the honour to request you to convey the information contained in the attached *aide-mémoire* to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(Signed) Anup SINGH, Chairman,
United Nations Commission on Korea

AIDE-MEMOIRE

The United Nations Commission on Korea, by resolution adopted at its 33rd meeting on 13 June 1949, established Sub-Committee III, charged it to examine and report to the Commission procedures to be employed in the observation and verification of the withdrawal of United States occupation forces from Korea. By resolution adopted at its 35th meeting on 20 June 1949, the Commission charged Sub-Committee III with the task of actual observation and verification of the withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea. The texts of both resolutions are attached.

In accordance with the directions contained in the resolution of 20 June 1949, Sub-Committee III has completed its observation of the withdrawal of United States occupation forces from Korea and is now engaged in a verification of the fact of such withdrawal.

Sub-Committee III now stands ready, in respect of the occupation forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whenever proper facilities are afforded for the purpose, to carry out on behalf of the Commission the duties laid upon the latter by paragraph 4 (d) of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948.

8. SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE III AND APPENDICES (A/AC.26/SC.4/13)

1. Since the date of the first progress report of Sub-Committee III, the Sub-Committee has been engaged in verification of the fact of withdrawal of United States occupation forces from Korea. In that connexion, it has taken the following steps in addition to those previously reported:

(a) One of its members, Captain F. Sánchez-Hernández, alternate representative of El Salvador, accompanied by three members of the secretariat, inspected the former United States military installations at Pusan from 9 to 10 July 1949 and verified that no United States military personnel remained there, except for a number of officers forming part of the Korean Military Advisory group and not considered to fall in the category of occupation forces. A visit to Kwang-ju was cancelled as it was considered to be unnecessary.

(b) As stated in the first progress report, similar visits of verification had already been made to the Camp Sobingo and Ascom City-Inchon areas.

(c) On 5 July 1949, a meeting took place between members of Sub-Committee III and the Ambassador of the United States of America for

the purpose of an exchange of views on means of making a complete disclosure of information concerning transfer of United States military *matériel* to the Korean security forces, as suggested in the letter of 23 June to the Ambassador from the Chairman of the Sub-Committee. Other questions were also discussed. As a result of that exchange of views,⁶⁷ it was agreed that the Ambassador of the United States would furnish the Sub-Committee with the following:

(i) Information on the exact function and status of the Korean Military Advisory Group and a copy of any agreement to be concluded between the Governments of the United States and of the Republic of Korea relating thereto;

(ii) A statement that troop withdrawal had been completed, together with a chart showing the stages of withdrawal;

(iii) A statement that United States military occupation of Korea had ceased as of midnight on 30 June 1949.

On 21 July 1949, the Chairman addressed a request to the Ambassador of the United States for additional information on the following points:

(iv) The lapse of the right previously possessed by the Government of the United States to take control of the Korean Army in any specified area;

(v) The authority under which the transfer of military *matériel* had been made to the Korean security forces before the completion of troop withdrawals and the authority under which such transfers would be made after that time;

(vi) The arrangement under which United States Air Force personnel continued to be maintained at Kimpo Airport.

(d) The foregoing information has now been furnished to the Sub-Committee. It is contained in two communications to the Chairman of the Sub-Committee from the Ambassador of the United States under dates of 8 July 1949 (appendix (a) and 25 July 1949 (appendix (b)) and in a communication made on behalf of the Ambassador of the United States by Brigadier General W. L. Roberts, Chief, United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, under date of 16 July 1949 (appendix (c)).

(e) The Sub-Committee has had no reply to its letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea on 23 June 1949 in which it requested information concerning the transfer of *matériel* from the United States to the Republic of Korea.

(f) The Sub-Committee met on 27 July 1949 to consider the findings to be reported to the Commission in respect of the verification of the withdrawal from Korea of the United States occupation forces.

2. The Sub-Committee has the honour to report to the Commission that it has completed its task in respect of verification of the withdrawal of United States occupation troops from Korea, and presents the following findings for approval:

⁶⁷ A/AC.26/SC.4/14.

As of 30 June 1949 the only United States troops remaining in Korea were some fifty Air Force personnel who will be stationed at Kimpo Airport until arrangements for civilian administration can be instituted, and the personnel of the Korean Military Advisory Group, which has an authorized strength of 500 men.

The Sub-Committee has not been able to verify the disposition made of United States military *matériel* in Korea because the information requested in this connexion has not been supplied to it. The Sub-Committee has not, however, considered that it was essential to press for such information. The Ambassador of the United States has adduced considerations of military security affecting the Republic of Korea which appear to the Sub-Committee to be cogent.

3. The Sub-Committee is satisfied, on the basis of its observations and of the information which it has obtained, that the following are the facts concerning the withdrawal of United States occupation forces from Korea.

(a) The withdrawal of the United States occupation forces in Korea was completed on 29 June 1949, with the exception of the fifty-odd Air Force personnel referred to above;

(b) With the lapse on 30 June 1949 of the executive agreement relating to interim military and security matters between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General, USAFIK, of 24 August 1948, the right of the Government of the United States and the authority of the Commanding General, USAFIK, to assume control of the Korean security forces lapsed and no such right or authority now exists in the Government of the United States or the Chief of the Korean Military Advisory Group;

(c) The United States Government no longer possesses or controls any military equipment in Korea except the side-arms and motor vehicles remaining in the possession of the Korean Military Advisory Group. As of the date of completion of United States troop withdrawal, the United States had transferred all its military *matériel* in Korea to the Korean security forces, except for such *matériel* as had been withdrawn with the troops. Such transfers were made under the provisions of the United States Surplus Property Act of 1944 as amended. Deliveries of *matériel* other than those referred to above would have to be made under legislative authorization in effect at the time.

APPENDICES

(a) COMMUNICATION TO THE CHAIRMAN OF SUB-COMMITTEE III FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Seoul, 8 July 1949

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 23 June 1949, and to the exchange of views which I had with your Committee on 5 July 1949 on the subject of the observation and verification of the withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea.

I should like to confirm that the withdrawal of the United States military forces in Korea was completed on 29 June 1949, and the United States military occupation organization, known as "USAFIK," was deactivated as of midnight, 30 June 1949. At the same time, the executive agree-

ment relating to interim military and security matters entered into between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General, USAFIK, on 24 August 1948, automatically lapsed.

The United States Government no longer possesses or controls any military equipment in Korea except the side-arms and motor vehicles remaining in the possession of the Korean Military Advisory Group.

The Korean Military Advisory Group is remaining in Korea at the request of the Government of the Republic of Korea for the purpose of advising and assisting the Korean Government in the development and training of the Korean security forces. The Korean Military Advisory Group is a constituent element of the American Mission in Korea and has an authorized strength of not more than 500 military personnel. The Korean Military Advisory Group is now carrying on its functions on the basis of an informal understanding with the Korean Government. The Government of the United States proposes to negotiate a formal agreement with the Korean Government at an early date pertaining to the organization and functioning of the Advisory Group.

As soon as such an agreement is concluded, I shall be glad to make a copy of the signed agreement available to your Committee.

(Signed) John J. MUCCIO
Ambassador

(b) COMMUNICATION TO THE CHAIRMAN OF SUB-COMMITTEE III FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Seoul, 25 July 1949

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 21 July 1949, in which you requested written confirmation of certain points pertaining to verification by the United Nations Commission on Korea of the withdrawal of the United States occupation forces from Korea. I am glad to take up below, seriatim, the points raised in your letter under reference:

1. In my letter to you of 8 July 1949, I confirmed that the "withdrawal of the United States Military forces in Korea was completed on 29 June 1949, and the United States military occupation organization, known as 'USAFIK,' was deactivated as of midnight, 30 June 1949. At the same time, the executive agreement relating to interim military and security matters entered into between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General, USAFIK, on 24 August 1948, automatically lapsed". The authority of the Commanding General, USAFIK, to assume control of the Korean security forces, under certain conditions, stemmed from that executive agreement. With the lapsing of that agreement and the deactivation of USAFIK, neither the Government of the United States nor the Chief, KMAG, has any authority to take control of the Korean security forces.

2. All *matériel* transferred to the Korean security forces before the completion of troop withdrawal, plus a small quantity still in transit, was made available to the Korean Government under the provisions of the Surplus Property Act of

1944 as amended. Any deliveries of *matériel*, apart from those referred to above, would have to be made under legislative authorization in effect at the time.

3. United States Air Force personnel continue to be stationed at Kimpo Airport pursuant to informal arrangement with the Korean Government for the purpose of insuring the uninterrupted operation of the Airport pending completion of more formal arrangements respecting the future operation of the Airport. The strength of the United States Air Force unit at Kimpo is being progressively reduced and now comprises seven officers and fifty-two men. Subject to agreement with the Korean Government and the appropriation of funds by the United States Congress, it is contemplated that the Civil Aeronautics Authority will assume operation of the Airport at an early date. It is hoped that withdrawal of United States Air Force personnel from the Airport will be completed by 1 September 1949.

I wish further to confirm that the chart transmitted by General Roberts to you showing stages of withdrawal of United States occupation forces from Korea was sent in my behalf.

(Signed) John J. MUCCIO
Ambassador

(c) COMMUNICATION TO THE CHAIRMAN OF SUB-COMMITTEE III FROM THE CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

San Francisco, 16 July 1949

In accordance with your request, I have the honor to transmit herewith a report showing the

progressive outshipment of tactical troops of the United States Army from the Republic of Korea.

The tabulation appended hereto as inclosure No. 1 is self explanatory. It shows in the left hand column the unit concerned, in the next two columns the date of inactivation or outshipment. The authorized strength together with progressive reductions are shown in the next columns. It should be noted that all USAFIK personnel remaining in Korea on 13 June 1949 were on that date transferred to Headquarters and Headquarters Company USAFIK, which thereupon had a personnel strength of 1,703.

All 5th Regimental Combat Team personnel remained assigned to the Regimental Combat Team which on that date had a strength of 2,162. By 20 June 1949, air and surface outshipments including those on USAT *Munimori* which sailed that date had reduced the personnel to 1,703 and 1,600 respectively; and by 29 June, air and surface transportation to include the USAT *Beaudoin* and the USAT *Brewster* had reduced tactical troop strength in Korea to zero except for Captain Gregory of the Adjutant General Department and one assistant who stayed behind to verify the count; these two left by air 1 July 1949.

I trust that the attached tabulation and the explanation given above will meet your needs and will show that the withdrawal of United States Army tactical units from the Republic of Korea was completed on 29 June 1949.

(Signed) W. L. ROBERTS
Brigadier General, USA
Chief, United States
Advisory Group to the
Republic of Korea

HQ USAFIK

Unit	Date of inactivation	Date of shipment	Authorized strength		Actual Strength										
					May					June					
					OFF	EM	2	9	16	23	30	6	13	20	23
HQ USAFIK	June 28		69	107	206	205	199	199	131	131	185	1,703	1,000	0	0
HQ CO USAFIK	June 28		7	105	104	114	112	112	86	86					
235 APU	June 18		1	15	15	15	15	15	5	5	0	0	0	0	0
360 DENT PROS	May 20		2	6	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
152 FIN DISB SEC	June 22		3	24	37	20	22	22	9	9	6	0	0	0	0
249 MED DET	May 20		2	8	8	8	18	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
971 CIC DET	May 20		5	1	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

5th RCT

Unit	(Compl date)	June 29	Actual Strength											
			May 27	May 27	May 27	May 27	May 27	May 27	May 27	May 27	May 27	May 27	May 27	
5th INF REGT		152	2,898	3,167	2,973	2,951	2,951	2,354	2,354	2,162	1,600	800	0	0
555 FA BN		36	473	539	468	469	469	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
72 ENGR (C) CO		5	162	173	161	161	161	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
58 CAV RCN TRP		6	151	167	162	161	161	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12 MED COLL CO		5	130	95	93	93	93	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
317 HID	May 20	7	35	21	20	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
517 EUD	June 25	9	139	197	183	184	184	140	140	134	0	0	0	0
282 ARMY BAND	May 20	1	28	35	35	35	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

USAFIK SPECIAL TROOPS

Unit	Date of inactiva- tion	Date of shipment	Authorized strength	Actual Strength											
				May						June					
				OFF	EM	2	9	16	23	30	6	13	20	23	29
HQ & HQ DET...	June 28			25	92	2	9	16	23	30	6	13	20	23	29
4 ORD MM CO	12			9	186	219	194	191	191	88	88	148	0	0	0
371 ORD AMMO SUP	12			1	22	23	20	18	18	12	12	6	0	0	0
510 EUD	20			12	214	232	223	222	222	175	175	87	0	0	0
514 ORD DET	28			1	17	33	22	21	21	28	28	29	0	0	0
35 TC TRK CO	25			5	103	121	124	124	124	121	121	91	0	0	0
536 TC TRK CO	25			4	78	69	88	86	86	89	89	53	0	0	0
90 TC HAR CFT CO	4			29	56	84	79	73	73	69	69	0	0	0	0
3 MED PORT	28			19	168	194	180	178	178	163	163	136	0	0	0
76 SIG SVBN	3			38	457	483	416	412	412	135	135	0	0	0	0
55 MP CO	25			4	97	128	123	119	119	79	79	76	0	0	0
207 MP SV CO	15			13	196	191	161	149	199	86	86	15	0	0	0
25 CID	15			9	2	12	11	11	11	10	10	10	0	0	0
576 QM SV CO	10			7	162	182	168	159	159	106	106	0	0	0	0
594 QM DEP SUP CO	25			8	178	186	165	162	162	105	105	93	0	0	0
382 STA HOSP	22			47	162	212	184	183	183	110	110	64	0	0	0
	May														
874 OPT RPR TM	20			1	6	3	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
535 MED SUP DET	22			1	13	11	10	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
143 VET FD INSP	20			1	4	5	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	June														
1st BN, 5th INF		29		35	825										
2nd BN, 5th INF		21		35	825										
3rd BN, 5th INF		20		35	825										

B. Communications from the Ambassador of the United States of America to the Commission, and his hearing before the Commission

1. LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION FROM THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TRANSMITTING A COPY OF HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF TROOP WITHDRAWAL (A/AC.26/14)

Seoul, 14 April 1949

I have the honour to transmit a copy of a letter which I have addressed today to the President of the Republic of Korea, paragraph 4 of which relates specifically to the question of troop withdrawal.

It is the policy of my Government to keep the Commission fully informed of all steps taken that may affect its activities, and I shall therefore keep the Commission currently informed of developments relating to this subject.

(Signed) John J. MUCCIO
Special Representative

(Text of the letter)

Seoul, 14 April 1949

I have the honour to confirm the statements I made to you this afternoon that American diplomatic officers have been authorized to communicate to Governments to which they are accredited that the present position of the United States Government with respect to Korea is as follows:

1. It is the United States view that the United Nations has already made substantial progress toward restoring freedom and independence of the Korean people and that in the General Assembly resolution of 12 December it has a formula for pursuing that progress to fruition.

2. The United States believes consolidation of existing gains and success of further United Nations efforts in Korea will depend in large measure on firm and unwavering support by United Nations Member States of the 12 December resolution and endorsement of the Government of Republic of Korea contained therein.

3. In this connexion the United States feels every assistance and facility should be afforded the new United Nations Commission on Korea established under the 12 December resolution in its efforts to help the Korean people and their lawful government to achieve goal of free and united Korea, a goal to which the United States is convinced an overwhelming majority of Koreans of both north and south wholeheartedly aspire.

4. United States position on troop withdrawal is based on the view that to withdraw its occupation forces prematurely or to permit their retention on Korean soil for any longer than is necessary would in either case be to jeopardize attainment of United Nations objectives in Korea. Accordingly, and in keeping with the spirit of the General Assembly resolutions on Korea, the United States has during the past several months effected substantial reduction of its occupation forces in Korea. Such United States forces as still remain do so at the request of the Korean Government pending further development of its own rapidly improving security forces and, in accordance with the 12 December resolution, will be withdrawn "as early as practicable", hopefully in matter of months, subject to consultation with the United Nations Commission.

5. In addition to supporting procedures set forth in the 12 December resolution, and quite apart from question of troop withdrawal, it is the United States intention to continue to provide economic, technical, military and other assistance regarded as essential to economic and political stability of the newborn Republic.

6. The United States is convinced the main burden of responsibility for the failure of United

Nations efforts so far to achieve final solution of Korean problem must be placed on the Soviet Union and its evident determination to subordinate legitimate aspirations and welfare of the Korean people to its own objective of communist domination of the entire Korean peninsula. The United States believes further this obstacle can be overcome only through united support of United Nations decision as envisaged in paragraph 2 above.

I would appreciate an expression of your Excellency's views regarding the United States position on troop withdrawal as outlined in paragraph four above.

I may add that as the United States regards the Korean problem as one of international concern, and in line with the general policy of keeping the United Nations Commission on Korea fully informed of any action that may affect its activities, I am furnishing that Commission with a copy of this letter.

(Signed) John J. MUCCIO
Special Representative

2. LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TRANSMITTING A COPY OF HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KOREAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP (A/AC.26/14/Add.1)

Seoul, 2 May 1949

In accordance with the second paragraph of my letter of 14 April 1949, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter which I have addressed as of this date to the President of the Republic of Korea regarding the establishment of a Korean Military Advisory Group.

(Signed) John J. MUCCIO
Ambassador

(Text of the letter)

Seoul, 2 May 1949

I have the honour to refer to your request for a United States military and naval mission and to recent references thereto in our discussions looking towards setting a date for the early withdrawal of United States occupation forces.

As you know there has been in existence on a provisional basis for more than eight months a United States military mission known as the Provisional Military Advisory Group whose function it has been to advise and assist the Korean Government in the development and training of its own security forces. It is the judgment of my Government that, due in no small part to the spirit of eager co-operation which has been shown by the Korean Government and its responsible officials, the work of the Provisional Military Advisory Group has contributed significantly to raising the capabilities of the security forces of the Republic of Korea. This judgment would seem to be substantiated by your own recent statement to the effect that Korean defense forces "are now rapidly approaching the point at which our security can be assured, provided the Republic of Korea is not called upon to face attack from foreign sources".

In order to assure the continuance of this progress without further dependence upon the presence of United States occupation forces in Korea, my Government has decided to establish an augmented Korean Military Advisory Group to function as a part of the American Mission in Korea, with responsibility for the training mission heretofore undertaken by the Provisional Military Advisory Group. Under my over-all direction as Ambassador, the Korean Military Advisory Group will be headed by Brigadier General William L. Roberts, presently Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, and Commanding Officer of the Provisional Military Advisory Group. Further details concerning the composition of the new military advisory group will be discussed at an appropriate time with the proper officials of your Government.

(Signed) John J. MUCCIO
Ambassador

3. EXCERPTS FROM THE HEARING OF THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING TROOP WITHDRAWAL (A/AC.26/SR.33)

The CHAIRMAN stated that he and the Principal Secretary, in accordance with a decision made at the previous meeting, had visited the United States Ambassador (Mr. Muccio) and invited him to meet with the Commission to review the question of the withdrawal of United States troops from Korea. The Commission was also interested in learning how the Ambassador and General Roberts envisaged the technical process of co-operation with the Commission in its observation of withdrawal.

Mr. Muccio had accepted the invitation immediately and was now present with General Roberts, Commanding General of United States Army Forces in Korea. The Ambassador was invited to make a general statement concerning the background of the withdrawal. Members might then ask questions which he could answer or not as he chose, either on or off the record.

Mr. MUCCIO expressed pleasure at the opportunity to meet with the Commission, and recalled the informal exchange of views he had had with some members of the Commission on 15 May. Other members had not been present, and clarification might be required as to certain points raised in that discussion.

The General Assembly resolution of 14 November 1947 had provided for withdrawal by the occupying Powers of their armed forces "as early as practicable and if possible within ninety days". But in view of the delay in considering the Korean problem at the Paris session of the General Assembly, the matter of troop withdrawal had not actually been considered until some time later than had at first been anticipated.

On 6 and 7 February 1949, United States Secretary of the Army Royall and General Wedemeyer had spent some time in Seoul and had reviewed with President Rhee and Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Lee Bum Suk the question of providing the Korean Army with equipment, arms and ammunition. Secretary Royall had outlined certain plans which had been formulated by the best American military talent in Korea and referred to General MacArthur's headquarters and to Washington for further study. The

need to continue the task force then in being and the then provisional United States Military Advisory Group had been discussed in the light of plans to continue the programme of equipping and training Korean security forces which were growing in strength.

Later Mr. Muccio had been called to Washington for consultations on the matter with appropriate officials of his Government. Immediately upon returning to Korea, he had discussed the question of troop withdrawal with President Rhee. As a result of this exchange of views, President Rhee had stated on 19 April that the time was fast approaching when Korean security forces would be equal to coping with the situation.

In a further conference between American and Korean authorities the previous Monday, President Rhee had expressed the view that retention of United States military forces in Korea would not "mean much". He was more interested in a statement by American authorities that the United States would stand by Korea; such a statement would have a more salutary effect than retention of a small task force.

Withdrawal of United States forces from Korea had in effect been under way for some time, during which the large number of troop originally present had been gradually reduced, in pace with the increasing capabilities of the Korean security forces. The question now was not one of withdrawal, but of the time of its completion. The bulk of United States combat forces would leave Korea between the 21st and 30th of the current month. Mr. Muccio assured the Commission that he and General Roberts, commanding United States Army Forces in Korea and Chief of the Korean Military Advisory Group, would be glad to do everything possible to facilitate the Commission's observation and verification of the completion of the withdrawals.

The exact technique to be employed in observation and verification was a matter for the Commission to decide, but the United States authorities were prepared to extend whatever co-operation was requested. Mr. Muccio did not know to what extent the Commission might have discussed the matter with the Korean authorities, but was confident that the latter would have no hesitancy in providing full facilities to the Commission during the final period of troop withdrawal.

Mr. Muccio offered to leave with the Commission a copy of a policy statement on Korea issued that morning by the State Department in Washington. In the minds of many people in Korea, withdrawal of the United States task force was associated with a fear that the United States was abandoning Korea. The main purpose of the statement was to assure the Korean people that the United States was not abandoning Korea, but considered the withdrawal as merely a further step in normalizing relations between the Governments of the United States and Korea.

The CHAIRMAN asked whether any request for military aid for Korea had been submitted to Congress.

Mr. MUCCIO replied that no Congressional authorization had been required for transfers to Korean security forces so far of arms, equipment and ammunition, which had been supplied directly by the United States Army under the Surplus Property Act. Most of the United States

military equipment in Korea had already been turned over to Korean authorities, and the rest would be transferred before the troop withdrawals were completed.

Congressional authorization would be required for continued support of Korean combat forces in future. Korean requirements for the future would be subject to the general programme of military assistance to other countries which was now before Congress.

Mr. LUNA (Philippines) asked for clarification of a slight legal point on which he had doubts. The General Assembly resolution of 14 November 1947 recommended that Korea's future national government should arrange with the occupying Powers for troop withdrawal. It thus appeared that the Government of Korea should take the initiative in the matter. Yet the decision seemed to have been made already by the United States State Department without regard for the role of the Korean Government.

Mr. MUCCIO thought there was a meeting of minds between the Korean and United States Governments, as a result of his own discussions with Korean authorities as well as those of Army Secretary Royall and General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SINGH (India) asked Mr. Muccio's opinion as to whether the Korean Government was actually reconciled to the idea of United States troop withdrawal or was likely to make further protests, in view of public controversy concerning the issue. For example, a public meeting scheduled for 11 June to protest the withdrawal was ostensibly inspired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. MUCCIO said the main concern of the Korean Government had always been not to prevent the withdrawal, but to be assured of an adequate supply of equipment and ammunition before it took place.

In reply to a question by the CHAIRMAN, Mr. MUCCIO stated that the authorized strength of the Korean Military Advisory Group to be retained in Korea was 500 officers and men. Upon completion of the withdrawal, no other United States military personnel would remain in Korea, except for a few temporary residual groups such as that at Kimp'o Airport. Discussions were under way concerning arrangements to replace such personnel, who would remain for a few weeks at most.

Mr. SINGH (India) pointed out that the Commission was obliged to report on military as well as other developments which had occurred during its stay in Korea, and asked whether it would receive details of withdrawal movements effected during that period.

Mr. MUCCIO said he would be glad to furnish the Commission with full details of such movements, including dates and numbers of troops involved.

Mr. MAGAÑA (El Salvador) hoped General Roberts would clarify the manner in which the Commission could observe and verify the final withdrawals. He had prepared a list of seven questions; the answers to some might be deleted from the record as constituting military secrets.

His first question concerned the total number of personnel in each occupation force.

General ROBERTS said the United States occupation forces numbered approximately 8,000.

Mr. MUCCIO said he could make the general statement that United States troops were distributed principally in the areas of Inchon, Ascom City and Seoul. He would be glad to furnish full details in reply to certain other questions. Korean security forces had received a good portion of the supplies intended for them; others were being turned over to them, and all would have been delivered before the United States forces left.

He thought the Korean Government should be asked to furnish information as to where the supply depots were located, if the Commission found it essential. Relations between the Korean Government and the United States Korean Military Advisory Group were now under consideration.

Mr. JAMIESON (Australia) wished, without prejudice to whatever position the Commission might take in future, to hear Mr. Muccio's comment on section 4 (d) of the General Assembly resolution, which empowered the Commission to request the assistance of military experts of the two occupying Powers.

Mr. MUCCIO said he had discussed the point with General Roberts, who would be glad to furnish any personnel for this purpose which the Commission felt that it desired or required.

General ROBERTS confirmed that he would furnish full data on troop dispositions and sailings, and invited the Commission to watch the actual embarkations.

Mr. JAMIESON (Australia) wondered if the United States authorities interpreted section 4 (d) of the resolution to mean that their Government would furnish experts to observe withdrawal of USSR forces and vice versa.

The CHAIRMAN observed that the real question would be what the drafters of the resolution sponsored by the United States delegation at the Paris Assembly had in mind.

Mr. MUCCIO said United States authorities were prepared to furnish the Commission with full facilities for observation; it was for the Commission to ascertain what the Soviets would do in the north.

He did not know how the United States delegation in Paris had interpreted section 4 (c).

Mr. LUNA (Philippines) recalled that the Commission had received copies of two letters addressed by the Ambassador to President Rhee. Did the Ambassador care to inform the Commission as to whether the President had replied to these letters?

Mr. MUCCIO said the first letter, dated 14 April, had been mainly an outline or clarification of the position of the United States *vis-à-vis* Korea and the United Nations; it had not called for a reply. The second letter, dated 2 May, announcing establishment of the Korean Military Advisory Group, had been itself a reply to a request advanced by the Korean Government on several occasions, particularly at the time of Secretary Royall's visit. Details of the relationship between the Military Advisory Group and the Korean Army were now under consideration. Relations so far had been highly satisfactory, and no difficulty was anticipated.

Mr. Muccio wished to correct an impression prevalent in some quarters that his letter had been sent to the Commission for its information only.

The position of his Government had been that the Commission was an international body, and that questions as to interpretation of its terms of reference were not proper subjects for United States intervention. Clarification of its duties and responsibilities under the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948 appeared to be reserved to the competence of the Commission, of which the United States was not a member.

He had therefore phrased his letter carefully to avoid any indication as to what the United States expected the Commission to do or not to do. Such decisions rested entirely with the Commission.

Mr. LIU (China) wished to put a hypothetical case in connexion with the question asked by the Australian representative. If the Commission should so interpret the resolution as to invite Russian experts to observe the United States withdrawals from South Korea, and if the Russians accepted the invitation, would United States military officials in South Korea object?

Mr. MUCCIO replied that Korean authorities had not been consulted and that this was their country, but that as far as the United States was concerned, there would be no objection, provided of course that American experts were given reciprocal rights in North Korea.

The CHAIRMAN thanked the Ambassador for his explanations and for the good will with which he had replied to questions.

4. LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CONFIRMING HIS STATEMENT BEFORE THE COMMISSION (A/AC.26/14/Add.2)

Seoul, 11 June 1949

I have the honour to refer to the appearance of myself and the Commanding General USAFIK before the Commission on 9 June 1949, and to confirm herewith my verbal statement that my Government was prepared to co-operate to the fullest with the Commission in order to assist it in observing and verifying the withdrawal of United States troops from Korea in accordance with paragraph 4 of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948.

The Commanding General USAFIK will be glad to furnish the Commission with the services of any United States military experts which the Commission may feel that it requires, and in addition will make available full details of the troop withdrawal operation.

(Signed) John J. MUCCIO
Ambassador

C. Communications from members of the National Assembly and patriotic organizations regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and the establishment of military missions in Korea

1. PETITION FROM MR. KIM YAK SOO, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND OTHER MEMBERS, URGING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM KOREA (A/AC.26/NC.2)

Seoul, 18 March 1949

The whole people of Korea is grateful to you for having come to this country to accelerate the

democratic development of this country. Needless to say that the Republic of Korea is confronted with a grave national crisis at present and this crisis can be got through only by giving solution to those basic problems which now lie before the whole nation. From this standpoint and by way of facilitating your work in Korea, we desire to have the privilege of making a few suggestions. Your responsibility for this country is indeed great, because you are expected not only to make the foreign forces evacuate this country but to put this evacuation under strict supervision so that the peaceful unification of our fatherland may be effected and the democratic development may be carried out. Were this responsibility to be successfully fulfilled on your part, the spontaneous expression of the national opinion should first of all be respected. This respect for the national opinion means the exclusion from Korea of foreign influences and of the pressures from outside quarters, and therefore is in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The territorial division of Korea between south and north and the consequent split of thirty million people in the divided zones are caused by the long-term occupation of Korea by foreign forces.

Accordingly the origin of all those difficult problems which now beset the nation is not in the Korean people themselves but is in the fact that the self-determining power of the Korean people is now absent because of the prevailing foreign influences in this country. As is well known, the Korean people is highly civilized and is very proud of its long historical background spreading over more than 5,000 years. They love peace and do not desire war. Moreover, in settling our present national crisis, the idea of the nation is very far from such an undertaking as military conquest of north by south or vice versa. What the people of Korea most earnestly desire to do is to effect the peaceful unification of our fatherland and to reject the idea of Korea's repeating the undesirable example of Greece. This is the most earnest and prevalent opinion of the whole Korean people and it is specially requested that you would kindly assist the Republic of Korea so that its Government may effect the unification of Korea by the peaceful method referred to above. Lastly it cannot be too strongly stressed that unless foreign influences are completely withdrawn from this country, the objective for which you have come to this country will be entirely frustrated.

(Signed by)

Representative :

Kim Yak Soo
Kang Wock Choong
Pak Yun Won
Whang Byung Kyu
Ro Il Whan
Whang Yun Ho
Kim Byung Hoi
Choi Tai Kyu
Kim Dong Choon
Cho Wok Hyun
Kim Bong Doo
Chung Chin Keun
Pak Ki Woom
Ryu Chun Sang
Kim Choong Ki
Ryu Kong Kyun
Wong Chang Kill
Ree Seung Woo

Ree Moon Won
Baik Hyung Nam
Seu Yong Kill
Kim Yong Chai
Son Chai Hak
Rym Suk Kyu
Kim Wok Chyu
Ree Koo Soo
Kang Sun Myung
Kwun Tai Wook
Kim Ick Ro
Kim Ki Chul
Shin Sung Kyun
Kim Yung Ki
Heu Yung Ho
Bai Chung Hyuk
Bai Heun
Kim Kyung Bak

Hong Soon Wok
Oh Taik Kwan
Chya Kyung Mo
Choi Bum Sool
Kim Myung Tong
Kim Yong Hyun
Ree Chong Keun
Kim Yung Dong
Cho Kyu Kap
Cho Chong Seung
Kim Chang Ryul
Ree Chin Soo
Kim In Sik

Kang Dall Soo
Kim Ik Ki
Chang Hong Yum
Shin Kwang Kyun
Pak Chan Hun
Cho Kuk Hyun
Ree Chong Soon
Ree Man Keun
Chung Hai Chun
Yun Byung Koo
Ryu Hong Ryul
Oh Ki Ryul
Pak Chong Nam

2. STATEMENT AND PETITION PRESENTED BY MR. KIM YAK SOO, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, OBJECTING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET MILITARY MISSIONS IN KOREA (A/AC.26/NC.7)

In submitting the petition, Mr. Kim stated :

We are very happy to see that the United Nations Commission on Korea members are very busy in observing the withdrawal of the US troops from South Korea. But we have learned that the Soviet Union left a military advisory group in North Korea and that the USA is going to do the same in South Korea. If that is the case, the form of occupation is merely changed into the establishment of military missions and, in essence, the foreign troops, though small in number, will be staying on Korean soil just the same. So long as the foreign troops remain in Korea, the international aspect of the Korean problem is still retained. We, therefore, request the United Nations to do away with the US-USSR military missions in Korea.

(Text of the Petition)

Dear members of the United Nations Commission on Korea,

We pray for your good health. Under date of 18 March 1949 we submitted to you a petition signed by sixty-two members of the National Assembly requesting withdrawal of the foreign troops from Korea. We regret that we have not yet received any reply to this petition from you.

We were also surprised to see the resolution of 24 May as reported in the United Nations Commission on Korea News Release No. 18. While adopting this resolution, the delegates of France and Australia abstained, the Syrian delegate was absent, and the Indian delegate opposed it. How could the UNCOK pass the resolution in that manner? We Koreans are very much disappointed in the Commission, and we fear that the Commission lost its prestige.

On the other hand, we express our heart-felt gratitude to the Commission for the fulfilment of one of its tasks by observing the US troops' withdrawal from Korea. The establishment of the US-USSR military missions in Korea may make a second Greece out of Korea; and we oppose it. For the sake of international obligation and prestige we request the UNCOK to abolish the two nations' military missions.

Humbly submitted by

KIM Yak Soo (Seal)

3. STATEMENT BY AND PETITION FROM MR. KIM DONG WON, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND OTHER MEMBERS, SUPPORTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION IN KOREA (A/AC.26/NC.7/Add.1)

When submitting the petition, Mr. Kim Dong Won made these remarks:

We, the members of the National Assembly, were surprised to read the petition submitted to the United Nations Commission on Korea by Mr. Kim Yak Soo, requesting the Commission to abolish the United States Military Mission in Korea.

Although yesterday (19 June) was Sunday, all the patriotic Assembly members, considering the importance of the issue, got together and drafted this petition and signed it. It should be made known clearly that there were 150 members present in the National Assembly this morning, of whom 141 signed this petition.

We want to make it clear that Mr. Kim Yak Soo's petition does not reflect the will of the National Assembly and that it is purely his personal view. Even at the end of the adjourning ceremony of the National Assembly this morning he admitted this fact and added that there had been five other Assembly members who accompanied him while presenting his petition.

(Joint declaration for United States military aid to Korea)

The undersigned representatives of the National Assembly, considering the existing conditions of the national defence of the Republic of Korea which are not sufficient to guarantee the security of the nation,

Recognize the absolute need for military aid of the friendly United States who has the responsibility of developing and protecting the Republic of Korea,

And welcome the establishment of the United States Military Mission.

Signed by

Chong To Young	Hong Soon Nyong
Cho Han Paek	Park Chun
Chang Hong Tam	Oh Suk Choo
Kim Jun Yon	Kim Pong Cho
Park Hae Chung	Lee Suk
Ch'oe Suk Hwa	Kim Kyong Do
Kim Moon Pyong	Kim I-Soo
Suh Sang Il	Won Yong Han
Song P'il Man	Kim Chong Son
Suh Woo Suk	Chong Kwang Ho
Yoo Chin Hong	Kim Ik Ki
Lee Ho Suk	Hong Sung Ha
An Chun Sang	Lee Pyong Kwan
Lah Yong Gyoon	Kim Sang Ho
Kim Sang Sun	Kim Ung Chin
Cho Yung Kyu	Yoon Pyong Koo
Paek Nam Ch'ae	Yoo Sung Kap
Lee Man Kun	Wen Yong Gyun
Shin Pang Hyun	Ch'oe Un Kyo
Chung Chun	Hwang Ho Hyun
Lee Chung Iae	Song Pong Hae
Chu Ki Yong	Ch'oe Kyu Kak
Hong Hi Chong	Lee Chong Soon
Ch'oe Pong Sik	Lee Yoo Sun
Cho Kook Hyon	Yoo Hong Yol

Signed by (continued)

Suh Sung Dal	Hong Pom Hi
Hong Ik Pyo	Kim Ung Kwon
Kim Chin Koo	Ch'oe Kook Hyon
Yoo Chun Sang	Park Ch'an Hyon
Lee Suk Choo	Shin Ik Hi
Suh Chong Hi	Lee Ch'ong Ch'on
Chong Hae Chun	Yoon Chae Woo
Lee Chong Gun	Kim Tong Won
Yang Pyong Chik	Lee Yong Chun
Koo Chung Hoe	Park Soon Suk
Kim Chik Hyon	Lee Sung Hak
Kwak Sang Hoon	Shin Kwang Kyun
Kim Ch'ul	Lee Yo Han
Hwang Doo Hyon	Kang Dal Soo
Cho Chae Myon	Lee Kang Woo
Kim Myong Dong	Chong Woo Il
Kim Kyong Pae	Kwong Pyong Ro
Kim Ik No	Cho Pyong Han
Kim Chung Ki	Han Am Kook
Lee Chong Rin	Ch'oe Hon Kil
Cho Hon Young	Lee Hang Pal
Kim Chong Moon	Chin Hon Sik
Shin Hyon Mo	Chang Pyong Man
Lee In	Lee Sung Duk
Kim Chae Hak	Lee Chu Hyong
Yoo Rai Won	Kwon T'ae Hi
Chung Koo Sam	Kwon T'ae Wook
Shin I Hwan	Ch'oe Ch'ang Sup
Park Hae Kuk	Cho Kyu Kap
Park Sang Young	P'yo Hyon T'ae
Kim Kyo Chung	Ch'oe Suk Hong
Han Suk Pong	Kang I-Moon
Lee Pum Kyo	Kim Woo Sik
Park Kwan Soo	Huh Chung
Oh Tae Yol	Chang Ki Young
Park Woo Kyung	Kim To Yon
Cho Chong Sung	Park Chong Hwan
Lee I-Sang	Min Kyong Sik
Kim Kyo Hyon	Song Chang Sik
Chong Kyun Sik	Shin Sang Hak
Park I'Woon	Suh Soon Young
Kim Yong Jai	Yim Young Sin
Lee I-Ki	Kim Sang Ten
Chong Chin Kun	Ch'oe Yoon Dong
Kim Yong Dong	Kim Yong Hwa
Yun Ch'i Young	

4. LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION FROM POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, APPEALING TO THE COMMISSION TO VERIFY THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM NORTH KOREA BEFORE OBSERVING THE EVACUATION OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES (A/AC.26/NC.8)

Seoul, 22 June 1949

We wish to express our sincere gratitude to the United Nations Commission on Korea for its great effort to strengthen and unify Korea, it is an honour for us to send you this letter.

As you know, the communist army in the north is raiding South Korea every day and there is no way to verify whether the Soviet occupation troops in North Korea have evacuated or not. There is also news that the three big ports of North Korea—Wonsan, Najin and Chungjin—have been leased to the USSR. These facts indicate that the ominous hands of the aggressive and imperialistic Soviet Union are moving toward the Far East. In this situation the US troops are withdrawing in conformity with the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 14 November 1947, without taking any adequate

defensive measures for Korea. This withdrawal of the US troops is bringing louder and louder cries from the Korean people in Seoul as well as in the provinces, imploring the USA not to withdraw its troops before the strengthening of Korean defence forces and calling for arms so as to secure the peace of Korea, which is a bulwark of world democracy.

Despite this present internal and external situation, Kim Yak Soo and sixty-two other members of the National Assembly had in the past petitioned your Commission requesting the withdrawal of the US troops; and again recently Kim Yak Soo and five other members of the National Assembly, pretending to represent the above-mentioned sixty-two members, called on your Commission to oppose the establishment of the United States Military Mission. It was an anti-national act ignoring the Korean situation. The traitorous nature of their act is clearly depicted by the resolutions of the Mass Meetings for Strengthening National Defence which are now being held throughout the nation and by the increasing indignation of the people. We believe that the members of the Commission know that the Soviet Union is turning a covetous eye on Korea and that its sinister ambition is being revealed day by day. However, your Commission, though it is the envoy of international peace, has approved and is observing unilateral withdrawal of the US troops. Such an attitude on the part of the UNCOK may help to intensify the tragedy already caused by murder, arson and pillage on the part of the North Korean Army. And that is definitely not what your Commission intends.

Thus on behalf of the whole nation we appeal to you to verify the withdrawal of the Soviet Union troops from North Korea before observing

the evacuation of the US forces. We also wish to request you to study measures for realizing a free election in North Korea and at the same time to take new measures for Korean unification.

Nationalist Society
 General Headquarters National Unification
 Taihan Women's Society
 Korean Youth Corps
 Democratic Nationalist Party
 Chosun Democratic Party
 Taehan Nationalist Party
 Socialist Party
 Women's Nationalist Party
 Korean Labourers Federation
 Korean Farmers Federation
 Korean Labourers and Farmers Party
 Korean Chamber of Commerce
 Hankook Labourers and Farmers Party
 National Students Federation
 Korean Students Patriotic Corps
 Korean Anti-Communist Federation
 Christian Association
 YMCA
 Headquarters, Ch'undo-Kyo
 Headquarters Buddhist Association
 Headquarters Tai Chong Kyo
 Headquarters Confucius Association
 Federation of All Korea Cultural Organizations
 Patriotic Old Men's Society
 Supporting Association for Korean Diplomats
 All Korea Writers Association
 Northern Representatives Group

Annex IV

TEXTS OF MAIN DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE POSITIONS AND ATTITUDES OF THE COMMISSION, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND NORTH KOREA IN RESPECT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE COMMISSION

A. Attitude of the Government of the Republic of Korea

1. LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, SUGGESTING CERTAIN MEASURES TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT BY THE COMMISSION TO EXERCISE FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL ITS TERRITORY (A/AC.26/9)

3 March 1949

I have the honour to forward herewith a message from the Government of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations Commission on Korea.

(Signed) B. C. LIMB
 Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Text of message)

The Government of the Republic of Korea takes this opportunity to express its hope that

the United Nations Commission on Korea, which has undertaken the task of realization of complete unity of Korea, will eventually through consecutive measures enable the Republic of Korea to exercise full sovereignty over the entire territory of Korea as provided for in the Constitution, in reality as well as in name.

This hope on the part of the Government of the Republic of Korea is believed to be self-explanatory in view of the history of its birth and international commitments thereon.

Moreover, in the light of the unanimous support of all Korean people in the south of 38 parallel and the long cherished desire as demonstrated in the recent uprisings of the Koreans in the north, it is firmly believed that this hope will prove to be the will of the thirty million population of the entire Korea, which will surely be ascertained through the free election as proposed hereunder.

Therefore the Government of the Republic of Korea has the honour to suggest to the United

Nations Commission on Korea that the following measures be put into effect as soon as possible.

I. *Political measures*

It is hoped that the United Nations Commission on Korea will persuade the Soviet Union to dissolve the North Korean puppet government as well as all the political parties and social organizations thereof, release the political prisoners in the north and ensure free passage through south and north, so that the Government of the Republic of Korea can conduct the general elections under the supervision of the United Nations Commission on Korea in North Korea under such free atmosphere as in the 10 May election in the south.

II. *Military measures*

Korea will never tolerate any foreign Powers or any internal armed forces organized as the instrument of aggression of foreign Power. The following measures are suggested in this connexion:

(a) A thorough supervision of the immediate and complete withdrawal from Korea of the Soviet Army, Chinese Communist Army, the guerrilla troops and any other similar military units or groupings;

(b) Lending good offices for the immediate dissolution of the so-called People's Army and security force that have obviously been organized for aggressive purposes.

III. *Security measures*

The Government of the Republic of Korea is willing to take the full responsibility for state security order in case of social emergency or unrest throughout Korea that might follow as a result of the measures proposed in the preceding two paragraphs.

IV. *Diplomatic measures*

(a) Any international agreement or treaty concluded and subsequent administrative policies adopted without the approval of the Government of Republic of Korea should be declared null and void;

(b) All the assets removed by the Soviet Army from Korea should be either returned or reimbursed.

V. *Economic measures*

(a) To make the Soviets take full responsibility for the existing monetary currency in North Korea and check additional increase of circulation;

(b) All electricity produced in Korea should be used in Korea exclusively.

2. LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, CONCERNING ITS EFFORTS TO CONTACT NORTH KOREA (A/AC.26/23)

Seoul, 19 May 1949

There is considerable speculation over the recent reports that the United Nations Com-

mission is planning to negotiate or confer with certain representatives of the communist organization in northern Korea regarding the re-unification of Korea. In order to put this speculation to rest, this Government desires to know directly from you whether or not such reports have a foundation in fact; and, if so, whether this plan has been officially approved by the Commission. It will be highly appreciated by this Government if you may be so good as to enlighten us on this question at the earliest convenient date, for the consequences from such a plan to open negotiations would be most serious.

You will recall the first conversation held between some of your distinguished members and the Ministers of this Government soon after your arrival in Seoul early this year. The question of the desirability of your dealing with the Korean communist leaders of the north was brought up at that time. As you know, we made clear our feeling that many disadvantages and no advantages would result from any such plan.

The fact is that we are fighting the Korean Communists for the very life and freedom of our country as an independent democratic State, which the Korean Communists are avowedly, deliberately and violently endeavouring to destroy. As we have said before, we had no communist problem in this country before the liberation, but the compromising policy of the Joint Commission encouraged and increased the communist agitators who infiltrated from abroad. Under the handicap of these circumstances, the United States Government did everything it could to remove the dividing line between north and south through negotiations over a period of two years, but the efforts were all in vain.

Later, at the request of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea we opened a way for the leaders of north and south to get together for a joint conference. The result was injurious to the cause of freedom and democracy, succeeding only in strengthening the communist position both north and south. We endured all this to satisfy the desires of those who were convinced they should experiment with the possibility of winning reasonable co-operation of the communists. It has been our hope that there would be an end to these attempts since it has been clearly evidenced that such experiments must end in failure and disadvantage to the cause of representative democratic government in Korea.

It is quite a surprise to us that you express a desire to deal with these people once again, in spite of the demonstrated failure of this experiment. Consequently, we remind you of this failure. It was disappointing to us to hear the feeling expressed that the Korean Government was not co-operating with the United Nations Commission. We regret exceedingly if we have appeared unable to co-operate in a manner wholly to your satisfaction. We are fully aware of the role of the United Nations in the re-establishment of Korean sovereignty and we intend to co-operate in the fulfilment of the United Nations' responsibilities in the problems of re-unifying our country and making possible the extension of representative democratic government into the area from which the United Nations Commission has thus far been excluded. We are certain that you gentlemen would not wish us to condone any experiment that endangers the very life of our

nation by exposing it to the same dangers we are jointly trying to overcome.

This Government would appreciate an explicit statement from you as to just what you would hope to accomplish by such negotiations. If you tell us how northern and southern Korea might be united as a result of a meeting with the Soviet puppets in the north, we would examine such a proposal closely. Without knowing what methods you intend to pursue, or to what ends they might lead, our sincere efforts toward co-operation are rendered more difficult.

As we have said before, it is not the Koreans in the north who are preventing reunion of northern and southern Korea; it is their Soviet overlords whose orders they obey. These are the real authorities with whom you must deal. We are sure that our position in this matter will be understood by the representatives of all free nations, represented both on the Commission and in the General Assembly of the United Nations, many of whom are themselves confronted with this same problem of survival against communist aggression. We are confident that you will have no disposition to proceed with any plans that would harm our cause rather than helping it.

(Signed) B. C. LIMB
Minister of Foreign Affairs

3 LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, RELATING TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION (A/AC.26/36)

Seoul, 30 June 1949

I have the honour to inform you that the people and the Government of the Republic of Korea are deeply appreciative of the sincere efforts of the United Nations Commission on Korea to fulfil the tasks which were entrusted to them by the United Nations. We fully acknowledge also that the prestige and the goodwill of the United Nations have wrought a tremendous influence upon the minds of the Korean people, and that they are convinced that the good offices of the United Nations extended through the United Nations Commission on Korea will finally enable them to achieve their aspired goal of unification and peace.

We earnestly hope the United Nations Commission on Korea will continue its work in Korea, for its tasks have not been completed. The Commission has much to accomplish. It has not yet witnessed the complete withdrawal of the Russian occupation forces from the north and it has yet to complete the great task of bringing about the unification of Korea.

The continuation of the work of the United Nations Commission on Korea for at least another year will be greatly appreciated by the Government and the people of Korea. Kindly communicate this matter to the United Nations General Assembly and obtain its concurrence on the desire of the people and Government of the Republic of Korea.

(Signed) B. C. LIMB
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Korea

4. LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, SUGGESTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIT OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS (A/AC.26/40)

Seoul, 11 July 1949

I have the honour to enclose herewith a record of some of the more flagrant examples of attack by the so-called "People's Army" of northern Korea upon the communities and security forces south of the 38th parallel.

These communist attacks, if permitted to continue without proper means of defence and prevention, are likely to produce conditions which will be dangerous to the peace of the Orient.

Mindful of this danger and desiring to be helpful in the peaceful unification of Korea, the United Nations General Assembly, I am sure, will do all in its power to retard and stop these unlawful attacks by the communists from the north.

May I be permitted to suggest that the establishment of a unit of United Nations military observers, composed of officers of sufficiently high rank (to secure for the findings of that observer team the necessary authority and prestige) stationed in Korea, working in conjunction with the United Nations Commission on Korea, will accomplish that purpose.

The Government of the Republic of Korea will welcome such a unit of United Nations military observers. I hope you will be so good as to communicate this matter to the United Nations General Assembly and recommend its favourable action on this subject.

(Signed) B. C. LIMB
Minister of Foreign Affairs

5. INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION AND THE LIAISON COMMITTEE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMISSION'S TASK (16 FEBRUARY 1949) (A/AC.26/W.6)

After the usual exchange of courtesies Dr. CHOUGH Pyong Ok, Chairman of the Liaison Committee, stated that he would like to outline to the members of the Commission his Government's interpretation of the Commission's task. He began by saying that in the opinion of the Korean Government unification of Korea meant unification on the basis constituted by the establishment of the South Korean Government. In other words his Government felt that the Commission would have to go to North Korea and supervise their elections which would be held to fill the 100 vacant seats reserved for representatives from North Korea in the Assembly.

While expressing his Government's view that the Commission was required to go north in order to carry out its task, Dr. Chough was emphatic in cautioning the Commission concerning the manner in which it should address the North Korean authorities in order to avoid any suggestion of recognition of their régime. It was in this connexion that he expressed great resentment over the cable sent by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Foreign Minister of the North Korean régime acknowledging receipt of the application of the latter for member-

ship in the United Nations. He stated that the cable had been intercepted at the RCA station in Seoul and was not being sent on to its destination.

Concerning consideration of paragraph 4 (c) of the General Assembly resolution Dr. Chough gave it as the opinion of his Government that the phrase "further development of representative government" referred to the development of such government above the 38th parallel.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Commission had interpreted this to mean rather the development of representative government throughout the whole of Korea and that members of the Commission would be happy to give any advice they could if called upon to do so.

Dr. CHOUGH replied that this would of course always be borne in mind and that he was sure there could be a useful and beneficial exchange of information. He reverted again immediately, however, to the primary necessity of establishing democratic government in the north. Although Dr. Chough did not refer specifically to the Commission's task of observing the withdrawal of occupying forces he did express himself rather heatedly on the recent motion before the South Korean Assembly in which thirty-odd members had demanded the withdrawal of United States forces. He stated that the supporters of this motion had either been misled or were carrying out Soviet policy. In making such a move their action was calculated to cause unrest in South Korea and was unwarranted. Decisions on so important a point were a prerogative of the Government.

As Dr. Chough made no reference to the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse between the two halves of Korea, this point was brought up by the Chairman of the Commission. Dr. Chough's reaction was very strong. He stated that there was now no economic intercourse between the two parts of Korea and that his Government did not intend that there should be any. The north, he said, would take advantage of any opening in this direction to encourage trade in a direction that would not only benefit only the north but would undermine the economic structure in the south. Moreover, the north could not be trusted to supply only goods. He instanced a comparatively recent case in which a cargo of fish was received from the north and subjected to a check by the police who, he said, found that the fish contained thousands of currency notes which were obviously intended to be used to pay communist agents in the south.

The resolution does not speak specifically of cultural intercourse but Dr. Chough referred excitedly to culture. There was an old culture in the south, he asserted, but in the north there was now only Marxist ideology. To talk of removing cultural and like barriers, therefore, would be to invite the unleashing of a flood of communist propaganda.

Dr. Chough then referred to the statements made at the public meeting of the Commission and particularly to the Commission's resolution of 9 February. The Korean Government was considerably disturbed at the implication that the Commission intended to conduct interviews with persons outside the Government. The lawful governmental body was the most suitable for con-

tact, he continued. In fact, were it to be learned that the Commission was consulting with certain personalities in Seoul public opinion would be confused and thrown into doubt. He implied that the result might be very serious. Asked whether his Government did not see any value in the Commission's consulting with what might be regarded as an opposition party, he began a strong attack on Kim Koo. He referred also to Kimm Kiusic and said that these men and their supporters could not be considered an opposition party at all. They want to overthrow the Government from the bottom up and secure unification on their own terms. He had told Chiang Kai-Shek when he saw him in China on his way to Paris that Kim Koo was finished. Addressing the Commission directly Dr. Chough said: "He is a rebel: he is a traitor". Both Kim Koo and the South Korean Labour Party, he continued, were puppets of the North Korean Government which is in turn a puppet of Soviet Russia. The only terms on which Kim Koo could be accepted would be after he had publicly come forward and stated: "We made a mistake. We will cooperate with the Government and the United Nations".

Mr. COSTILHES, referring to a warning against creating public unrest, asked whether it was not possibly the publicity that might be associated with interviews with personalities outside the Government that was worrying the latter.

Dr. CHOUGH said that of course publicity was especially harmful and repeated his reference to the opening of flood-gates of propaganda. His whole manner implied that whether or not any publicity was given to interviews with such personalities the Korean Government would look on them most unfavourably. The Chairman thanked Dr. Chough for his explanation on this point and stated that the Commission would always bear in mind what he had said but that he would understand no guarantee could be given as to whom the Commission would see.

Dr. Chough referred next to the policy statements read by delegates at the public meeting. He said that his Government was disturbed by Mr. Mughir's statement that if the Commission could not accomplish its purposes he would pack his bags and go home. The Government had every confidence in the ability and eagerness of Commission members to discharge their duties, Dr. Chough added. However there was a feeling in Korea that the Commission might possibly stay say ten months without accomplishing any actual result. But the presence of the Commission would nevertheless be regarded as a symbol of protection and security. The Korean people were in fact hoping for a miracle but even if there were no miracle the presence of the Commission had a historical implication, namely, to protect this young child of democracy on behalf of the United Nations. Statements such as Mr. Mughir's were very discouraging to the Koreans.

Mr. CHANG Kee Yung then spoke a few words. He reverted to the subject of interviewing Korean personalities. He said that doubts had been created among the Korean people when the Temporary Commission had interviewed certain people. Happily, however, the Temporary Commission had made a majority decision to hold the elections and there was now a lawful government with which the Commission could consult.

Asked whether the Government would object to the Commission's consulting opposition members of the National Assembly, Mr. Chang was evasive. He did not indicate that the Government would welcome such a procedure.

B. Position of the Commission in relation to the Government of the Republic of Korea

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I (A/AC.26/SC.1/4/Rev.1)

(The text appears in chapter II, paragraph 6, of the report of the Commission)

C. Attitude of North Korea

"MANIFESTO" OF THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF UNIFICATION FOR THE FATHERLAND, DEMANDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE COMMISSION FROM KOREA AND ANNOUNCING A GENERAL ELECTION TO BE HELD THROUGHOUT KOREA IN SEPTEMBER 1949 (A/AC.26/W.17)⁶⁸

Dear fellow countrymen:

Dear members of democratic political parties and social organizations of South and North Korea:

Dear brothers and sisters:

Nearly four years have already elapsed since our fatherland was liberated from the yoke of Japanese imperialism. Notwithstanding, our fatherland still remains divided by the artificial demarcation line of the 38th parallel.

During the four years the southern and northern parts of our fatherland have followed diametrically opposed directions.

In the northern half of our fatherland democratic construction has been and is still progressing fruitfully and the centuries' old cherished aspirations of the people are being realized.

In the southern half of our fatherland reactionaries have established their régime and are adopting all sorts of measures to suppress the democratic forces. Both economically and politically, South Korea is more and more being reduced to the servitude of the United States.

Who is obstructing our people in the attainment of unification? For whose interests is the division of our country being perpetuated? The American imperialists are obstructing the attainment of unification for the fatherland; and their hirelings, the pro-Japanese, and national traitors are deceiving the people, selling the interests of the fatherland and the people, and are prepared to ruin the fatherland and the people in order to protect the interests of their American masters and their régime.

The American imperialists have insulted us by saying that our people are ignorant and are incapable of governing and developing our country. They have been for nearly four years and are

still pursuing measures designed to convert South Korea into their military and political base for their anti-democratic struggle in the Far East and to make South Korea a new economic source for the United States of America in order to fatten the bellies of the Wall Street monopolistic capitalists. For four years the diplomacy of the United States and all the efforts of the American authorities have been aimed at carrying on an American imperialist plunder programme in South Korea.

Already at the Moscow Three Foreign Ministers Conference held at the end of 1945, the American delegation proposed that an administrative organ be set up with representatives from the Four Powers including the United States of America, China, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and that the administrative organ exercise its functions for the control of Korea through a high commissioner. This American proposal did not envisage any plan for the formation of a Korean government. According to the draft American proposal, a virtual mandate on our fatherland would have lasted for a period of up to ten years. The acceptance of such a proposal would mean that Korea should be placed under foreign rule for a long period of time without its independent people's régime.

However, this American proposal was rejected.

Accepting the Soviet Union's proposal, the Moscow Three Ministers Conference adopted a plan providing for the creation of conditions for the formation of a democratic Korean government, making Korea an independent State with the facilities of democratic development, and the liquidation of the harmful effects of the long Japanese imperialist rule in Korea.

This decision was in consonance with the interests of all walks of life of the Korean people, while it was against the interests of American imperialists and the national traitors, who, holding the reins of government in their own hands, were trying to prevent the masses from participating in the administration of the country and developing Korea along democratic lines. The interests of American imperialists and the national reactionary elements agreed entirely.

Therefore, the combined forces of the Korean reactionary elements and the American imperialists resorted to all sorts of measures with the object of frustrating the USSR-US Joint Commission which was charged with implementing the Moscow Three Ministers decision.

At this grave juncture for our nation, the Soviet Union, which faithfully upholds the principles of respecting the national independence and sovereignty of other nations, opened the door once again for the attainment of unification for our fatherland, by proposing the simultaneous withdrawal of the Soviet and American troops from Korea so as to give the Korean people the possibility of forming a united, democratic government with their own hands without the assistance and participation of the United States and the Soviet Union.

We Korean people heartily supported this just proposal of the Soviet Union, which agrees with our national interests. However, the Government of the United States rejected this proposal, for the proposal ran counter to the interests of the American imperialists and the Korean reactionary elements.

⁶⁸ Copies of the original text in Korean were sent to the delegations and secretariat through the exchange of mail service between the north and south. It was also beamed to the south on 28 June 1949 through the Pyongyang Radio and intercepted by the SCAP Radio reception stations in Tokyo. The English version of the Pyongyang radio intercept has been used in making the translation.

The Government of the United States unlawfully insisted that the Korean issue be put before the United Nations General Assembly.

Without hearing the will of the Korean people, and in spite of the opposition of the delegates from the Soviet Union and other democratic nations, the United Nations General Assembly created the so-called United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea under pressure of the United States.

The United Nations Commission on Korea, a tool for the aggressive policy of the United States, completely failed because its activities have been in contradiction to the interests of the Korean people who were indignant at its unlawful activities.

Through the unlawful, so-called United Nations "Little Assembly", in which delegates from true democratic nations did not participate, the Government of the United States had a resolution adopted for the holding of separate elections in South Korea.

An absolute majority of our people rose in unison and launched a movement to boycott the separate elections.

Only with brute force and undisguised armed force were the American authorities and the reactionary elements able to hold the so-called elections in South Korea on 10 May 1948, which were nothing but a fraud and fake. On the basis of this they formed the so-called "National Assembly" and the separate puppet "government" with Syngman Rhee, a vicious enemy of the Korean people and a murderer, as the ringleader.

The so-called National Assembly is a pitiful creature which does not approach anything like a real one. This National Assembly cannot represent the Korean people, for not a single worker or farmer has been elected to it. In other words, it cannot represent the Korean people, for there are no representatives of the absolute majority of the South Korean people. The so-called National Assembly of South Korea is a group consisting of the pro-Japanese, national traitors, and enemies of the people, including large holders, capitalists, and former officials of the Japanese Government-General.

Syngman Rhee and company, who are under the aegis of the American authorities, created the National Assembly simply for the purpose of legalizing their crimes of treason. Syngman Rhee and company imprison any Assemblyman, who dares demand the withdrawal of American troops and the peaceful unification of the fatherland, and ruthlessly suppress any attempt, no matter how slight, by Assemblymen to oppose the traitorous policy of Syngman Rhee and company.

In order to have their aggressive policy approved as a matter of form, the Government of the United States once again took the Korean issue to the United Nations General Assembly.

Under the coercion of the United States delegation, the United Nations General Assembly refused to hear the voice of true representatives of Korean people and resolved to dispatch to Korea the so-called new United Nations Commission on Korea.

American imperialists were afraid that on the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly the true representatives of the Korean people

should expose to the whole world the aggressive policy of the United States of America in Korea by disclosing the real character of the separate elections in South Korea and the actual conditions existing in our fatherland.

Into what have the Americans and national traitors changed the southern half of our fatherland? In the course of the four years under the rule of the American authorities and the Korean reactionary elements South Korea has become a wild arena of terrorism and political suppression against the democratic movement in South Korea.

In South Korea there is no freedom of speech, Press, assembly, association and demonstration. Democratic political parties and social organizations have been driven underground and their Press organs destroyed. Anyone in South Korea who truly expresses the long cherished desire of the people is shot to death without trial, arrested, and tortured unconditionally.

The Americans who came to garrison Korea three weeks after the surrender of Japan did not kill even a single member of the Japanese military personnel. They let them go.

In South Korea, under the direction of the Americans, tens of thousands of patriots who fight the great popular battle for the enforcement of democratic reforms, as well as the attainment of unification, independence and democratization of the fatherland, are being shot to death, imprisoned and tortured.

As a result of the rule by the American authorities and the national traitors, the economy of South Korea continues to be wrecked, while industrial production also continues to go downward. Under the beautiful name of so-called "economic aid" American monopolists are using South Korea as a market for the disposal of their surplus commodities. As a result of such "aid", millions of unemployed and beggars are roaming the streets of South Korea.

The agrarian economy is retrogressing. The people in the southern half, which is a granary of the fatherland, are forced to groan under hunger and starvation.

The Syngman Rhee puppet government and the fellow traitors in it have concluded all sorts of "pacts" and "agreements" with their masters, American imperialists. Through these "pacts" and "agreements" they made South Korea a true slave economically to American capitalists. The people of all Korea are indignant over the traitors' policy which enslaved South Korea.

The Korean People's Supreme Council had submitted a petition to the USSR and the US Governments respectively, asking for the withdrawal of their troops. The Soviet Government gladly complied with the Korean people's request and ordered its troops to withdraw from North Korea. The evacuation of the Soviet troops took place over six months ago. In spite of it, the American troops are still staying in South Korea. The Korean people are further indignant over it.

Now there is no pretext or condition which justifies continued occupation of South Korea by US troops. The Korean people are fighting against it because the US occupation hinders unification and complete independence of our fatherland. The Soviet Union has been giving us unlimited assistance to carry on this just task of Korean people.

Through different stages, the Soviet policy in regard to the solution of the Korean problem has been in perfect consonance with the interests of the Korean people. At the Three Power Foreign Ministers Conference at Moscow in 1945, the Soviet delegate, guarding the interests of the Korean people, refused the proposal made by the US delegate. The Soviet delegate consistently and repeatedly insisted upon the principles of the Moscow decision at the meeting of the US-USSR Joint Commission. When it became clear that the implementation of the Moscow agreement was impossible, the Soviet Government insisted upon the withdrawal of the occupying troops and showed in reality its genuine policy of respecting the sovereignty and rights of our people by taking the initiative in withdrawing its troops from Korea. The Soviet Government was and is still insisting on the right of the Korean people concerning the unification, democracy and independence of our fatherland.

Dear fellow brothers and sisters!

The US imperialists and national traitors are attempting to perpetuate the division of our fatherland for their greedy purpose. The time has come for us to solve with our own hands the question of the unification of our fatherland, because the division of our fatherland which has lasted for four years is causing misery to an extent no longer tolerable to our Korean people.

There is only one plan which will enable the unified, democratic Korea to develop her economy to meet the interests of the Korean people. South Korean economy, which is at the present in the stage of destruction, shall be speedily rehabilitated on the basis of the structure of North Korean economy. Who would be ignorant of the fact that both North and South Korea are economically inter-dependent on each other? The achievement of the North Korean people constitutes a prototype which shows how rapidly the unified, democratic, independent Korea can develop herself.

The reactionary elements who, under the aegis of American imperialists, are carrying the day in the southern half of our fatherland, do not want the peaceful attainment of unification for the fatherland on a democratic basis. Syngman Rhee and company are training troops and are asking their American masters for arms. Syngman Rhee and company are provoking an internecine civil war and are trying to immerse the fighters for the attainment of democratization and unification in a sea of blood. In the southern half of our fatherland terrorism and pursuit are becoming more and more vicious day by day and tens of thousands of persons fighting for the people are being killed.

The American imperialists, who are masters of the national traitors, have rich experience in provoking internecine strife for the purpose of suppressing democratic movements. Under the "aid" of American imperialists, the flames of war are raging in China and Greece. At present they are trying to immerse the Korean people in a sea of blood. They are inciting the Korean reactionary elements to war. No wonder that the so-called "National Defence Army" is almost daily provoking clashes along the 38th parallel.

It is the Americans and their hirelings, Syngman Rhee and his traitor company, who are

inciting and organizing the suppression of the people on Cheju Island and the guerrillas in South Cholla Province, as well as the clashes along the 38th parallel. Our people do not want an internecine strife. Our people do not want to shed blood in the interests of American monopolists and their hirelings, the national reactionary elements. The Korean people want and can attain, on our own and by peaceful means, unification for our fatherland. Can the Korean people be divided? Of course not! The Korean people have always been, and will be, one.

At this grave juncture for our fatherland and the people, the true patriots of South and North Korea, as well as members of political parties and social organizations, irrespective of their property or social position, must unite themselves in the struggle for the attainment of unification for the fatherland.

Dear brothers and sisters! The Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification for the Fatherland calls on all the democratic political parties and social organizations of South and North Korea, as well as all the Korean people, to carry out peaceful unification for the fatherland and proposes the following peaceful means for unification:

1. Let us hold the task of peaceful unification of the fatherland in our own hands and fulfil it.

2. We demand the immediate withdrawal of the American troops from Korea who are obstructing the peaceful unification of the fatherland.

3. We demand the immediate evacuation of the unlawful organ, the so-called "United Nations Commission on Korea", from our soil.

4. We propose to hold simultaneously elections throughout South and North Korea for a united legislative organ.

5. Let us hold the elections under the guidance of a committee consisting of delegates from democratic political parties and social organizations which stand for peaceful unification of the fatherland.

6. For the purpose of discussing a plan for peaceful unification of the fatherland, let us call a conference of delegates from political parties and social organizations of South and North Korea, which in turn will form an Election Guidance Committee.

7. Let us hold the elections for the legislative organ in September 1949 on the principles of universal, equal elections on the basis of the secret ballot. Those who enthusiastically cooperated with the Japanese Empire during the days of the Japanese rule are deprived of the right to vote.

8. In order to ensure the freedom of election let us enforce the following measures without fail:

(a) Discontinue suppression of democratic political parties and social organizations and their leaders;

(b) Legalize all democratic political parties and social organizations and ensure them freedom of activity;

(c) Revoke the order for the closing down of the Press organs of democratic political parties and social organizations and ensure the democratic political parties and social organizations the right to have their own Press organs;

(d) Ensure freedom of speech, Press, assembly, mass meetings and demonstration;

(e) Release immediately all political prisoners.

9. The Election Guidance Committee shall have the following powers:

(a) To give the existing governments in South and North Korea and their appropriate organs the necessary directives regarding the preparations and holding of the election;

(b) To review the execution of its decisions and directives;

(c) To supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea by a committee to be formed by the Election Guidance Committee.

10. Simultaneously with the formation of the General Election Guidance Committee, the existing police and security forces in South and North Korea shall be placed under the direct control of the Election Guidance Committee. The Election Guidance Committee shall eliminate from the police forces pro-Japanese and those who had served the Japanese police and military police, and disband the police units which participated in the suppression of the people's resistance on Cheju Island and the guerrilla movement in South Korea.

11. The supreme legislative organ, formed by the general elections, shall adopt a constitution

for the Republic of Korea and form a government in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, and the government thus formed shall take over government functions from the existing governments in South and North Korea and then dissolve them.

12. The existing troops in south and north shall be combined on a democratic basis by the new government of the Republic of Korea. The units of the South Korea National Defence Army which participated in the suppression of the people's resistance on Cheju Island and other areas, as well as of the partisan movement, shall be disbanded. Those who participated in the suppression of the people's resistance and the partisan movement are banned from serving in the armed forces, and those who incited and organized the suppression shall be punished.

Such is the programme which we propose to democratic political parties and social organizations and all the people for the peaceful attainment of unification for the fatherland. We are convinced that all the Korean people will enthusiastically support our proposal. Anyone who persists in opposition and obstruction of the task for peaceful unification shall not escape punishment by the Korean people. The Korean people, marching forward toward the attainment of unification, democratization and independence for the fatherland, are capable of liquidating all who are standing in our way.

Long live a united, democratic, independent Korea!

Long live the Korean people who will be united forever!

Annex V

LIST OF DELEGATIONS TO THE COMMISSION, AND SECRETARIAT

1. DELEGATIONS TO THE COMMISSION

Australia: Patrick Shaw, Representative;⁶⁹ A. B. Jamieson, Representative; Claire Garrett, Secretary-typist; Joan Fullard, Secretary-typist.

China: Liu, Yu-Wan, Representative; Ssutu, T. T., Alternate; Loo, W. D., Secretary.

El Salvador: Miguel Angel Magaña, Representative; Fidel Sanchez-Hernandez, Alternate.⁷⁰

France: Henri Costilhes, Temporary Representative; Marcel Barthelemy, Secretary;⁷¹ Charles Martel, Secretary.

India: Anup Singh, Representative.

Philippines: Rufino Luna, Representative; Norberto Luna, Secretary;⁷² Antonio Ferrer, Secretary.

Syria: Yasin Mughir, Representative.⁷³

2. SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION

Principal Secretary: Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer.

Deputy Principal Secretary: Sanford Schwarz.

Assistant Secretaries: Graham Lucas,⁷⁴ Arsen Shahbaz, Hung-Ti Chu.

Administrative Officer: Alfred Katz.

Assistant Administrative Officer: Jehangir Paymaster.

Interpreters: Harry Liao, Mark Priceman.

⁶⁹ Mr. Shaw and Miss Garrett returned to Tokyo on 23 February. Mr. Shaw accompanied by Miss Fullard returned to Seoul on 2 July. They left again for Tokyo on 12 July.

⁷⁰ Mr. Magaña informed the Commission that El Salvador was withdrawing from membership on the Commission on 20 July. On 26 July the delegation of El Salvador rejoined the Commission.

⁷¹ Mr. Barthelemy left Seoul on 12 June.

⁷² Mr. Norberto Luna left Seoul on 20 June.

⁷³ Mr. Mughir left Seoul on 26 March.

⁷⁴ Mr. Lucas left Seoul on 30 May.

Précis-writers: Marian Robb, Harold Riddle.

Secretary-typists: Dorothy Compton, Anne-Marie Hubert, Barbara Liu, Ann D. Sheehan, Marion Wood, Cora Wyman.

Military Technical Adviser: Colonel C. C. Liu.⁷⁶

3. LOCALLY RECRUITED STAFF

Interpreter: Myo-Mook Lee.

Translator-Interpreters: Yong Won Kim, Kyu Yong Lee, Robert T. Park.

Correspondent-Secretaries: Lydia C. Koh, Unja Lee.

Clerk-Messenger: Chong Dea Lee.

Office Machine Operator: Chun, Yun Sang.

Dispatchers: Chun, Ki Poong, J. H. Kim.

Receptionists:⁷⁶ So Young Lee, Soon Yeh Cho, Flory Leigh.

Annex VI

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

A. United Nations documents concerning the problem of the independence of Korea

1. REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A/575, A/575/Add.1 and A/575/Add.2, first part of the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, volumes I to III.

A/575/Add.3 and A/575/Add.4, second part of the report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, volumes I to II.

2. REPORT OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A/583, consultation by the Temporary Commission on Korea with the Interim Committee.

3. INCLUSION OF THE ITEM OF THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOREA IN THE AGENDA OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A/653, adoption of the agenda of the third regular session and allocation of items to the Committees (item 16, the problem of the independence of Korea).

4. PROCEEDINGS IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE (a) DOCUMENTS

A/C.1/365, letter from the chief delegate at the General Assembly for the Government of the Republic of Korea to the Secretary-General, dated 1 October 1948.

A/C.1/366, cable from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea" to the Secretary-General, dated 8 October 1948.

A/C.1/367, letter dated 4 November 1948 from the Czechoslovak Delegation to the Chairman of the First Committee transmitting a draft resolu-

tion inviting the delegation of "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea" to participate in the examination of the problem of the independence of Korea.

A/C.1/395, draft resolution of China inviting the delegation of the Republic of Korea to participate without the right to vote in the debate of the First Committee on the Korean question.

A/C.1/426, joint draft resolution of Australia, China and the United States of America on the problem of the independence of Korea.

A/C.1/427/Corr.1, draft resolution of the USSR proposing the abolishment of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.⁷⁷

A/C.1/428, draft resolution on the problem of the independence of Korea adopted by the First Committee at its 236th meeting on 8 December 1948.

(b) SUMMARY RECORDS

A/C.1/SR.200, summary record of the 200th meeting, 15 November 1948.

A/C.1/SR.229 to 236 inclusive, summary records of the 229th to the 236th meetings, 6 to 8 December 1948.

5. PROCEEDINGS IN THE FIFTH COMMITTEE

A/C.5/288, United Nations Commission on Korea; report of the Secretary-General on the financial implications of the establishment of the Commission.

A/C.5/289, letter from the President of the General Assembly to the Chairman of the Fifth Committee, dated 9 December 1948.

A/C.5/SR.177, summary record of the 177th meeting, 9 December 1948.

⁷⁶ Colonel Liu joined the Secretariat on 21 June and completed his duties with the Commission on 16 July 1949.

⁷⁷ These served at different periods.
⁷⁸ With slight revision this document was issued as A/790 which was again considered by the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

6. PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST AND FIFTH COMMITTEES

(b) VERBATIM RECORDS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY⁷⁸

(a) DOCUMENTS

A/788, report of the First Committee, 9 December 1948.

A/795, report of the Fifth Committee, 10 December 1948.

A/PV.142, verbatim record of the 142nd meeting, 24 September 1948.

A/PV.186, verbatim record of the 186th meeting, 11 December 1948.

A/PV.187, verbatim record of the 187th meeting, 12 December 1948.

B. Complete list of documents of the United Nations Commission on Korea⁷⁹

1. AGENDAS OF THE COMMISSION

A/AC.26/Agenda 1	Provisional agenda for the 1st meeting	2 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 2	Provisional agenda for the 2nd meeting	7 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 3	Provisional agenda for the 3rd meeting	7 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 4	Provisional agenda for the 4th meeting	8 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 5	Provisional agenda for the 5th meeting	9 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 6	Provisional agenda for the 6th meeting	10 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 7	Provisional agenda for the 7th meeting	11 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 8	Provisional agenda for the 8th meeting	12 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 9	Provisional agenda for the 9th meeting	15 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 9/Rev.1	agenda for the 9th meeting	15 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 10	Provisional agenda for the 10th meeting	16 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 11	Provisional agenda for the 11th meeting	18 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 12	Provisional agenda for the 12th meeting	18 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 13	Provisional agenda for the 13th meeting	21 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 14	Provisional agenda for the 14th meeting	23 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 14/Rev.1	agenda for the 14th meeting	23 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 15	Provisional agenda for the 15th meeting	25 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 16	Provisional agenda for the 16th meeting	28 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 16/Rev.1	agenda for the 16th meeting	28 February 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 17	Provisional agenda for the 17th meeting	2 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 17/Rev.1	agenda for the 17th meeting	2 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 18	Provisional agenda for the 18th meeting	9 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 18/Rev.1	agenda for the 18th meeting	9 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 19	Provisional agenda for the 19th meeting	10 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 19/Rev.1	agenda for the 19th meeting	10 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 20	Provisional agenda for the 20th meeting	17 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 21	Provisional agenda for the 21st meeting	18 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 22	Provisional agenda for the 22nd meeting	19 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 23	Provisional agenda for the 23rd meeting	24 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 23/Rev.1	agenda for the 23rd meeting	24 March 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 24	Provisional agenda for the 24th meeting	5 April 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 24/Rev.1	agenda for the 24th meeting	5 April 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 25	Provisional agenda for the 25th meeting	11 April 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 25/Rev.1	agenda for the 25th meeting	12 April 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 26	Provisional agenda for the 26th meeting	20 April 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 26/Rev.1	agenda for the 26th meeting	22 April 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 27	Provisional agenda for the 27th meeting	29 April 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 28	Provisional agenda for the 28th meeting	16 May 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 28/Add.1	Provisional agenda for the 28th meeting	17 May 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 29	Provisional agenda for the 29th meeting	18 May 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 30	Provisional agenda for the 30th meeting	20 May 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 30/Rev.1	agenda for the 30th meeting	23 May 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 31	Provisional agenda for the 31st meeting	24 May 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 32	Provisional agenda for the 32nd meeting	1 June 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 33	Provisional agenda for the 33rd meeting	8 June 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 34	Provisional agenda for the 34th meeting	11 June 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 35	Provisional agenda for the 35th meeting	17 June 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 36	Provisional agenda for the 36th meeting	21 June 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 37	Provisional agenda for the 37th meeting	25 June 1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 38	Provisional agenda for the 38th meeting	2 July 1949

⁷⁸ See also *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I*, pages 95, 104 to 105, 1006 to 1043.

⁷⁹ Covering the period up to 28 July 1949.

1. AGENDAS OF THE COMMISSION (*continued*)

A/AC.26/Agenda 39	Provisional agenda for the 39th meeting	7 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 39/Rev.1	agenda for the 39th meeting	8 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 40	Provisional agenda for the 40th meeting	11 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 40/Rev.1	agenda for the 40th meeting	13 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 41	Provisional agenda for the 41st meeting	19 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 41/Rev.1	agenda for the 41st meeting	20 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 42	Provisional agenda for the 42nd meeting	21 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 42/Rev.1	agenda for the 42nd meeting	22 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 43	Provisional agenda for the 43rd meeting	22 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 44	Provisional agenda for the 44th meeting	23 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 45	Provisional agenda for the 45th meeting	25 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 46	Provisional agenda for the 46th meeting	25 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 47	Provisional agenda for the 47th meeting	26 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 48	Provisional agenda for the 48th meeting	27 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 49	Provisional agenda for the 49th meeting	27 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 50	Provisional agenda for the 50th meeting	28 July	1949
A/AC.26/Agenda 50/Rev.1	agenda for the 50th meeting	28 July	1949

2. SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS OF THE COMMISSION

A/AC.26/SR.1	Summary record of the 1st meeting	2 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.2	Summary record of the 2nd meeting	9 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.3	Summary record of the 3rd meeting	7 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.4	Summary record of the 4th meeting	10 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.4/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 4th meeting	16 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.5	Summary record of the 5th meeting	10 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.6	Summary record of the 6th meeting	13 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.7	Summary record of the 7th meeting	13 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.7/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 7th meeting	26 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.8 with Annexes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Summary record of the 8th meeting with various statements made at this meeting	12 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.9	Summary record of the 9th meeting	16 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.9/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 9th meeting	26 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.10	Summary record of the 10th meeting	17 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.10/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 10th meeting	26 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.11	Summary record of the 11th meeting	19 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.11/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 11th meeting	28 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.12	Summary record of the 12th meeting	21 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.13	Summary record of the 13th meeting	22 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.14	Summary record of the 14th meeting	25 February	1949
A/AC.26/SR.15	Summary record of the 15th meeting	4 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.16	Summary record of the 16th meeting	4 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.17	Summary record of the 17th meeting	5 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.18	Summary record of the 18th meeting	11 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.18/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 18th meeting	18 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.19	Summary record of the 19th meeting	15 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.19/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 19th meeting	18 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.20	Summary record of the 20th meeting	21 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.21	Summary record of the 21st meeting	25 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.21/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 21st meeting	31 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.22	Summary record of the 22nd meeting	28 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.23	Summary record of the 23rd meeting	26 March	1949
A/AC.26/SR.24	Summary record of the 24th meeting	7 April	1949
A/AC.26/SR.25	Summary record of the 25th meeting	19 April	1949
A/AC.26/SR.26	Summary record of the 26th meeting	16 May	1949
A/AC.26/SR.27	Summary record of the 27th meeting	13 May	1949
A/AC.26/SR.27/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 27th meeting	18 May	1949
A/AC.26/SR.28	Summary record of the 28th meeting	23 May	1949
A/AC.26/SR.29	Summary record of the 29th meeting	24 May	1949
A/AC.26/SR.29/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 29th meeting	27 May	1949

2. SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS OF THE COMMISSION (*continued*)

A/AC.26/SR.30	Summary record of the 30th meeting	31 May	1949
A/AC.26/SR.30/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 30th meeting	1 June	1949
A/AC.26/SR.30/Corr.2	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 30th meeting	13 June	1949
A/AC.26/SR.31	Summary record of the 31st meeting	1 June	1949
A/AC.26/SR.32	Summary record of the 32nd meeting	6 June	1949
A/AC.26/SR.33	Summary record of the 33rd meeting	15 June	1949
A/AC.26/SR.34	Summary record of the 34th meeting	17 June	1949
A/AC.26/SR.35	Summary record of the 35th meeting	27 June	1949
A/AC.26/SR.35/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 35th meeting	3 July	1949
A/AC.26/SR.36	Summary record of the 36th meeting	29 June	1949
A/AC.26/SR.36/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 36th meeting	3 July	1949
A/AC.26/SR.37	Summary record of the 37th meeting	6 July	1949
A/AC.26/SR.37/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 37th meeting	8 July	1949
A/AC.26/SR.38	Summary record of the 38th meeting	8 July	1949
A/AC.26/SR.39	Summary record of the 39th meeting	15 July	1949
A/AC.26/SR.40	Summary record of the 40th meeting	15 July	1949
A/AC.26/SR.41	Summary record of the 41st meeting	25 July	1949

3. GENERAL DOCUMENTS

A/AC.26/1	Resolution adopted at the 5th meeting concerning the establishment of sub-committees	9 February	1949
A/AC.26/2	Rules of procedure adopted at the 6th meeting	10 February	1949
A/AC.26/3	Resolution adopted at the 10th meeting concerning access of Koreans to the Commission	17 February	1949
A/AC.26/4	Report of Sub-Committee I concerning contact with North Korea, adopted at the 11th meeting	18 February	1949
A/AC.26/5	Report of Sub-Committee II concerning persons and topics for hearings, adopted at the 14th meeting	25 February	1949
A/AC.26/6	Resolution concerning social functions adopted at the 16th meeting	1 March	1949
A/AC.26/7	Report of Sub-Committee I concerning personalities to be heard and main topics of discussion, adopted at the 17th meeting	2 March	1949
A/AC.26/8	First information report (period 1-19 February 1949)	4 March	1949
A/AC.26/9	Message from the Government of the Republic of Korea, letter from B. C. Limb, Minister of Foreign Affairs	9 March	1949
A/AC.26/10	Report of Sub-Committee I concerning contact with North Korea, adopted at the 21st meeting	19 March	1949
A/AC.26/11	Report of Sub-Committee II concerning further list of persons to be heard and trips to the provinces, adopted at the 22nd meeting	21 March	1949
A/AC.26/12	Second information report (period 20 February-12 March 1949)	26 March	1949
A/AC.26/13	Report of Sub-Committee I concerning further list of persons to be heard and visits to industrial areas	12 April	1949
A/AC.26/14	Communication from the Special Representative of the United States, John J. Muccio, to the Chairman of the Commission, Miguel Angel Magaña, regarding troop withdrawal	18 April	1949
A/AC.26/14/Add.1	Communication from the Ambassador of the United States of America, John J. Muccio, to the Chairman of the Commission, Miguel Angel Magaña, regarding the establishment of a Korean Military Advisory Group	4 May	1949
A/AC.26/14/Add.2	Communication from U.S. Ambassador Muccio to the Chairman of the Commission regarding withdrawal of United States troops	13 June	1949

3. GENERAL DOCUMENTS (*continued*)

A/AC.26/15	Third information report (period 13 March-2 April 1949)	19 April	1949
A/AC.26/16	Replies to Press questionnaire of 31 March 1949, as approved by the Commission at its 26th meeting	22 April	1949
A/AC.26/17	Communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, B. C. Limb, to the Chairman of the Commission concerning the by-election to be held on the island of Cheju Do on 10 May 1949	28 April	1949
A/AC.26/17/Add.1	Communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, B. C. Limb, to the Chairman of the Commission, concerning the by-election to be held at Chon-an Gun on 10 June 1949	9 May	1949
A/AC.26/18	Question of observer teams, statement by the representative of El Salvador at the 27th meeting	30 April	1949
A/AC.26/19	Fourth information report (period 3-23 April 1949)	6 May	1949
A/AC.26/20	List of documents issued by the Commission for the period 24 January-11 May 1949	12 May	1949
A/AC.26/20/Add.1	List of documents issued by the Commission period 12 May-12 July 1949	13 July	1949
A/AC.26/21	Resolution adopted at the 28th meeting concerning the composition of the Commission	18 May	1949
A/AC.26/22	Report of Sub-Committee I concerning contact with North Korea, adopted at the 28th meeting	19 May	1949
A/AC.26/23	Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, B. C. Limb, to the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Henri Costilhes, concerning contact with North Korea	19 May	1949
A/AC.26/24	Draft resolution of the Philippines concerning withdrawal of occupation forces (introduced at the 29th meeting)	19 May	1949
A/AC.26/24/Rev.1	Amended draft resolution of the Philippines concerning withdrawal of occupation forces	19 May	1949
A/AC.26/24/Rev.1/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the amended draft resolution of the Philippines concerning withdrawal of occupation forces	20 May	1949
A/AC.26/25	Resolution adopted at the 30th meeting concerning withdrawal of occupation forces	24 May	1949
A/AC.26/26	Report of Sub-Committee I concerning persons to be heard, adopted at the 30th meeting	23 May	1949
A/AC.26/27	Fifth information report (period 24 April-14 May 1949)	27 May	1949
A/AC.26/28	Sixth information report (period 15 May-4 June 1949)	10 June	1949
A/AC.26/29	Resolution adopted at the 34th meeting concerning observation of withdrawal of occupation forces	13 June	1949
A/AC.26/29/Add.1	Resolution adopted at the 35th meeting concerning observation of withdrawal of occupation forces	20 June	1949
A/AC.26/30	Report of Sub-Committee I concerning broadcast to North Korea and Press release regarding hearings, adopted at the 34th meeting	13 June	1949
A/AC.26/31	Draft outline of the report of UNCOK to the General Assembly	18 June	1949
A/AC.26/32	Report of Sub-Committee I concerning field visits, adopted by the Commission at its 36th meeting	24 June	1949
A/AC.26/33	Draft resolution of El Salvador concerning the problem of Korea	25 June	1949
A/AC.26/33/Rev.1	Draft resolution of El Salvador concerning the problem of Korea	8 July	1949
A/AC.26/33/Rev.2	Draft resolution of El Salvador concerning the problem of Korea	8 July	1949
A/AC.26/34	Final report of Sub-Committee II, adopted at the 37th meeting	29 June	1949

3. GENERAL DOCUMENTS (*continued*)

A/AC.26/35	Communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, B. C. Limb, to the Chairman of the Commission concerning observation of withdrawal of occupation forces	1 July	1949
A/AC.26/36	Communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, B. C. Limb, to the Chairman of the Commission, Anup Singh, concerning continuation of the work of the Commission	1 July	1949
A/AC.26/37	Final report of Sub-Committee I, adopted at the 39th meeting	8 July	1949
A/AC.26/38	Seventh information report (period 5 June-2 July 1949)	9 July	1949
A/AC.26/39	Communication from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Commission concerning arrest of members of the National Assembly	11 July	1949
A/AC.26/40	Communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, B. C. Limb, to the Chairman of the Commission, concerning United Nations military observers	11 July	1949
A/AC.26/41	Withdrawal of the Delegation of El Salvador from the Commission, resolution adopted at the 41st meeting	21 July	1949
A/AC.26/41/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the resolution concerning the withdrawal of the Delegation of El Salvador from the Commission	21 July	1949
A/AC.26/42	Report to the General Assembly	27 July	1949
A/AC.26/43	Annexes to the report to the General Assembly	28 July	1949

4. WORKING PAPERS

A/AC.26/W.1	Resolution 195 (III) of the General Assembly adopted 12 December 1948	24 January	1949
A/AC.26/W.2	Provisional rules of procedure	7 February	1949
A/AC.26/W.3	Korean-Aid Agreement, agreement on aid between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea	7 February	1949
A/AC.26/W.4	Application of the Republic of Korea for admission to membership	8 February	1949
A/AC.26/W.5	Texts of messages and address delivered on the occasion of the mass meeting for welcoming the members of the Commission	14 February	1949
A/AC.26/W.6	Notes on interview between members of the Commission and the Liaison Committee appointed by the Korean Government	17 February	1949
A/AC.26/W.7	Text of speech of Mr. Jamieson, Chairman of the Commission, before the Korean National Assembly	22 February	1949
A/AC.26/W.8	Addresses of welcome by Mr. Sin Ik Hi, Chairman of Korean National Assembly	25 February	1949
A/AC.26/W.9	Letter from Chairman of the Liaison Committee to the Principal Secretary	25 February	1949
A/AC.26/W.10	Terms of office of the Chairmen	9 March	1949
A/AC.26/W.10/Rev.1	Terms of office of the Chairmen	31 March	1949
A/AC.26/W.11	Materials bearing on the interpretation of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948	23 March	1949
A/AC.26/W.12	Report of the drafting group on the Press questionnaire	21 April	1949
A/AC.26/W.13	Communications from Dr. Chough Pyung Ok, Personal Representative of President Rhee, to the heads of certain Permanent Delegations to the United Nations	4 May	1949
A/AC.26/W.14	Korean Press Law	23 June	1949
A/AC.26/W.15	National Security Law—Law No. 10 of 1 December 1948	24 June	1949
A/AC.26/W.16	Korean broadcasts by the Commission (note by the Secretariat)	2 July	1949

4. WORKING PAPERS (*continued*)

A/AC.26/W.16/Rev.1	Korean broadcasts by the Commission, draft of broadcast	7 July	1949
A/AC.26/W.16/Rev.1/Add.1	Korean broadcasts by the Commission, exchange of communications between the Principal Secretary and Clarence Ryee, Director of the Office of Public Information of the Republic of Korea	26 July	1949
A/AC.26/W.17	Text of the Manifesto of "The Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification for the Fatherland"	12 July	1949
A/AC.26/W.18	Press interview with a former lieutenant of the "People's Army of North Korea"	18 July	1949
A/AC.26/W.19	Arrest of newspapermen covering the Commission activities, communication from Dr. Anup Singh, Representative of India	19 July	1949
A/AC.26/W.19/Add.1	Arrest of newspapermen covering the Commission activities, communication from Miss Moh Youn Sook, Chief Liaison Committee to the United Nations Commission	20 July	1949
A/AC.26/W.19/Add.2	Arrest of newspapermen covering the Commission activities, communication from Mr. Clarence C. Ryee, Director, Office of Public Information	21 July	1949

5. COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED FROM INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

A/AC.26/NC.1	Communication from the Chairman of the Han Kook Independence Party to the Commission	10 February	1949
A/AC.26/NC.2	Communication from Kim Yak Soo, Vice-President of the National Assembly, and members of the Assembly to the Commission	19 March	1949
A/AC.26/NC.3	Communication from the Korean Labour and Farmer Party to the Commission, statement regarding unification	22 March	1949
A/AC.26/NC.4	Communication from the Tai Han Chung Nyon Tan (Korean Youth Corps) to the Commission	22 March	1949
A/AC.26/NC.5	List of communications from organizations and individuals (received during the period 1 February-31 March 1949)	7 April	1949
A/AC.26/NC.5/Add.1	List of communications from organizations and individuals (received during the period 1 April-30 June 1949)	7 July	1949
A/AC.26/NC.6	Communication from Shin Haing Sik, Representative of Korea Public Opinion Investigation Association, to the Chairman of the Commission	7 May	1949
A/AC.26/NC.7	Communication from Kim Yak Soo, Vice-President of the National Assembly, concerning establishment of military missions in Korea	21 June	1949
A/AC.26/NC.7/Add.1	Communication from Kim Dong Won, Vice-President of the National Assembly, concerning establishment of military missions in Korea	22 June	1949
A/AC.26/NC.8	Communication to the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Anup Singh, from political and social organizations, concerning withdrawal of occupation forces	24 June	1949
A/AC.26/NC.9	Communication from the mass meeting of northerners in South Korea to the Commission presenting a resolution adopted at the mass meeting	30 June	1949
A/AC.26/NC.10	Communication to the Commission from the mass meeting held on 1 July 1949 under the auspices of the Korean Labourers Federation and the Korean Farmers Federation presenting a message and resolution adopted at that meeting	4 July	1949

5. COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED FROM INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS (continued)

A/AC.26/NC.11	Communication to the Commission from the mass meeting of Korean Christians concerned with the national safety	15 July	1949
A/AC.26/NC.12	Arrest of newspapermen covering the Commission activities, communication from Lee Insoo, editor in chief of the <i>Seoul Times</i> to the Commission	20 July	1949
A/AC.26/NC.13	Communications to the Commission from the Korean Youth Corps and the Korean Students mass meeting for strengthening national defence	20 July	1949

6. INFORMATION PAPERS

A/AC.26/Inf.1	Korean officials	4 February	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.2	Delegations to the Commission	8 February	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.2/Rev.1	Delegations to the Commission	31 March	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.3	Secretariat of the Commission	8 February	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.3/Rev.1	Secretariat of the Commission	16 February	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.3/Rev.2	Secretariat of the Commission	12 March	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.3/Rev.3	Secretariat of the Commission	12 March	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.3/Rev.4	Secretariat of the Commission	31 March	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.2/Rev.2	Delegations to the Commission	16 May	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.2/Rev.2/Corr.1	Delegations to the Commission	17 May	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.2/Rev.3	Delegations to the Commission	6 July	1949
A/AC.26/Inf.3/Rev.5	Secretariat of the Commission	6 July	1949

7. SUB-COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS

(a) SUB-COMMITTEE I

A/AC.26/SC.1/1	Summary record of interview with the President of the Republic of Korea and Cabinet members	11 February	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/2	Report and recommendations	16 February	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/2/Rev.1	Report and recommendations, contact with North Korea	17 February	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/3	Report and recommendations	25 February	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/4	Report of Sub-Committee I, position of the Commission in relation to the Government of Korea	28 February	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/4/Rev.1	Position of the Commission in relation to the Government of Korea	2 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/5	Personalities to be heard and main topics of discussion	2 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/6	Hearing of Lee Bum Suk, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence	10 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/6/Corr.1	Corrigendum to A/AC.26/SC.1/6	19 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/7	Communication with North Korea	9 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/8	Hearing of Kim Yak Soo, Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly	11 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/9	Hearing of Pak Kun Oong, former member of the Interim Legislative Assembly	16 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/10	Hearing of Miss Louise Yim, Minister of Commerce and Industry	17 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/11	Suggested course of action in contacting North Korea	17 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/11/Corr.1	Corrigendum to A/AC.26/SC.1/11	19 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/12	Further list of persons to be heard	21 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/13	Hearing of Dr. A. C. Bunce, Chief of Korean Mission, United States Economic Co-operation Administration	11 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/14	Further list of persons to be heard and visits to industrial areas	11 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/15	Hearing of Major-General Lee Eung Jun	13 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/16	Hearing of Kim To Yeun, Minister of Finance	15 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/17	Hearing of Kimm Kiusic, Chairman, National Independence Federation	23 April	1949

(a) SUB-COMMITTEE I (continued)

A/AC.26/SC.1/18	Hearing of Kim Pyang Hoi, Representative of Cholla Namdo, National Assembly	24 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/19	Visits to industrial establishments (Seoul-Yongdung Po-Inchon area)	29 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/20	Hearing of Sul Eui Sik, publisher of <i>Sai Han Minbo</i>	4 May	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/21	Hearing of Kim Pyung Yen, Governor of Pyongan-Namdo Province (North Korea)	7 May	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/22	Report: persons to be heard and contact with North Korea	16 May	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/23	Letter from S. Y. Kim, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Secretary of Sub-Committee I, concerning legal trade and exchange of mail between the south and the north	1 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/24	Hearing of Kim Koo	6 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/25	Hearing of Kwon Yun Ho, preacher: Shi Chun Kyo (Presbyterian group of Korea)	6 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/26	Hearing of General Lee Chun Chun (Chi Tae Hyung), member of the National Assembly	8 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/27	Report: broadcast to North Korea; Press release regarding hearings	9 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/28	Summary of suggestions and opinions regarding unification of Korea and removal of economic and other barriers	14 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/29	Report concerning trips to be made	17 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/30	Final report to the Commission (period 9 February-24 June 1949)	25 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/30/Rev.1	Final report to the Commission (period 9 February-30 June 1949)	6 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/31	Report of Sub-Committee I	18 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.1/31/Annex II/Rev.1	Revised draft of Annex II of the report of Sub-Committee I	21 July	1949

(b) SUB-COMMITTEE II

A/AC.26/SC.2/1	Report and recommendations	17 February	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/1/Rev.1	Report and recommendations	22 February	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/2	Hearing of Sin Ik Hi, President of the National Assembly	1 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/3	Hearings of Yoo Chin O and L. G. Paik	7 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/4	Hearing of Yun Chi Yung, former Minister of the Interior	11 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/5	Chronology of important developments in Korea from 15 August 1948 to 31 January 1949	14 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/5/Corr.1	Corrigendum to A/AC.26/SC.2/5	17 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/6	Hearing of An Chai Hong, formerly Civil Administrator of the Interim Government	17 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/7	Further list of persons to be heard and trips to the provinces	17 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/8	Hearing of Bishop Ro, Vicar Apostolic of Seoul	25 March	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/9	Hearing of Kim Bup Rin, President of Dong Kook University	2 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/10	Hearing of Kim Song Soo, member of the Supreme Council of the Democratic Nationalist Party	5 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/11	Hearing of Cho So Ang, Chairman of the Socialist Party	5 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/12	Hearing of Colonel B. C. Limb, Minister of Foreign Affairs	8 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/12/Corr.1	Corrigendum to A/AC.26/SC.2/12	14 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/13	Hearing of Kim Hyo Suk, Minister of the Interior	19 April	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/14	Summary and analysis of hearings	9 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/15	Report on trips to the Provinces affected by recent disturbances	9 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.2/16	Final report to the Commission	18 June	1949

(c) *ad hoc* COMMITTEE

A/AC.26/SC.3/1	Report of the <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee regarding the access of Koreans to the Commission	22 February	1949
A/AC.26/SC.3/2	Report of the <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee of the Whole on the question of observer teams	1 June	1949

(d) SUB-COMMITTEE III

A/AC.26/SC.4/1	Report and recommendations	16 June	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/2	First progress report	2 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/3	Summary record of 1st meeting	7 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/4	Summary record of 2nd meeting	7 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/5	Summary record of 3rd meeting	7 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/6	Summary record of 4th meeting	8 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/6/Corr.1	Corrigendum to the summary record of the 4th meeting	11 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/7	Summary record of 5th meeting	7 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/8	Summary record of 6th meeting	7 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/9	Communications from Brigadier General W. L. Roberts concerning withdrawal of United States occupation forces	7 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/10	Communication to the Chairman of Sub-Committee III from the Ambassador of the United States concerning withdrawal of US troops	11 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/11	Communication dated 16 July 1949 to the Chairman of Sub-Committee III from Chief, United States Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea	20 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/12	Communication under date of 25 July 1949 from the Ambassador of the United States to the Chairman of Sub-Committee III	26 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/13	Second progress report	27 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/14	Meeting with U.S. Ambassador Muccio	28 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/15	Notes on observation of United States troop embarkation at Inchon, 21 June 1949	8 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/16	Notes on observation of United States troop embarkation at Inchon, 29 June 1949	8 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/17	Notes on inspection of former USAFIK installations at Camp Sobingo-Youngsan area, 30 June 1949	8 July	1949
A/AC.26/SC.4/18	Notes on inspection of Ascom-Inchon area, 1 July 1949	8 July	1949

8. PRESS RELEASES

Number			
1 ⁸⁰	Arrival of the advance party and objectives of the Commission	29 January	1949
1, Corr.1	Corrigendum to the above Press release	29 January	1949
2	First meeting of the Commission	2 February	1949
3	First public meeting of the Commission	12 February	1949
4	Regarding resolution on access of Koreans to the Commission, and first field trip	17 February	1949
5	Request to the Secretary-General to transmit to the USSR a message regarding contact with North Korea	22 February	1949
6	Misquotation of remarks of the Press Officer concerning "representative government"	28 February	1949
7	Resolution concerning social functions	1 March	1949
8	Arrival of the Delegate from El Salvador	26 March	1949
9	Message of congratulation addressed by the Chairman to President Rhee on his 75th birthday	28 March	1949
10	Trips to Cheju Do and Cholla Namdo	21 April	1949
11	Press questionnaire	23 April	1949

⁸⁰ This first Press release was prepared at Lake Success and the advance party brought it. A few corrections were subsequently made and a corrigendum released.

8. PRESS RELEASES (*continued*)

<i>Number</i>			
12	Trip to Cheju Do	29 April	1949
13	Address by the Chairman at the Capitol ceremony on the first anniversary of the general elections	10 May	1949
14	Trip of Chairman and Principal Secretary to scene of disturbances at 38th parallel	10 May	1949
15	Text of address by the Chairman at the mass meeting on the first anniversary of the general elections	11 May	1949
16	Trip to Cheju Do	17 May	1949
17	Contact with the north: letter to Kim Il Sung	19 May	1949
18	Resolution concerning Commission's responsibility toward withdrawal of occupying forces under the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948	24 May	1949
19	Concerning hearing with Ambassador Muccio and General Roberts	9 June	1949
20	Resolution concerning observation of withdrawal of US occupation forces and establishment of a sub-committee in this respect	13 June	1949
21	Sub-Committee I welcomes suggestions concerning unification	13 June	1949
22	Visit to Chonan to observe by-election of 10 June 1949	14 June	1949
23	Visits to Inchon and Choonchon and incident at Choonchon	16 June	1949
24	Creation and powers of Sub-Committee III	20 June	1949
25	Trip to Ongjin area	28 June	1949
26	Letters of condolence to President Rhee and Major Kim regarding assassination of Kim Koo	28 June	1949
27	Broadcast of the Chairman of the Commission to the north	29 June	1949
28	Last embarkation of American occupation forces	30 June	1949
29	Address of the Chairman of the Commission at the funeral services for Kim Koo	5 July	1949
30	Concerning recommendations of Sub-Committee I regarding continuation of its work, adopted at the 39th meeting of the Commission	9 July	1949
31	Letter to the Secretary-General enclosing <i>aide memoire</i> concerning the withdrawal of occupation forces	13 July	1949
32	Withdrawal from the Commission of the Delegation of El Salvador	21 July	1949
33	Arrest of newspapermen assigned to the Commission and suspension of Press conferences	22 July	1949
34	Derogatory remarks in the National Assembly about members of the Commission	25 July	1949
35	Resolution adopted by the Commission concerning the withdrawal of the Delegation of El Salvador		
36	Delegation of El Salvador rejoined the Commission	26 July	1949
37	Completion of withdrawal of United States occupation forces, observed and verified by the Commission	27 July	1949
38	Completion of the report to the General Assembly	28 July	1949